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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

CODY JAMES FORTIN,
Supreme Court Case No. 43334
Petitioner-Appellant,
vs.
STATE OF IDAHO,
Respondent.

CLERK'S RECORD ON APPEAL

Appeal from the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District, in and for the County of Ada.

HONORABLE PATRICK H. OWEN

STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER

LAWRENCE G. WASDEN

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

ATTORNEY FOR RESPONDENT

BOISE, IDAHO

BOISE, IDAHO

000001

Date: 8/12/2015

Fourth Judicial District Court - Ada County

Time: 08:21 AM

ROA Report

Page 1 of 3

User: TCWEGEKE

Case: CV-PC-2013-08285 Current Judge: Patrick H. Owen
Cody J Fortin, Plaintiff vs State Of Idaho, Defendant

Cody J Fortin, Plaintiff vs State Of Idaho, Defendant
Judge

Date

Code

User

5/7/2013

NCPC

CCNELSRF

New Case Filed - Post Conviction Relief

District Court Clerk

CHGA

CCNELSRF

Judge Change: Administrative

Patrick H. Owen

PETN

CCNELSRF

Petition and Affidavit for Post Conviction Relief

Patrick H. Owen

AFFD

CCNELSRF

Affidavit in Support of Petition and Affidavit for
Post Conviction Relief

Patrick H. Owen

MOTN

CCNELSRF

Verified Motion for Waiver of Costs

Patrick H. Owen

MOTN

CCNELSRF

Motion for Appointment of Counsel

Patrick H. Owen

MOTN

CCNELSRF

Motion for the Release of PSI

Patrick H. Owen

MOTN

CCNELSRF

Motion for Judicial Notice

Patrick H. Owen

CERT

CCNELSRF

Certificate Of Mailing

Patrick H. Owen

5/8/2013

PROS

PRFISCKD

Prosecutor assigned Jonathan M Medema

Patrick H. Owen

5/24/2013

ANSW

CCREIDMA

Answer - Jonathan M Medema 5623 forSt of
Idaho

Patrick H. Owen

MOTN

CCREIDMA

Motion To Take Judicial Notice

Patrick H. Owen

MOTN

CCREIDMA

Motion for Summary Disposition

Patrick H. Owen

MISC

CCREIDMA

Brief In Support of Motion For Summary
Disposition

Patrick H. Owen

NOTC

CCREIDMA

Notice of Hearing (Fortin)

Patrick H. Owen

MOTN

CCNELSRF

Motion for Extension of Time To Respond to
Summary Judgment and to Vacate the June 8th
2013 Hearing on the Same States Motion

Patrick H. Owen

AFSM

CCNELSRF

Affidavit In Support Of Motion for Extension of
Time To Respond to Summary Judgment and to
Vacate the June 8th 2013 Hearing on the Same
States Motion

Patrick H. Owen

MEMO

CCNELSRF

Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support Patrick H. Owen
of a Motion for Extension of Time To Respond to
Summary Judgment and to Vacate the June 8th
2013 Hearing on the Same States Motion

6/10/2013

ORDR

DCJOHNSI

Order Granting Motion for Appointment of Counse Patrick H. Owen

6/25/2013

HRSC

CCHEATJL

Notice Of Hearing Scheduled (Motion
07/30/2013 03:00 PM) Motion For Summary
Dismissal

7/2/2013

MEMO

CCHUNTAM

Memorandum Decision and Order re:
Patrick H. Owen
Appointment of Counsel, Waiver of Filing Fees,
Release of the Pre-Sentence Report, and Judicial
Notice of Underlying Flies

7/19/2013

MOTN

CCHOLMEE

Motion for Stay of Proceedings and For Leave to
Amend Petition

Patrick H. Owen

MOTN

CCJOHNLE

Motion to Release PSI

Patrick H. Owen

NOHG

CCVIDASL

Notice Of Hearing

Patrick H. Owen

HRSC

CCVIDASL

Hearing Scheduled (Motion 09/17/2013 03:00
PM) Motion for Summary Dismissal and Motion
to Take Judicial Notice

Patrick H. Owen

6/6/2013

7/29/2013

Patrick H. Owen
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ROA Report

Page 2 of 3
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Case: CV-PC-2013-08285 Current Judge: Patrick H. Owen
Cody J Fortin, Plaintiff vs State Of Idaho, Defendant

Cody J Fortin, Plaintiff vs State Of Idaho, Defendant
Date

Code :

User

7/30/2013

HRVC

CCHUNTAM

Hearing result for Motion scheduled on
Patrick H. Owen
07/30/2013 03:00 PM: Hearing Vacated Motion
For Summary Dismissal

8/23/2013

ORDR

DCJOHNSI

Order Releasing PSI

Patrick H. Owen

ORDR

DCJOHNSI

Order Granting Stay and for Leave to Amend
Petition

Patrick H. Owen

9/16/2013

HRVC

CCHUNTAM

Hearing result for Motion scheduled on
Patrick H. Owen
09/17/2013 03:00 PM: Hearing Vacated Motion
for Summary Dismissal and Motion to Take
Judicial Notice

12/17/2013

NOTC

CCJOHNLE

Notice of Scheduling Conference Under IRCP
16(a) and 16(b)

Patrick H. Owen

6/17/2014

NOTC

DCJOHNSI

Notice of Status Conf

Patrick H. Owen

HRSC

DCJOHNSI

Hearing Scheduled (Status 06/25/2014 03:00

Patrick H. Owen

Judge

PM)
6/23/2014

CONT

DCJOHNSI

7/9/2014

DCHH

DCJOHNSI

Continued (Status 07/09/2014 03:00 PM)

Patrick H. Owen

Hearing result for Status scheduled on

Patrick H. Owen

07/09/2014 03:00 PM: District Court Hearing Hel<
Court Reporter: redlich
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing
estimated:50

11/3/2014

NOHG

CCSCOTDL

Notice Of Hearing (Status Conference)(11-19-14

Patrick H. Owen

@3PM)
HRSC

CCSCOTDL

Hearing Scheduled (Status Conference
11/19/2014 03:00 PM)

DCHH

DCJOHNSI

Hearing result for Status Conference scheduled
Patrick H. Owen
on 11/19/2014 03:00 PM: District Court Hearing
Held
Court Reporter: redlich
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing
estimated:50

HRSC

DCJOHNSI

Hearing Scheduled (Review Hearing
01/21/2015 03:00 PM)

1/21/2015

DCHH

DCJOHNSI

'

Hearing result for Review Hearing scheduled on Patrick H. Owen
01/21/2015 03:00 PM: District Court Hearing Hel<
Court Reporter: redlich
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing
estimated:50

NOTH

CCRADTER

Notice Of Hearing

Patrick H. Owen

HRSC

CCRADTER

Hearing Scheduled (Motion for Summary
Judgment 03/17/2015 03:00 PM)

Patrick H. Owen

2/10/2015

MEMO

CCHEATJL

Memorandum In Response To State's Motion For Patrick H. Owen
Summary Judgment

2/26/2015

MEMO

CCMARTJD

Reply Memorandum Regarding Motion for
Summary Disposition

11/19/2014

2/9/2015

Patrick H. Owen

Patrick H. Owen

Patrick H. Owen
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Case: CV-PC-2013-08285 Current Judge: Patrick H. Owen
Cody J Fortin, Plaintiff vs State Of Idaho, Defendant

Cody J Fortin, Plaintiff vs State Of Idaho, Defendant
Date

Code .

User

3/17/2015

DCHH

DCJOHNSI

Hearing result for Motion for Summary Judgment Patrick H. Owen
scheduled on 03/17/2015 03:00 PM: District
Court Hearing Held
Court Reporter: redlich
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing
estimated:50

5/12/2015

MEMO

DCJOHNSI

Memorandum Decision and Order Granting
Motion for Summary Disposition

Patrick H. Owen

6/12/2015

JDMT

DCJOHNSI

Judgment

Patrick H. Owen

CDIS

DCJOHNSI

Civil Disposition entered for: State Of Idaho,
Other Party; Fortin, Cody J, Subject. Filing date:

Patrick H. Owen

Judge

6/12/2015

STAT

DCJOHNSI

STATUS CHANGED: Closed

Patrick H. Owen

6/15/2015

NOTA

CCATKIFT

NOTICE OF APPEAL

Patrick H. Owen

6/18/2015

ORDR

DCJOHNSI

Order Appointing SAPD

Patrick H. Owen

8/11/2015

NOTC

TCWEGEKE

Notice of Transcript Lodged - Supreme Court No. Patrick H. Owen
43334
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CODY J. FORTIN # 72953
I.C.C. K Pod 216-B
Post Office Box 70010
Boise, Idaho 83707
Petitioner pro se

MAY O7 2013
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, C1erk
ly ri.tc Nf!UmN
~l!fY

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT

8 It
13182 "

OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
CODY J. FORTIN,

)
)
)

Petitioner,

THE STATE OF IDAHO,

_______________

p-

c

Civil Case N o . - - - - - - - District Court No. CR-FE-2009-19383

)
)

-vs-

Respondent.

r\J

\.I

)
)
)

.

;

PETITION' FOR POST
CONVICTION RELIEF

)
)

STATE OF IDAHO

)
: ss.
The County of ADA )

COMES NOW, CODY J. FORTIN, petitioner prose, in the above entitled cause; and,
who, respectfully presents this application for post conviction relief, based upon the law and
facts of the case, those grounds and causes more fully explained herein and after, as well as
the petitioner's affidavit in support hereof; said affidavit being attached hereto, and by this
reference, incorporated herein as though quoted in its respective entirety:

I.
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
A.

Here, the applicant brings before the Court a collateral attack upon the findings of

guilt by a jury of his peers, subsequent sentencing, and those errors committed at the direct
appellate stage; alleging, that each is the direct result of ineffective assistance of counsel(s),
and, which individually and/or collectively require relief.

INITIAL APPLICATION FOR POST CONVICTION RELIEF - Page 1 of 8.
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B.

Moreover, Notice is hereby provided to the Court and opposing parties, pursuant to

I.C. 119-4903, that the applicant lacks both the complete record and legal expertise needed
to properly prepare and present all the applicable issues or to attach the relevant portions of
the case record.
For these reasons alone, notice is being given that further amendment and discovery
will no doubt be required.
II.

JURISDICTION
A.

Petitioner is currently incarcerated within the Idaho Department of Corrections

(IDOC), and housed at the Idaho Correctional Center (ICC), South of Boise, pursuant to a
finding of guilty on charges of Aggravated Battery with the use of a deadly weapon in the
commission of crime, where he is serving a unified term of twenty five years (25), with a
minimum period of confinement of twelve (12) years, consecutive to a term of five (5) years
fixed, with fifteen (15) indeterminate on charges of Assault and Battery on Certain Personnel,
enhanced for the Use of Deadly Weapon handed down in a companion case.
Those findings of guilt and sentencing complained of herein were imposed by the
Honorable Duff D. McKee and Honorable Patrick Owen, in criminal case CR-FE-2009-19383,
in a Judgment of Conviction and Commitment filed on August

6th

2010, in the Fourth

Judicial District Court, County of Ada, State of Idaho.
B.

This petition challenges the constitutionality of those same convictions and sentences,

charging that there exists evidence of material facts and law, not previously presented nor
heard, which have abrogated the rights of the applicant guaranteed under the applicable
portions of the United States and Idaho State Constitutions, and thus require the reversal of
the petitioner's convictions or, at the very least, resentencing.

C.

Accordingly, jurisdiction is proper in this matter pursuant to Idaho Code 19-4901 et

seq., and Rule 57 of the Idaho Criminal Rules.

Furthermore, venue in these proceedings is

appropriately before this Court, since the crime( s) alleged occurred within Ada County.

INITIAL APPLICATION FOR POST CONVICTION RELIBF - Page 2 of 8.
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III.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND PRIOR PROCEEDINGS
A.

On October

13th

2009 while attending a party at a private residence the petitioner and

another individual, named Darryl Shayler, 1 begin arguing, which eventually led to a physical
confrontation. Sometime during that initial mutual combat Darryl received what appeared to
be knife inflected wounds in the neck and shoulder. No one testified to seeing the petitioner
actually inflect those wounds including Shayler. Within minutes a second confrontation took
place outside the home, where Shayler alleged Fortin cut him across face and left the scene.
The following day the petitioner was arrested in his girlfriend's driveway by
uniformed and plainclothes detectives on charges of Aggravated Battery and Use of Deadly
Weapon, on Shayler.

Reports of the exact events that transpired before the petitioner was

taken into custody on October

14th

2009 vary depending upon the teller of the tale. For the

moment it is sufficient to say that an information was eventually handed down charging
Fortin with assault with a dangerous weapon (a knife) on the prior day, and, assault on a
police officer, with a dangerous weapon (the vehicle) on October
B.

14th

2009.

At his video arraignment, bond and a date for the preliminary hearing were set, and,

the office of the Ada County Public Defender was appointed to represent the petitioner.
Within days, appointed counsel approached Fortin with a deal offered by the
prosecutor, the terms of which were as follows: In consideration for pleas of guilty to assault
on the civilian and eluding a police officer, Fortin would be sentenced on those crimes to five
(5) fixed, fifteen (15) indeterminate and zero (0) fixed, five (5) years indeterminate
respectively; and, the state would drop both weapon enhancements and the assault on the
police officer.

C.

Fortin's parents retained a private attorney on his behalf and matters changed: An

amended complaint was filed, further amended and the charges and trials for the events of
October 13th and 14th separated at the request of Fortin's new counsel and against his
expressed wishes.

INITIAL APPLICATION FOR POST CONVICTION RELIBF - Page 3 of 8.
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D.

Following a series of motions and hearings held on these matters, Fortin proceeded to

trial on the separated charges and was found guilty by jury in what was now being designated
as CR-FE-09-19383.

A timely appeal was filed in that matter by conflict counsel, Greg

Silvey, and an unpublished decision was handed down under Idaho Court of Appeals Docket
No. 38069 on April 30, 2012 affirming the conviction; subsequently a petition for review was
denied and a final remittitur issued May 22, 2012.
Here, ends the initial statement of the case and the course of the prior proceedings.
IV.

INITIAL CAUSES OF ACTION
WHETHER THE INDIVIDUAL AND/OR CUMULATIVE ACTIONS AND INACTIONS
OF THE PETITIONER'S ATTORNEYS AT THE INVESTIGATIVE, ENTRY OF PLEA, TRIAL,
SENTENCING AND DIRECT APPEAL STAGES OF THE UNDERLYING PROCEEDINGS
OONSTITUTE INSUFFICIENT, UNSUFFICIENT, AND INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF
COUNSEL(S) RESULTING IN THE ABROGATION OF THE PETITIONER'S RIGHTS UNDER
THE FIFTH, SIXTH AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS TO THE UNITED STATES
OONSTITUTION, AS WELL AS THOSE SAME GUARANTEES GRANTED UNDER ARTICLE
I, SECTION 13 AND OTHER PORTIONS OF THE IDAHO STATE OONSTITUTION???
1.
The individual and/or collective failures, actions and inactions of Fortin's retained
A.

private trial attorney and appointed direct appeal counsel( s) - Charles Crafts and Greg Silvey,
respectively - at the investigative, entry of plea, trial, sentencing and direct appeal stages of
criminal case CR-FE-2009-19383 have denied the petitioner his state and federal
constitutional rights to sufficient and effective assistance of counsel( s) at each of the
foregoing stages of these proceedings for those reasons following, inter a1ia:
2.

At the time of trial counsel's paid retention a plea bargain was on the table which

would have resulted in a maximum term of imprisonment of fifteen (15) years on two felony
convictions with concurrently imposed sentences in consideration for pleas of guilty.
Counsel's advice to separate the charges and proceed to trial on each, instead, was clearly a
matter of substandard performance. Particularly, considering Trial counsel failed to inform
his client that the separation of the charges and his subsequent entries of pleas would subject

INITIAL APPLICATION FOR. POST CONVICTION RELIEF - Page 4 of 8.
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him to a sentencing where any argument for concurrent terms under the doctrine of a
common course of conduct and scheme would be strictly discretionary on the part of the
court, and were not a part of any plea bargain.that separation was against the express wishes
of the petitioner.2 Prejudice is convincingly apparent in the result: Fortin, instead, received
consecutive terms of five years (5) fixed, with fifteen (15) indeterminate and twelve (12)
years fixed followed by thirteen (13) years indeterminate.

A decision to accept the plea

bargain would have guaranteed less time and fewer convictions; while simply not separating
the trials would have avoided a consecutive sentencing scheme.
The only person who benefited from the foregoing decisions to proceed and separate
the trials was counsel.
3.

During the investigative and trial stages the petitioner alleges the following individual

and cummulative errors were perpretrated by this same attorney:

a.

Counsel's failure to file a motion in limine regarding Forin's alleged gang

affiliation, or in the alternative to move for an immediate mistrial, resulted in the jury
hearing the petitioner was a gang member and having to depend upon a judicial instruction to
unring that bell. This decision was neither tactical nor strategic, but rather a failure to
properly investigate or to object.
b.

Trial counsel's failure to conduct a pretrial interview and to subpoena as a

defense witness, Casey Smith, resulted in the trial judge's refusal to allow counsel to recall
this witness, where her earlier testimony could have been impeached by her statements to
police closer to the time of the incident, was prejudicial and a result of neither strategic or
tactical choice, but substandard performance with a prejudicial result.
c.

When counsel failed to object to the admission of flight evidence during trial

predicated upon relevance as criticized by the Unpublished Opinion of the Idaho Court of
Appeals.3
d.

This same counsel should have objected to the wording of the verdict form

provided to the jury during deliberations; a form whose format destroyed the defendant's

INITIAL APPLICATION FOR. POST OONVICTION RELffiF - Page 5 of 8.
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presumption of innocence by listing seven possibilities of guilt before the entitled first
consideration of not guilty. In its presented form that "instruction" to the jury denied the
defendant his equal protection and due process rights by removing the presumption of
innocence from the minds of jury prior to and during deliberations.
e.

Despite being requested to file a Rule 35 and agreeing to do so retained

counsel failed to submit that filing or to inform his client he didn't intend to keep this
commitment.
4.

It was substandard performance and prejudicial when appellate counsel failed to

federalize any issues raised on direct appeal, even though counsel was noticed by his client of
the omission ( See: Appendice "A"included herewith); as well as the fact that same attorney
failed to object to record that contains a complete reiteration of the Friday, February 4, 2011
restitution hearing that credits the spoken language to the opposite party speaking.

Said

otherwise, all of the prosecutors remarks are credited to defense counsel and vice versa. 4

1
2

Darryl Shayler Is spelled Darryl Shaylor in some documents and Shayler in others.
See: Fortin's Affidavit in Support of Post Conviction Relief, • 7-9, included herewith

and incorporated hereby, in this regard.
3

See: State of Idaho v. Fortin, 2012 Unpublished Opinion No. 454 Page 3 footnote 1.

See: Appendice "A" included herewith and herein, in this regard.
4
T. Transcript Feb. 4, 2011 Page 8 beginning at line and continuing thereafter.

INITIAL APPLICATION FOR POST CONVICTION RELIEF - Page 6 of 8.
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VI.
CONCLUSION
A.

Make no mistake this is a case that centers around "he said, she said" evidence. Small

differences in testimony and other evidence would have huge consequences in the result:
Regardless:
B.

The foregoing material facts and circumstances are sufficient to warrant appointment

of counsel, judicial notice of the entire underlying record(s), and an evidentiary hearing on
these and any additional issues brought to light following the court's appointed counsel or the
petitioner being granted possession of the record. Specific relief is sought as follows:

VII
PRAYER FOR RELIEF
WHEREFORE, the petitioner respectfully moves this Court to enter an Order
providing the following:
1.

ACCEPTANCE OF JURISDICTION and VENUE in these proceedings, with normal

advancement upon the Court's calendar:
2.

THAT JUDICIAL NOTICE is to be taken of the entire underlying record(s), pursuant

to LR.E. 201, in district court number CR-FE-2009-19383, Court of Appeals Docket No.
38069, as well as those same records found in companion case CR-2009-0019475, and:
3.

APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL, pursuant to I.C. 19-4904 and 19-852;

4.

THAT DIRECTS the Clerk to serve the respondent a conformed copy of this filing,

pursuant to LC. 19-4902; thus REQUIRING the respondent to provide an Answer, as well as
those relevant portions of the record within thirty (30) days of receipt thereof, pursuant to

LC. 19-4906(a).
5.

THAT, following the passing of an adequate amount of time for the parties to

prepare, an evidentiary hearing occur; and,
6.

THAT, in the event, that the preponderance of evidence submitted eventually

demonstrates that the petitioner has suffered from ineffective assistance of counsel under the

INITIAL APPLICATION FOR POST CONVICTION RELIEF - Page 7 of 8.
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law and in view of the facts submitted, that petitioner's findings of guilty be set aside and/or
the subsequent sentences be modified and/or set aside: and/or,
7.

AND, for any additional relief the Court may deem necessary or proper under these

circumstances.

DATED this

3

day of MAY 2013.
Respectfully submitted,

~IN
Petitioner pro se

VIII.
VERIFICATION
I, DO HEREBY CERTIFY and AFFIRM that I am the petitioner in the foregoing
application for post conviction relief, and; that I have read the contents thereof in their
entirety, and, that the facts contained therein are true and correct to the best of my
knowledge and belief in all regards.

DATED this

3- day of MAY 2013.

/
Petitioner-Affiant pro se

SUBSCRIBED and SWORN to before me, a Notary Public, this

~--

J

~J
day o

- .

., ' --~~~:::---i
JAMES G. OUINN
;
·'

***

SEAL

***

NOTARY PUBLIC
STATE OF 11.lAHO

L
'

Commission Expires: t,1lQI 13!

INITIAL APPLICATION FOR POST CONVICTION RELIEF - Page 8 of 8.
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December ist 2011
CODY J. FORTIN # 72953
I.C.C. K Pod 211-A
Post Office Box 70010
Boise, Idaho 83707

COPY !!!
MR. GREG SILVEY

Attorney at Law
Post Office Box 565
Star, Idaho 83669
RE:

State of Idaho v. Cody J. Fortin, Docket No. 38069:

Initial Appellant's Brief and Other Matters.
Dear Mr. Silvey:
I very much appreciate the work you put into my initial brief on direct appeal and include my
thanks for the copy you forwarded.
For some time now I've attempted to contact you through your office, unsuccessfully. While
I understand your time is limited, would you be good enough to answer my single concern at
this point in the proceedings: Do you feel comfortable that none of the issues presented on
my direct appeal warrant have been federalized to protect my possible eventual appeal to the
United States federal courts?
Please be kind enough to provide me a copy of the State's response; and, should you elect to
file a reply brief, a copy of that filing. Do you anticipate oral argument in these matters?
Pending your response, I wish you well and the best over the coming Holidays.

Sincerely,-#
Cody J. Fortin
c:

file

APPENDICE •A•
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•
CODY J. FORTIN# 72953
I.C.C. K Pod 216-B
Post Office Box 70010
Boise, Idaho 83707

N~.
AJ.1 (

't Jr
~::J
f'it.~1. ____

Petitioner pro se

MAY D7 2013
CHAISTOPHER D. RICH, C1erk
1y rue Nl!L!ON
EM!PUTY

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
CODY J. FORTIN,

)

Petitioner,
-vs-

)
)
)
)
)

THE STATE OF IDAHO,

_______________
Respondent.

STATE OF IDAHO

)
)
)
)

r. \t PC

. u eas N
CIV
e O. (!{/ _-=:c--:~...,,-,,.-:-- ,,-~~

District Court No. CR-FE-2009-193 83
AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT
OF PETITION FOR POST
CONVICTION RELIEF

)

: ss.
The County of ADA )

n

,._ ;-. r.
.....

;

{ - - _ . , _ . . - - . --1

'·

.

\..._/

'
~ ~.~

\ , , , : : ~..; 'S;

·,:_ -

~

'

i'. '.

-~.

··'

CODY J. FORTIN, after first being duly sworn upon his oath, deposes and says:
1.

AFFIANT is the petitioner pro se in the above encaptioned matter, and brings this

application for post conviction relief in good faith, absent any purpose to delay or annoy:
2.

AFFIANT has only a limited education, is financially indigent, and has no knowledge

of case law and legal procedure; as a point of fact, all of these filings have been prepared by
a former inmate law clerk, who may or may not be able to continue to aide YOUR AFFIANT
since the rules that govern such assistance are growing increasingly more restrictive:
3.

AFFIANT has never seen nor possessed the entire case file or fully examined a

complete copy of the underlying record and discovery in these matters:

AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF PETITION FOR POST CONVICTION RELIBF - Page 1 of
3.
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4.

THAT the Idaho Correctional Center's legal resource office, where the petitioner is

housed, has no state or federal reporter series, and contains only the most basic of preprinted forms, some of which including those for post conviction relief are legally inadequate:
5.

AFFIANT was adjudged indigent at the on-set and appellate stages of the underlying

proceedings.
6.

YOUR AFFIANT has read in it's entirety the petition in these matters, and, should

YOUR AFFIANT be called upon to provide testimony in these proceedings, AFFIANT could
and would testify that the facts represented therein are a true representation of the events as
they occurred throughout the underlying proceedings, as well as the following specific
material facts: that
7.

AFFIANT was counseled convincingly by his trial attorney, Charles Craft, that he

could prevail at a trial by jury; and, had that counseling not occurred, YOUR AFFIANT
would have elected to accept the state's plea bargain offer that included, inter alia, dismissal
of one felony charge and two weapon enhancements, plus a numerically lower and concurrent
sentencing recommendation:

8.

YOUR AFFIANT, upon being informed that his family retained attorney, Charles

Crafts, intended to bifurcate his charges into two (2) separate trials advised that same
counsel that he was opposed to such a decision, only to be told that this was a decision
reserved for one's attorney and that it was in YOUR AFFIANT'S best interest to do so. At
no time was AFFIANT told of the inherent dangers of such a choice - i.e. consecutive v.
current sentences.

9.

AFFIANT and his Family requested that counsel file a motion for reduction in

sentence, which despite being assured would occur, never happened. Nor was the petitioner
or his Family advised it would not be done prior to the expiration of time to do so.

AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF PETITION FOR POST CONVICTION RELIEF - Page 2 of 3.
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10.

FURTHER sayeth YOUR AFFIANT naught.
DATED this

J

day of MAY 2013.

CODY J. FORTIN
Petitioner-Affiant pro se

"('c(
SUBSCRIBED and SWORN to before me, a Notary Public, this]

11-~·

day of MAY 2013.

01. cQ ~
--t,J'Ji1(1 laPUBYcIDAHO

~AME~SG
O~IUINN

*** SEAL ***

"'.
~~

NOTARYPIJBLICOTARY
STATE OF IOAHO

';I:

Jl;

Commission Expires: ~j JO/

AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF PETITION FOR POST CONVICTION RELIEF - Page 3 of 3.
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OODY J. FORTIN # 72953
I.C.C. K POD 216-B
Post Office Box 70010
Boise, Idaho 83707

MAY D7 2013

Petitioner pro se

CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk
ly f"llG N/R.~ON
l!lt!F'lITY

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
CODY J. FORTIN,
Petitioner,
-vsTHE STATE OF IDAHO,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

_______________
Respondent.

Civil Case No..
-------District Court No. CR-FE-2009-19383

A VERIFIED MOTION FOR WAIVER
OF COSTS AND IN FORMA PAUPERIS
STATUS ON APPLICATION FOR POST
CONVICTION PROCEEDING

STATE OF IDAHO )
: ss
COUNTY OF ADA)

OOMES NOW, CODY J. FORTIN, petitioner pro se, in the underlying matter of a
petition for post conviction relief; and, who, pursuant to the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure,
the Affidavit in Support hereof and within; the facts contained within the Affidavit in Support
of Post Conviction Relief, included herewith; and, the accompanying Motion for Appointment
of Counsel, respectfully moves this Honorable Court to grant the petitioner the waiver of any
associated costs in these proceedings, as well as in form.a pauperis status on the petitioner's
motion for appointment of counsel submitted contemporaneously:

VERIFICATION FOR INDIGENT STATUS AND WAIVER OF OOSTS
CODY J. FORTIN, after first being duly sworn upon his oath, deposes and says:
1.

YOUR AFFIANT is the applicant in the above entitled petition and presents the

following sworn testimony in support of his request for court appointed counsel and the
waiver of costs in this matter:

VERIFIED MOTION FOR WAIVER OF msTS AND IN FORMA PAUPERIS STATUS000017
1 of 2.

2.

AFFIANT is a pro se petitioner who has been continuously incarcerated since October

of 2009 and, who, when originally charged in these proceedings was adjudged indigent:

3.

YOUR AFFIANT will not be able to pay the costs involved in this proceeding, nor to

obtain the necessary funds to retain a private attorney:
4.

AFFIANT brings this request and underlying filing in good faith, absent any purpose

to hinder, annoy or delay:
5.

YOUR AFFIANT has no real or personal property beyond that of those few personal

possessions allowed within the prison, and possesses no bank or savings accounts, stocks,
bonds, nor receives any annuities from any outside sources.
6.

AFFIANT neither owns nor possesses any automobiles, motorcycles or other

recreational vehicles:
7.

AFFIANT is not presently employed within the prison system and YOUR AFFIANT's

only other source of funds is the occasional gift from friends and family; moreover, the
current balance in YOUR AFFIANT's inmate trust account (a certified copy of which is
attached hereto) - immediately prior to filing these documents isf l(co:::A.
8.

FURTHER, sayeth YOUR AFFIANT naught.
DATED this

_2_

day of MAY 2013.

£:ODY

fFORTIN
Affiant pro se

,J
SUBSCRIBED and SWORN to before me, a Notary, on thisl__ day of MAY 2013.

~$~

0TARYPUBL1C- State of IDAHO

*** SEAL **

~-,

.

i·
'

JAMES G. QUINN
NOTARY PUBLIC
STATE OF IOAHO

Commission Expires:!J_/
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= IDOC TRUST=========== OFFENDER BANK BALANCES

Doc No: 72953
Name: FORTIN, CODY JAMES
Account: CHK Status: ACTIVE

05/03/2013 =

ICC/UNIT H PRES FACIL
TIER-2 CELL-16

Transaction Dates: 05/03/2012-05/03/2013
Beginning
Total
Total
Current
Balance
Charges
Payments
Balance
24.53
3902.03
4038.09
160.59
================================TRANSACTIONS================================
Date
Batch
Description
Ref Doc
Amount
Balance
05/04/2012
05/08/2012
05/09/2012
05/09/2012
05/10/2012
05/10/2012
05/15/2012
05/22/2012
05/25/2012
06/05/2012
06/06/2012
06/08/2012
06/12/2012
06/14/2012
06/14/2012
06/14/2012
06/15/2012
06/19/2012
06/26/2012
06/26/2012
06/28/2012
06/28/2012
07/02/2012
07/03/2012
07/03/2012
07/03/2012
07/03/2012
07/03/2012
07/03/2012
07/06/2012
07/10/2012
07/11/2012
07/12/2012
07/17/2012
07/24/2012
07/24/2012
07/31/2012
07/31/2012
08/07/2012

HQ0583680-009
IC0584066-443
IC0584250-015
IC0584283-005
HQ0584404-003
IC0584436-019
IC0584746-551
IC0585585-452
IC0586203-321
IC0587706-444
HQ0587873-026
HQ0588372-010
IC0588710-509
HQ0588957-003
HQ0588989-002
IC0589036-011
IC0589197-011
IC0589346-467
IC0590076-378
HQ0590161-017
HQ0590284-006
HQ0590307-018
HQ0590590-011
IC0590613-384
HQ0590670-012
IC0590730-385
IC0590751-385
IC0590760-384
IC0590813-358
HQ0591075-016
IC0591536-487
HQ0591751-027
HQ0591970-003
IC0592404-433
IC0593103-425
IC0593105-049
IC0593824-376
HQ0593838-025
IC0594574-389

011-RCPT MO/CC
099-COMM SPL
078-MET MAIL
070-PHOTO COPY
061-CK INMATE
078-MET MAIL
099-COMM SPL
099-COMM SPL
099-COMM SPL
099-COMM SPL
022-PHONE TIME
011-RCPT MO/CC
099-COMM SPL
012-RCPT CHECK
061-CK INMATE
078-MET MAIL
045- CARLS JR
099-COMM SPL
099-COMM SPL
022-PHONE TIME
011-RCPT MO/CC
011-RCPT MO/CC
011-RCPT MO/CC
099-COMM SPL
011-RCPT MO/CC
099-COMM SPL
100-CR INM CMM
100-CR INM CMM
099-COMM SPL
011-RCPT MO/CC
099-COMM SPL
022-PHONE TIME
061-CK INMATE
099-COMM SPL
099-COMM SPL
100-CR INM CMM
099-COMM SPL
011-RCPT MO/CC
099-COMM SPL

261954
199201
180460
199202
199200

187404
728942
LOST PROP
187402
207200
206062 D2
187405
742731
742733
742949
719140

719197
205955
204939

807784

400.00
6.85DB
0.20DB
O.lODB
22.00DB
0.45DB
14.29DB
89.35DB
65.71DB
30.73DB
10.20DB
50.00
8.46DB
19.00
75.00DB
1. lODB
15.75DB
50.80DB
23.99DB
10.20DB
200.00
40.00
400.00
23.99DB
400.00
23.99DB
23.99
23.99
64.02DB
400.00
67.86DB
13.60DB
200.00DB
16.71DB
21. 60DB
66.09
88.57DB
50.00
59.52DB

424.53
417.68
417.48
417.38
395.38
394.93
380.64
291. 29
225.58
194.85
184.65
234.65
226.19
245.19
170.19
169.09
153.34
102.54
78.55
68.35
268.35
308.35
708.35
684.36
1084.36
1060.37
1084.36
1108.35
1044.33
1444.33
1376.47
1362.87
1162.87
1146.16
1124.56
1190.65
1102.08
1152.08
1092.56
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= IDOC TRUST

OFFENDER BANK BALANCES

Doc No: 72953
Name: FORTIN, CODY JAMES
Account: CHK Status: ACTIVE

05/03/2013 =

ICC/UNIT H PRES FACIL
TIER-2 CELL-16

Transaction Dates: 05/03/2012-05/03/2013
Beginning
Total
Total
Current
Balance
Charges
Payments
Balance
24.53
3902.03
4038.09
160.59
================================TRANSACTIONS===============================
Date
Batch
Description
Ref Doc
Amount
Balance
08/08/2012
08/16/2012
08/16/2012
08/21/2012
08/21/2012
08/28/2012
08/31/2012
08/31/2012
09/04/2012
09/04/2012
09/11/2012
09/18/2012
09/19/2012
09/21/2012
09/26/2012
10/02/2012
10/08/2012
10/10/2012
10/19/2012
10/23/2012
10/30/2012
11/06/2012
11/13/2012
11/13/2012
11/16/2012
11/27/2012
12/11/2012
12/18/2012
12/19/2012
12/21/2012
12/21/2012
12/21/2012
12/24/2012
12/28/2012
01/08/2013
01/11/2013
01/15/2013
01/18/2013
01/22/2013

HQ0594872-023
HQ0595887-023
HQ0595922-008
IC0596180-409
HQ0596300-002
IC0596848-428
IC0597375-427
IC0597411-427
IC0597527-425
IC0597540-424
IC0598721-520
IC0599753-510
HQ0599936-0ll
IC0600305-346
HQ0600863-020
IC0601354-482
IC0602219-456
HQ0602509-020
IC0603717-007
IC0604026-470
IC0604729-432
IC0605602-396
IC0606418-508
IC0606485-016
IC0606927-329
IC0607788-550
HQ0609673-007
IC0610400-508
HQ0610609-019
IC0610945-374
IC0610970-004
IC0610970-008
HQ0611063-024
IC0611538-439
IC0612630-519
HQ0613233-021
IC0613706-576
IC0613936-009
IC0614197-020

022-PHONE TIME
061-CK INMATE
061-CK INMATE
099-COMM SPL
022-PHONE TIME
099-COMM SPL
099-COMM SPL
099-COMM SPL
099-COMM SPL
099-COMM SPL
099-COMM SPL
099-COMM SPL
022-PHONE TIME
099-COMM SPL
011-RCPT MO/CC
099-COMM SPL
099-COMM SPL
022-PHONE TIME
045-PIOZZA
099-COMM SPL
099-COMM SPL
099-COMM SPL
099-COMM SPL
071-MED CO-PAY
099-COMM SPL
099-COMM SPL
011-RCPT MO/CC
099-COMM SPL
022-PHONE TIME
099-COMM SPL
078-MET MAIL
078-MET MAIL
011-RCPT MO/CC
099-COMM SPL
099-COMM SPL
011-RCPT MO/CC
099-COMM SPL
045-CHICKEN
071-MED CO-PAY

213222
198554
198555
214313

187403
382458
219984
D2 MEAT

89988
4026
233802
233803
233800
5263
6880
613513
235163-K
95294

10.20DB
450.00DB
22.00DB
54.25DB
10.20DB
29.76DB
29.76DB
-29.76DB
-29.76DB
29.76DB
21.14DB
41. 99DB
10.20DB
66.83DB
10.00
50.77DB
54.70DB
13.60DB
18.80DB
45.41DB
24.45DB
35.53DB
61.80DB
5.00DB
30.31DB
9.78DB
150.00
77.15DB
10.20DB
61.24DB
5.14DB
2.63DB
50.00
23.03DB
52.89DB
30.00
2.08DB
23.20DB
5.00DB

1082.36
632.36
610.36
556.11
545.91
516.15
486.39
516.15
545.91
516.15
495.01
453.02
442.82
375.99
385.99
335.22
280.52
266.92
248.12
202.71
178.26
142.73
80.93
75.93
45.62
35.84
185.84
108.69
98.49
37.25
32.11
29.48
79.48
56.45
3.56
33.56
31.48
8.28
3.28
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= IDOC TRUST

OFFENDER BANK BALANCES

Doc No: 72953
Name: FORTIN, CODY JAMES
Account: CHK Status: ACTIVE

05/03/2013 =

ICC/UNIT H PRES FACIL
TIER-2 CELL-16

Transaction Dates: 05/03/2012-05/03/2013
Beginning
Total
Total
Current
Balance
Charges
Payments
Balance
24.53
3902.03
4038.09
160.59
================================TRANSACTIONS================================
Date
Batch
Description
Ref Doc
Amount
Balance
01/23/2013
01/29/2013
01/30/2013
01/31/2013
02/05/2013
02/12/2013
02/13/2013
02/15/2013
02/19/2013
02/22/2013
02/26/2013
03/01/2013
03/05/2013
03/05/2013
03/05/2013
03/06/2013
03/12/2013
03/13/2013
03/13/2013
03/15/2013
03/19/2013
03/20/2013
03/20/2013
03/22/2013
03/25/2013
03/25/2013
03/26/2013
03/27/2013
03/27/2013
04/02/2013
04/02/2013
04/02/2013
04/03/2013
04/08/2013
04/09/2013
04/10/2013
04/10/2013
04/11/2013
04/15/2013

HQ0614444-023
IC0614892-414
HQ0615047-017
HQ0615253-002
IC0615653-377
IC0616663-546
HQ0616814-028
HQ0617093-008
IC0617210-486
IC0617777-018
IC0617992-436
HQ0618498-012
IC0618825-427
HQ0618850-005
HQ0619008-003
HQ0619133-022
IC0619687-547
HQ0619931-027
HQ0619987-010
IC0620226-006
IC0620427-469
HQ0620585-022
IC0620655-021
HQ0620893-010
HQ0621046-008
HQ0621093-004
IC0621177-457
HQ0621382-007
HQ0621426-012
HQ0622115-012
IC0622140-443
IC0622174-015
HQ0622301-008
HQ0622719-023
IC0622916-479
HQ0623057-020
HQ0623090-005
IC0623273-022
HQ0623481-024

011-RCPT MO/CC
099-COMM SPL
022-PHONE TIME
061-CK INMATE
099-COMM SPL
099-COMM SPL
022-PHONE TIME
011-RCPT MO/CC
099-COMM SPL
078-MET MAIL
099-COMM SPL
Oll-55PT MO/CC
099-COMM SPL
Oll-55PT MO/CC
022-PHONE TIME
011-RCPT MO/CC
099-COMM SPL
022-PHONE TIME
011-RCPT MO/CC
045-SUBWAY
099-COMM SPL
022-PHONE TIME
078-MET MAIL
011-RCPT MO/CC
011-RCPT MO/CC
011-RCPT MO/CC
099-COMM SPL
022-PHONE TIME
011-RCPT MO/CC
011-RCPT MO/CC
099-COMM SPL
078-MET MAIL
022-PHONE TIME
011-RCPT MO/CC
099-COMM SPL
022-PHONE TIME
011-RCPT MO/CC
078-MET MAIL
011-RCPT MO/CC

7518
237227
241154
244436
9080
242214
10059
10213
244740
10472
248787
11095
249504-K
248913
249114
11785
11823
11894
214654
12104
12522
251003
250925
12931
214655
13164
251042
13361

450.00
59.77DB
10.20DB
130.00DB
61.90DB
69.90DB
34.00DB
10.00
53.83DB
2.07DB
26.71DB
100.00
35.98DB
10.02
44.20DB
350.00
65.95DB
37.40DB
10.00
13.00DB
73.34DB
37.40DB
1.12DB
350.00
10.00
350.00
66.56DB
40. 80DB
20.00
10.00
38.58DB
2.58DB
34.00DB
20.00
22.88DB
68.00DB
10.00
1.12DB
15.00

453.28
393.51
383.31
253.31
191.41
121.51
87.51
97.51
43.68
41.61
14.90
114.90
78.92
88.94
44.74
394.74
328.79
291.39
301. 39
288.39
215.05
177.65
176.53
526.53
536.53
886.53
819.97
779.17
799.17
809.17
770.59
768.01
734.01
754.01
731. 13
663.13
673.13
672.01
687.01
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= IDOC TRUST

OFFENDER BANK BALANCES

Name: FORTIN, CODY JAMES
Doc No: 72953
Account: CHK Status: ACTIVE

05/03/2013 =

ICC/UNIT H PRES FACIL
TIER-2 CELL-16

Transaction Dates: 05/03/2012-05/03/2013
Beginning
Total
Total
Current
Balance
Charges
Payments
Balance
24.53
3902.03
4038.09
160.59
================================TRANSACTIONS================================
Date
Batch
Description
Ref Doc
Amount
Balance

------------- ------------------ ---------- ---------- -------------------- IC0623592-459
099-COMM SPL
41. 58DB
645.43

04/16/2013
04/18/2013
04/23/2013
04/24/2013
04/25/2013
04/30/2013
05/01/2013

HQ0623995-014
IC0624281-482
HQ0624428-017
HQ0624588-021
IC0624969-434
HQ0625170-010

011-RCPT MO/CC
099-COMM SPL
022-PHONE TIME
061-CK INMATE
099-COMM SPL
022-PHONE TIME

13605

10.00
48.24DB
34.00DB
320.00DB
48.40DB
44.20DB

253049
251945
251041

655.43
607.19
573.19
253.19
204.79
160.59

STATE OF IDAHO
.
Idaho Department of correction
nd
t hereby certify that the foregoing is a full, true, ~
correct copy of an instrument ~ the same no~ rema(J'
on file and of record in my office. .
6"'£7{,

3

WITNESS my hand ereto affixed th,s_.;::::;.............

, _--t,;---+4-::,---_,,..D., 2D.l2,

dlyof-
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CODY J. FORTIN # 72953
I.C.C. K POD 216-B
Post Office Box 70010
Boise, Idaho 83707

N~
A.~.

....,

};j Lp Flltt. ____

Petitioner pro se

MAY O7 2013
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, C1etrk
Dy f"IIC NELSON
OOl'l.HY

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
CODY J. FORTIN,
Petitioner,

)
)
)

GI/ PC l 318iJ11 Jj

Civil Case No.
District Court

N~~l-< E-1009-19383

- ~

)

-vs-

)

)
)
)
)

THE STATE OF IDAHO,

Respondent.
_______________
)

MOTION FOR APPOINTMENT OF
COUNSEL IN AN APPLICATION
FOR POST CONVICTION RELIEF

COMES NOW, CODY J. FORTIN, petitioner prose, in the above encaptioned cause of
action; and, who, respectfully moves this Honorable Court, pursuant to Idaho Code 1194903, for the appointment of counsel to represent the applicant in these proceedings for

collateral relief.
Petitioner's motion is predicated upon the statute, the material facts found within the
application for post conviction relief included herewith, the affidavit in support thereof; the
accompanying verified motion for waiver of costs and request for in form.a pauperis status,
as well as the entire underlying record(s) in criminal case number CR-FE- 2009-19383 and

Court of Appeals Docket No. 38069.
DATED this

3

day of MAY 2013
Respectfully submitted by:

Petitioner-Movant prose
MOTION FOR APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL IN POST CONVICTION PROCEEDING 000023
- 1 of 1.

,-;;,

CBR.TIFICATE OF FILING BY MAILING
I, DO HER.EBY CERTIFY and AFFIRM that the original and a true and correct copy
of the foregoing Petition for Post Conviction Relief, with accompanying documentation were
served upon Christopher D. Rich, Clerk of Four~h Judicial District Court for filing, by
placing the same in the U.S. Mail, this 3rd day of MAY 2013, addressed as follows:

MR. CHR.ISTOPHER. D. R.ICH
Clerk of District Court
Fourth Judicial District
ADA COUNTY COURTHOUSE
200 Front Street
Boise, Idaho 83702

Petitioner-Affiant prose

CERTIFICATE OF FILING BY MAILING - Page 1 of 1.
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-NO. [ifi('~,;;=-Jri:i ~:rm~i-.- - A.14):

MAYO 7 2013

CODY J. FORTIN # 72953
I.C.C. K POD 216-B
Post Office Box 70010
Boise, Idaho 83707

CHRISTOPHER D. RICH Cl
Dy rue NELSON

erk

'

Ol!!PlfTY

Petitioner pro se

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH ruDICIAL DISTRICT
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
CODY J. FORTIN,
Petitioner,
-vs-

)
)
)
)
)

)

THE STATE OF IDAHO,

)

)
)
)

_______________
Respondent.

e, J ~I§ 2 8

C~vil ~ase No.~y
D1stnct Court~ C~

-2

l

9

-~

l.i

'

i.•

MOTION Fd'R THE RELEASE OF THE
UNDERLYING P.S.I., PURSUANT TO
I.C.R. 32 AND THE SUBSTANTIAL
RIGHTS OF THE PETITIONER

COMES NOW, CODY J. FORTIN, petitioner pro se, in the above entitled cause of
action; and, who, respectfully moves this Honorable Court to direct the Clerk of the Court to
release and deliver to the petitioner or his court appointed counsel a full and complete copy
of the presentence investigative report in the underlying criminal action, including any
attachments thereto and exhibits thereof.
Petitioner's motion is predicated upon the record to date; the affidavit in support of
the initial application for post conviction relief; the Idaho Criminal and Civil Rules; the fact
that said report contains evidence of material facts regarding matters of sentencing that
impact the substantial rights of the petitioner; and, that the absence of its integration into
this record will impede the petitioner's right to provide proof of the issues.

DATED this

"3

day of MAY 2013.
Respectfully submitted by:

~ . io;;,N - Movant
MOTION FOR RELEASE OF THE UNDERLYING P.S.I. RECORDS - 1 of 1.

i-;

. \.,..

000025

J ..

CODY J. FORTIN # 72953
1.C.C. K POD 216-B
Post Office Box 70010
Boise, Idaho 83707

NO._,;:-~,Fii~---l t D Filf:J)

AJA

P.M . _ _ __

MAYO 7 2013

Petitioner pro se

CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, CJ('jrk
Dy P,fC Nl!LSON
De!'UTY

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
CODY J. FORTIN,

)
)

Petitioner,

)
)
)
).

-vsTHE STATE OF IDAHO,

)
)

)
Respondent.
_______________
)

~v

P C 1 3 18?

Civil Case
District Court No. CR-FE-2009-19383

MOTION FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE
OF THE UNDERLYING CRIMINAL
CASE AND APPELLATE RECORDS,
PURSUANT TO THE IDAHO RULES
OF EVIDENCE, RULE 201

COMES NOW, CODY J. FORTIN, petitioner prose, in the above encaptioned cause of
action; and, who, respectfully moves this Honorable Court, pursuant to Rule 201 of the

Idaho Rules of Evidence, to take judicial notice of the entire underlying district court and
appellate records in District Court Criminal Case No. CR-FE-2009-19383 and Idaho Court of
Appeals Docket No. 38069, as well as the companion case CR-2009-0019475, including all
appendices, exhibits, and attachments thereto for the purpose of these proceedings.
This motion is based upon the filings and record to date, the Rule, the protection of
the petitioner's substantial rights, and the affidavit in support of post conviction relief; said
affidavit being filed contemperaneously with this motion, and by this reference incorporated
herein as though set out in verbatim.

DATED this

3. day of MAY 2013.
J. FORTIN
Petitioner-Movant prose

MOTION FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE OF THE UNDERLYING RECORDS - 1 of 1.
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FILED
Tuesday. May 07, 2013 at 11 :55 AM
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, CL

K OF THE COURT

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT O THE

STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
CODY J FORTIN, PLAINTIFF
Plaintiff(s)

CASE NO. CV-PC-2013-08285

vs

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

STATE OF IDAHO, DEFENDANT
Defendant(s)

I, CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, the undersigned authority, do hereby certify that I
have mailed, by United States Mail, one copy of the: PETITION AND AFFIDAVIT FOR
POST CONVICTION RELIEF as notice pursuant to Rule 77 (d) I.R.C.P. to each of the
parties or attorneys of record in this cause in envelopes addressed as follows:
CODY J FORTIN
#72953 PO BOX 70010
BOISE ID 83707
ADA COUNTY PROSECUTING ATTORNEY
(INTERDEPARTMENTAL MAIL)
ADA COUNTY PUBLIC DEFENDER
(COPY IN FILE)
Dated:Tuesday, May 07, 2013

CHRISTOPHER

o: flICH

.

Clerk of the Court

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
~ u r t Reference

1/1

5/7/2013

000027

e
!'~------,,!iteo-r-r----·~---"'-'~i~.d ~it)=
MAY 2 4 2013
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH Cler
By STEPHANIE VIDAK
DEPUTY

GREG H. BOWER
Ada County Prosecuting Attorney
Jonathan M. Medema
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney
ISB No.: 5623
200 West Front Street, Room 3191
Boise, ID 83702
Telephone: (208) 287-7700

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
CODY JAMES FORTIN
Petitioner,
vs.
STATE OF IDAHO,
Respondent.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

CASE NO. CV-PC-2013-08285

ANSWER

COMES NOW, the State of Idaho, by and through Jonathan Medema, Deputy

Prosecuting Attorney, and does hereby answer Petitioner Fortin's petition for post-conviction
relief in the above-entitled action as follows:

I.
GENERAL RESPONSES TO MR. FORTIN'S POST-CONVICTION ALLEGATIONS
All allegations made by Petitioner are denied by the State unless specifically admitted
herein.

ANSWER (FORTIN)- I

000028

k

II.
SPECIFIC ANSWERS TO MR. FORTIN'S POST-CONVICTION ALLEGATIONS
1.

Mr. Fortin's petition contains an introductory paragraph and a three paragraph

Section entitled "Preliminary Statement". These paragraphs do not contain factual assertions and
therefore are not capable of being admitted or denied.
2.

Answering paragraph A under "Section II Jurisdiction", respondent admits Mr.

Fortin is currently in the custody of the Idaho Department of Corrections. Respondent admits that
in criminal case CR-FE-2009-19383, Mr. Fortin was sentenced to a term of twenty-five years in
the custody of the Department of Corrections consisting of twelve years determinate and thirteen
years indeterminate. The State denies that the sentence in CR-FE-2009-19383 was ordered to be
served consecutively to any other sentence. The court in CR-FE-2009-0019475 ordered the
sentences in that case to run consecutively to the sentence imposed in the CR-FE-2009-19383
case, from which Mr. Fortin now seeks post conviction relief.
3.

Answering paragraphs Band C under "Section II Jurisdiction," respondent asserts

that these paragraphs do not contain factual allegations that can be admitted or denied.
4.

Answering the allegations in Section III "Statement of the Case and Prior

Proceedings," respondent admits that on October 15, 2009 Mr. Fortin was before the Magistrate
Division of the District Court in CR-FE-2009-0019383 for his initial appearance, what petitioner
calls his video arraignment. Respondent admits that the court set bond and scheduled a
preliminary hearing for October 29, 2009. Respondent admits that the court appointed the Ada
County Public Defender to represent Mr. Fortin initially. Respondent admits· that Charles Crafts
substituted as counsel for Mr. Fortin in CR-FE-2009-0019383 on or before October 29, 2009.
Respondent admits Mr. Fortin went to trial in CR-FE-2009-0019383 beginning May 17, 2010.
Respondent admits the trial was only on the charges in CR-FE-2009-0019383. Respondent
admits Mr. Fortin appealed from the conviction in this case and the conviction was affirmed on
appeal.
Mr. Fortin states that the "charges and trials for the events of October 13th and 14th
separated at the request of Mr. Fortin's new counsel and against his express wishes." (pet. P.3).
ANSWER (FORTIN) - 2

000029

Respondent assumes Mr. Fortin is referring to the charges in CR-FE-2009-0019475 when he
references the events of October 14th. With this assumption, the State admits that initially the
charges in both the 193 83 and 194 75 cases were set for trial on the same date, although it does
not appear the court ever ordered such trials to be consolidated pursuant to I.C.R. 13. The State
further admits that the charges in these two cases were eventually tried separately. The State
denies that the cases were tried separately at the request of Mr. Fortin's counsel. Mr. Fortin
asserts he was initially offered a plea bargain where the State would recommend the sentences in
the 19383 case and the 19475 run concurrently to each other. The State denies this assertion. The
State denies all of the other factual assertions in Section III "Statement of the Case and Prior
Proceedings."
5.

Answering paragraphs A and A( 1) under section heading IV "Initial Causes of

Action," the State asserts that these paragraphs do not contain factual allegations and, therefore,
need not be admitted or denied.
6.

Answering paragraph A(2) under Section IV, petitioner asserts that, at the time he

hired private counsel, a plea bargain was on the table which would have resulted in a maximum
term of imprisonment of fifteen years on two felony convictions with concurrently imposed
sentences in consideration of pleas of guilty. As to the assertion that the State extended a plea
offer to Mr. Fortin before he hired private counseJl, the State is without sufficient information to
form a belief as to the truth of such assertion and, therefore, denies the same. There is a written
offer in the State's file for CR-FE-2009-0019893 that is dated 10-28-09, the day before the
initially scheduled preliminary hearing. However, the State is not aware of whether the offer was
communicated to counsel that day or at the preliminary hearing on the next day, 10-29-09. As to
the assertion that the State extended Mr. Fortin a plea offer that would result in Mr. Fortin
pleading to only two felonies and would have resulted in a recommendation for concurrent

1 Mr. Fortin fails to allege a date when he hired private counsel. The substitution of counsel was filed with
the court 10-29-09. The State will use that date.
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fifteen-year sentences, the State admits that such an offer was made in the CR-FE-2009-0019383
case. That offer did not make any mention of the charges in CR-FE-2009-0019475. The State
made a simultaneous offer of settlement in the 19475 case that contemplated Mr. Fortin pleading
guilty to an additional felony in that case with the State recommending the sentence in that case
run consecutively to the sentence in the 19383 case. Mr. Fortin asserts that his trial counsel
failed to inform him "the separation of the charges"2 would "subject him to a sentencing where
any argument for concurrent terms under the doctrine of a common course of conduct and
scheme would be strictly discretionary on the part of the court." (Pet. P 5). The State does not
know what this means. Further, the State is without information as to conversations Mr. Fortin
did or did not have with his trial counsel. Therefore, the State denies this assertion.
7.

In paragraph 3(a) under section IV, Mr. Fortin makes the following statement:

"Counsel's failure to file a motion in limine regarding Fortin's alleged gang affiliation, or in the
alternative to move for an immediate mistrial, resulted in the jury hearing the petitioner was a
gang member and having to depend upon a judicial instruction to unring that bell." (Pet. P. 5).
This sentence is both logically and grammatically confusing. The State assumes Mr. Fortin
means to assert that his trial counsel failed to file a motion in limine prior to trial to exclude the
introduction of evidence that Mr. Fortin was a member of a gang. Respondent admits that
assertion. The State assumes Mr. Fortin means to also assert that his trial counsel failed to move
for an immediate mistrial after some evidence of Mr. Fortin's involvement in a gang was
introduced at trial. The State denies this assertion and it is disproved by the record at trial.
8.

In paragraph 3(b) under section IV, Mr. Fortin states, "Trial counsel's failure to

conduct a pre-trial interview and to subpoena as a witness, Casey Smith, resulted in the trial
judge's refusal to allow counsel to recall this witness ... " (Pet. P. 5). This sentence is a conclusion
about what formed the basis of the trial court's ruling and it carries an implication that the trial
court refused to allow counsel to recall the witness. Answering the implication that the trial court

2 By this the State assumes Mr. Fortin means the decision to have separate trials in the 19383 and 19475
cases, which is what occurred.
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refused to allow Mr. Fortin to recall Casey Smith, the State admits in part and denies in part. The
State admits that the Court refused to allow counsel to recall Casey Smith to offer certain
testimony that counsel proffered to the Court. The Court found that testimony would be
cumulative. The State denies that the Court put a blanket bar on counsel recalling Casey Smith
for any other procedural or substantive reason. Broadly read, Mr. Fortin's conclusory sentence
assumes facts as being true - that his trial counsel failed to conduct a pre-trial interview of Casey
Smith and that his trial counsel failed to subpoena Casey Smith. If Mr. Fortin means to allege
these facts as being true, the State denies his trial counsel failed to interview Casey Smith. As to
the allegation that he failed to interview her pre-trial, the State is without sufficient information
to form a belief as to that assertions and, therefore, denies the same. The record indicates trial
counsel for Mr. Fortin spoke with Ms. Smith while the trial was on going about the possibility of
recalling her. As to the allegation that trial counsel failed to subpoena her, the State is without
sufficient information to form a belief as to the truth of such assertion and, therefore, denies that
claim.
9.

In paragraph 3(c) of Section IV, petitioner states that "[w]hen counsel failed to

object to the admission of flight evidence during trial predicated on relevance as criticized by the
Unpublished Opinion of the Idaho Court of Appeals." (Pet. p. 5). This is a sentence fragment. It
contains no assertions or conclusions. It is not capable of being answered. The sentence fragment
assumes a fact. It assumes that counsel failed to object to the admission of flight evidence during
trial predicated on relevance. If Mr. Fortin intended this as an assertion of fact, the State denies it.
That assertion is disproved by the record in the 19383 case.
10.

In paragraph 3(d) of section IV, Mr. Fortin makes conclusions about whether the

jury instructions destroyed his presumption of innocence. This is a conclusion and need not be
answered. To the implied assertion that his counsel failed to object to the wording of the verdict
form, the state admits this assertion. To the applied assertion that the verdict form listed "seven
possibilities of guilt before the entitled first consideration of not guilty," (Pet. p. 6), respondent
objects. This assertion is vague and confusing. With that objection, respondent denies that
assertion.
ANSWER (FORTIN) - 5
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11.

In paragraph 3(e) of section IV of the petition, Mr. Fortin asserts that he asked his

counsel to file a rule 35 motion, counsel failed to file such motion, and counsel failed to inform
Mr. Fortin of the fact no motion was filed. Respondent admits that neither Mr. Fortin nor his

counsel filed a motion pursuant to I.C.R. 35 in CR-FE-2009-0019383. As to the remaining
allegations, respondent is without sufficient information to form a belief as to the truth of the
assertions and, therefore, denies them.
12.

In paragraph 4 of section IV, Mr. Fortin asserts his appellate counsel failed to

"federalize any issues raised on direct appeal". Respondent has no idea what Mr. Fortin means to
assert by this statement and, therefore, denies it. Mr. Fortin asserts that his appellate counsel
failed to object to an appellate record that contains alleged errors in the transcript of the
restitution hearing conducted on February 4, 2011. The State admits appellate counsel did not
seek to correct alleged errors in the transcript of the restitution hearing.
13.

The remainder of the petition contains conclusions of law and requests for relief.

These are not capable of being answered.
DATED this ~ y of May 2013.

GREG H. BOWER
Ada County Prosecuting Attorney

e ema
eputy Prosecuting Attorney

ANSWER (FORTIN)- 6

000033

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this

ZS

day of May 2013, I caused a true and

correct copy of the foregoing ANSWER to be placed in the United States mail, postage prepaid,
addressed to:
Cody J. Fortin, Inmate #72953
I.C.C. K Pod 216-B
PO Box 70010
Boise, ID 83707
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MAY 24 2013
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk
By STEPHANIE VIDAK
DEPUTY

GREG H. BOWER
Ada County Prosecuting Attorney

Jonathan M. Medema
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney
ISB No.: 5623
200 West Front Street, Room 3191
Boise, ID 83702
Telephone: (208) 287-7700
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
CODY JAMES FORTIN,
Petitioner,
vs.

STATE OF IDAHO,

____Respondent.
____ __
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CASE NO. CV-PC-2013-08285

MOTION TO TAKE
JUDICIAL NOTICE

COMES NOW, the State of Idaho, by and through Jonathan M. Medema, Deputy

Prosecuting Attorney, and hereby moves this Court for an Order taking judicial notice of the
below-listed documents:
1. Transcript of Arraignment on 12/04/09 in case number CR-FE-2009-0019383
2. Transcript of Jury Trial in case number CR-FE-2009-0019383
3. Transcript of Sentencing Hearing on 8/06/10 in case number CR-FE-2009-0019383
4. Transcript of Restitution Hearing on 2/04/11 in case number CR-FE-2009-0019383
5. Appellant's Brief, State v. Fortin, Docket Number 38069
6. Decision on Appeal, State v. Fortin, D9cket Number 38069, dated April 30, 2012
7. Register of Actions for case number CR-FE-2009-0019383
8. Register of Actions for case number CR-FE-2009-0019475
MOTION TO TAKE JUDICIAL NOTICE, (FORTIN) - Page 1
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9. Petition for Post-Conviction Relief, Fortin v. State, CV-PC-2011-19323
10. Amended Petition for Post-Conviction Relief, Fortin v. State, CV-PC-2011-19323
DATED this v'U~ay of May 2013

GREG H. BOWER

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

:2.3

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this
day of May 2013, I caused a true and correct
copy of the foregoing document to be placed in the United States mail, postage prepaid,
addressed to:
Cody J. Fortin, Inmate #72953
I.C.C. K Pod 216-B
PO Box 70010
Boise, ID 83707

Legal A'§sistant
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

STATE OF IDAHO,

)
)

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

)
)

NO. 38069

)

CODY JAMES FORTIN,

__________
Defendant-Appellant.

)
)
)
))

APPELLANT'S BRIEF
APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL
DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE
COUNTY OF ADA

PRESIDING JUDGE: HONORABLE PATRICK H. OWEN

District Judge
TRIAL JUDGE: HONORABLE D. DUFF MCKEE
Senior District Judge

GREG S. SILVEY
Attorney at Law
P.O. Box565
Star, Idaho 83669

(208) 286-7400

KENNETH K. JORGENSEN
Deputy Attorney General
Criminal Law Division
P.0. Box 83720
Boise, Idaho 83720-001 O
(208) 334-2400

ATTORNEY FOR
APPELLANT

ATTORNEY FOR
RESPONDENT
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case
Appellant Cody Fortin (hereinafter Mr. Fortin and/or Appellant) appeals from
convictions following a jury trial for the offenses of aggravated battery and use of a
deadly weapon in the commission of a crime.

Course of Proceedings
After having been charged via complaint and amended complaint with
aggravated battery and use of a deadly weapon in commission of a crime, Mr. Fortin
waived his preliminary hearing and was bound over to the district court on those
charges and a criminal information was filed. (R. p. 8-9, 13-14, 21, 22-23.)
The matter proceeded to jury trial where Mr. Fortin was found guilty as charged.
(R. p. 69.)

Mr. Fortin was sentenced to 25 years with the first 12 years fixed. (R. p.

80.) Mr. Fortin timely appeals. (R. p. 83.)

Statement of the Facts
This case was the subject of a jury trial.

As explained by the victim, Darryl

Shaylor, he was at a house party where people were drinking and using marijuana. (Tr.
5/17/2010, p. 2.) Mr. Shaylor testified that he only had one beer and was not using
drugs. 1 (Tr. 5/17/2010, p. 5.)

1

This was a common theme of the state's witnesses, to wit, that there was alcohol,
marijuana and according to one witness, methamphetamine, being used; but the
particular witness testifying at the time insisted that he or she had not used the drugs
and only had one drink.

1
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•
Mr. Fortin and his friend Derrick came to the house and at some point, Mr. Fortin
began arguing with one of the people there (Aaron Moore). (Tr. 5/17/2010, p. 6, 8.)
When Mr. Fortin challenged the other people there as well, Darryl Shaylor told him "I'm
not the person to be messing with tonight. I am in a bad mood." (Tr. 5/17/2010, p. 9, Ins.
14-15.) According to Mr. Shaylor, about 5 or 10 minutes later Mr. Fortin came at him
across the living room and so he stood up and Mr. Fortin swung at Mr. Shaylor (who
said he usually waits for the first swing) and the fight happened from there. (Tr.
5/17/2010, p. 10.)
Mr. Shaylor testified that they went to the ground and were rolling around, and
Mr. Fortin was trying to shove his fingers in his eyes and bite him and choke him. (Tr.
5/17/2010, p. 11.) Mr. Shaylor was able to take control and got on top and hit him and
then hit him three more times in the forehead and it stopped things for a little bit and he
was able to go out to the front of the house because he was feeling dizzy and had been
losing blood. (Tr. 5/17/2010, p. 12.)

He laid down outside and first he did not know he

had been stabbed, he thought the blood was Mr. Fortin's but then realized it was his
own (he had a stab injury to his neck/shoulder). (Tr. 5/17/2010, p. 12-13.)
Mr. Fortin then came outside and came up to Mr. Shaylor who saw a flash of
something shiny by his pocket, and while he couldn't really see it, he assumed it was a
knife. (Tr. 5/17/2010, p. 14, 18.) Mr. Shaylor said that Mr. Fortin hesitated but then his
friend stepped up an encouraged him. (Tr. 5/17/2010, p. 16.)

Mr. Shaylor asked him

'What are you going to do with that?" (Tr. 5/17/2010, p. 18.) Mr. Fortin swung the knife
and cut Mr. Shaylor across the face and then took off running. (Tr. 5/17/2010, p. 18.)
Mr. Shaylor yelled at him "Are you kidding me?" (Tr. 5/17/2010, p. 19.)

He felt a rush

2
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again and laid down to try to cool down and looked around but Mr. Fortin was already
gone. (Tr. 5/17/2010, p. 19.) Mr. Shaylor denied bringing or using a weapon that night.
(Tr. 5/17/2010, p. 20.)
The state called many witnesses who were at the party, but none of them saw
Mr. Shaylor get stabbed in the house. Kasey Smith, a close friend of Mr. Shaylor's, was
at the party (where she only had one beer). (Tr. 5/17/2010, p. 51.) She testified she
saw the slashing motion toward Mr. Shaylor while they were outside, although she did
not put that in her statement to the police. (Tr. 5/17/2010, p. 59, 73, 74.) She never
saw a knife but saw something shiny outside. (Tr. 5/17/2010, p. 83.) She also said that
Mr. Fortin tried to get in Candice's car. (Tr. 5/17/2010, p. 60.)
Aaron Moore, who actually admitted to drinking 10 or 12 beers. and a couple of
shots of rum, did not see any of the fight because he was in the kitchen when it started
and he ran away because he was a felon on probation. (Tr. 5/18/2010, p. 10, 16.)
James Bungard (who claimed he wasn't drinking or using drugs at all) testified
that after the fight in the house, Mr. Fortin picked a knife up off the floor and folded it up
and pretended to put it in his pocket. (Tr. 5/18/2010, p. 31, 43.) He said Mr. Fortin took
the knife and went outside, and he peeked out the door and saw him quickly slash
across Mr. Shaylor's face. (Tr. 5/18/2010, p. 44-45.)

Interestingly, he denied that

anyone was using marijuana (which almost all the other witnesses admitted),

but

testified that Kasey, Candice and John were smoking methamphetamine (which all the
other witnesses denied) and that he had told the police that. (Tr. 5/18/201 O, p. 52-53.)
He also admitted that he didn't put anything in his statement to police about the

3
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slashing, and had lied in the statement when he had said he saw Mr. Fortin brandishing
a knife outside. (Tr. 5/18/2010, p. 60-61.)
John Vida, whose residence this occurred at (and who claimed he had like one or
two beers but no drugs), didn't see the whole fight (or any knife). (Tr. 5/18/2010, p. 67,
70, 77.) At the first part of it he was in his backyard trying to keep his dog out of it and
after the people went outside the house he saw nothing because he shut the door and
locked it. Tr. 5/18/2010, p. 73, 79.)
Dawn Cliff, who had just started dating Mr. Shaylor (and claimed she wasn't
drinking that night), saw Mr. Fortin outside holding what she believed to be a knife,
because she saw a silver point, but she didn't see the full knife, and she didn't see what
then happened between them. (Tr. 5/18/2010, p. 109-110, 112.)
Mr. Fortin did not testify at trial, however, he advised the PSI writer that while he
engaged in a physical fight with the victim, he didn't stab him and never had a knife.
(PSI, p. 3.)

4
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ISSUES
I.

WHETHER THE COURT ERRED BY ADMITIING EVIDENCE OF MR. FORTIN'S
FLIGHT

11.
WHETHER THE COURT ERRED WHEN IT REFUSED TO ALLOW THE DEFENSE TO
CALL A WITNESS

111.
WHETHER THE COURT ERRED BY DENYING THE MOTION FOR MISTRIAL

IV.
WHETHER THE DOCTRINE OF CUMULATIVE ERROR REQUIRES REVERSAL

5
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ARGUMENT

I.
THE COURT ERRED BY ADMITTING EVIDENCE OF MR. FORTIN'S FLIGHT

A.

Standard of review.
The Idaho Supreme Court explained the standard of review for this issue in State

v. Moore, 131 Idaho 814, 965 P.2d 174 (1998):
Admission of evidence which is probative on the issue of flight to avoid
prosecution requires the trial judge to conduct a two-part analysis. First,
the judge must determine that the evidence is relevant under I.R.E. 401,
and second, the judge must determine that the probative value of the
evidence is not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.
This Court reviews the question of relevancy in the admission of evidence
de novo. A court's decision that evidence is more probative than
prejudicial is reviewed for abuse of discretion.

Id., p. 819 (internal citations omitted).
The Idaho Supreme Court in State v. Sheldon, 145 Idaho 225 (2008), detailed
the abuse of discretion standard:
When determining whether the district court abused its discretion, we
consider:
(1) whether the lower court rightly perceived the issue as one of
discretion;
(2) whether the court acted within the boundaries of such discretion and
consistently with any legal standards applicable to specific choices;
and
(3) whether the court reached its decision by an exercise of reason.

Id., p. 228.

6
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The arguments and rulings on flight.
The state filed a Notice of Intent to Use I.R.E. 404(b) Evidence, which provided

as follows in full (R. p. 30.):
COMES NOW, Christopher Atwood, Deputy Prosecuting Attorney
for the County of Ada, and notifies the Court and Counsel of the
State's intent to use facts as described below as evidence during
the jury trial in this case. The State does not believe that the
evidence falls under Idaho Criminal Rule 404(b) but out of caution
the State provides this notice in the event the Court finds otherwise.
If the Court finds the evidence is 404(b) evidence then the State
believes the evidence of the defendant's crimes, wrongs, or acts is
admissible to prove the defendant's identity.
The state intends to introduce evidence of the Defendant's conduct
when he was approached by law enforcement officers the day after
the aggravated battery occurred. When the officers approached the
Defendant and informed him he was under arrest, the Defendant
fled from the officers indicating consciousness of guilt from the
aggravated battery he had committed one day earlier. This
evidence was disclosed to Defendant in the police reports in the
State's Discovery Response in CRFE2009-0019475.
Notice of Intent to Use I.R.E. 404(b) Evidence, p. 1-2. (R. p. 30-31.)
The defense objected to the I.R.E. 404(b) (hereinafter 404(b)) evidence and the
matter was taken up at trial outside the presence of the jury. Defense counsel had
attempted to obtain a pre-trial ruling, but the court would not take it up earlier. (Tr.
5/18/2010, p. 214, 217.)
The offer of proof by the prosecutor was that the day following the stabbing, a
number of law enforcement officers approached the defendant to arrest him while he
was in his vehicle. A number of officers tried to use their cars to surround the defendant
while he was in his car. They had their lights on and approached the car with guns
drawn and police badges visible. (Tr. 5/18/2010, p. 208.)

7
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When the officers approached, the defendant fled from them in his car. They
pursued him approximately 8-10 miles when he crashed his car and ran on foot into a
field and then into a wooded area and into a ditch. The officers had called for backup
and a number of officers pursued him and surrounded the ditch and called for him to
come out with his hands up. Eventually they called in a K-9 who went in and bit the
defendant. The defendant eventually did come out and was arrested. (Tr. 5/18/2010, p.
208-209.)
The prosecutor stated he did not intend to introduce the fact that the defendant
struck a police officer during his flight because that is the subject of a different charged
case, aggravated battery on a law enforcement officer.

Further, the prosecutor stated

that he didn't intend to introduce all of the evidence of the eluding because that is
largely the other case as well, and so he did not intend to get into how fast he was going
and whether or not he put other people at risk and the fact that he side-swiped another
vehicle. But the prosecutor stated that he does intend to introduce the distance of the
flight and that he continued his flight on foot. The prosecutor explained that he filed the
404(b) notice out of an abundance of caution, he does not believe it is 404(b) evidence,
but rather, is evidence of flight. (Tr. 5/18/2010, p. 209-210.)
In response, defense counsel confirmed that there are two criminal cases
pending against the defendant in this jurisdiction, the instant aggravated battery and the
other one charging eluding. (Tr. 5/18/2010, p. 210.) The state did not consolidate the

cases. (Tr. 5/18/2010, p. 216.)

8
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Defense counsel argued that the prosecutor's recitation of what happened was·
not complete. The officers were actually plain clothes officers and were driving
undercover (as opposed to simply unmarked) cars, to wit, a PT Cruiser. 2
Thus, according to defense counsel, where undercover officers approach in plain
clothes and unmarked cars, it is not even evidence of flight to avoid prosecution. (Tr.
5/18/2010, p. 215.) Defense counsel explained that Mr. Fortin's position was that the
alleged victim had actually brought the knife to the fight the night before, and now
someone was approaching him with a gun. (Id.)
The court clarified that the state does not believe that the evidence falls under
404(b) because it is not evidence of prior bad acts, but is evidence of flight from this
act. (Tr. 5/18/2010, p. 212.) The court's ruling was as follows:
The law for years has been that flight can be argued-a flight to avoid
arrest can be argued by the prosecutor as indicia of guilt. At one time, in
fact, there was a pattern jury instruction where the jury was instructed that
if an accused defendant fled, that the jury could construe the fact that a
defendant was fleeing to avoid arrest to be an indication of guilt.
Modern instruction practice says you don't instruct juries that way
anymore, but I think that the law in Idaho clearly is that counsel are
entitled to argue the facts. The rational basis of that is that the
circumstances, a defendant's conduct, a defendants' demonstrated
conduct from the time of the event giving rise to the criminal charge to at
least a reasonable time thereafter is relevant for examination to see not
just what did the defendant do at the time of the crime, but what did he do
after the crime was-after the alleged crime was committed. How did he

2

Actually, the detective testified at trial they were driving a Nissan Altima, a Honda
Accord, and a GMC SUV of some kind. (Tr. 5/19/2010, p. 57, 60.) Also, while their
lights were on as the prosecutor stated, they were not traditional light bars, for instance,
one car had wig wag lights (the headlights alternatively flashing) and also had rapid
motion LED lights on the passenger side visor, and another car had the rapid motion
LED lights on its grill. (Tr. 5/19/2010, p. 42-43.) As to their dress and identification, the
detective testified that he was wearing civilian clothing (T-shirt) with his badge hanging
around his neck and another officer was wearing a black windbreaker with a flip down
police insignia which was not flipped down. (Tr. 5/19/2010, p. 47, 62-63.)
9
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comport himself? Where did he go? What did he do? How did he respond
when approached by officers? That is all within the -the old-fashioned
word is "res gestae." I don't know what the modern term is but there is a
more modern term for that. But that is all in the gambit of relevant
circumstances and it is fair game for both sides to investigate and
examine.
It is equally appropriate, for example, if a defendant's conduct is
completely the other way from any indication of guilt, that the defense may
bring forward that it shows that his comportment and activities and
conduct after the allegation are totally inconsistent with the prosecutor's
allegation of the occurrence of a crime. So it cuts both ways. What did the
defendant do? How did he act? How did he respond? What was his
conduct at least to the extent that you have a reasonable time after, and I
think here we are talking about one day and think that is certainly within
reach.
I indicated that I didn't think it was a 404(b) problem because I think
404{b) discusses prior bad acts or unrelated bad acts. And if you are
examining a defendant's conduct after a circumstance with relation to the
circumstance itself it is not a 404(b). it is an extension of the defendant's
conduct in connection with the circumstance.
Tr. 5/18/2010, p. 220, In. 24-p. 222, In. 22 (emphasis added).
A colloquy then occurred about the evidence of the police dog which went in and
bit Mr. Fortin, after which the court continued:
I am not sure where that goes. My struggle on this is an extraneous issue
that we are going to explore at some length that doesn't have anything to
do with any of the elements of the crime. And once you get the dog
involved in this thing, I think fear of the dog-that doesn't have any
necessary connection to flight to avoid arrest.
[PROSECUTOR] No, it is just how the officers found him.
THE COURT: But that is not relevant. The fact that they -I can understand
the argument that he in his flight is evidence. The officers' response is
not necessarily indicative of anything.
His flight, okay. Officers gave chase. Well, because A follows B, I'll say
okay, they gave chase because that leads to the chase on foot. But I don't
think you need to add-you don't need to embellish the chase with the
fact that it was 990 miles-an-hour though downtown Boise, you have
already indicated that you are not going there, anyway.
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Tr. 5/18/2010, p. 225, Ins. 2-24 (emphasis added).
A colloquy then occurred about the details of the chase, after which the court
stated:
... I will let you put in evidence of flight but without emphasizing the police
officers' response to that other than the fact that they did pursue, they did
pursue him, they did add officers as needed until they finally had enough
officers and had him surrounded and accomplished the arrest. Will that
satisfy that State?
[PROSECUTOR] It will.
THE COURT: With that caveat I will allow the testimony, and with the
representation that you are not going to go into the high speed, the crash,
and the crashing into the police car, and crashing into the civilian car.
[PROSECUTOR]: That is fine.
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Judge, I think I should put out for the record I do
just want to renew my objection to any of this evidence coming in.
THE COURT: I didn't think you were very happy about this.
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: I just wanted to make sure there is a record.
Tr. 5/18/2011, p. 228, In. 16-p. 229, In. 14.

C.

The court erred by admitting the evidence of flight.
First of all, the district court erred by not understanding that the evidence of flight

is other bad acts evidence. Then, since it did not understand the type of evidence at
issue, it failed to use the proper two step test to determine the evidence's admissibility.
The court at one point stated that the flight evidence did not fall under I.R.E.
404(b) (hereinafter 404(b)) because was not prior bad acts evidence, and later, stated
there was no 404(b) problem because it did not concern prior or unrelated bad acts.
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The district court was wrong, flight is other bad acts evidence. As explained by
the Idaho Court of Appeals in State v. Rossignol, 147 Idaho 818 (Ct.App. 2009):
Escape or flight is one of the exceptions to the general rule prohibiting
evidence of prior bad acts or crimes. State v. Gootz, 110 Idaho 807, 814,
718 P.2d 1245, 1252 (Ct. App. 1986). Evidence of escape or flight may be
admissible because it may indicate a consciousness of guilt. Id. However,
the inference of guilt may be weakened when a defendant harbors
motives for escape other than guilt of the charged offense. Id.
Admission of evidence which is probative on the issue of flight to avoid
prosecution requires the trial court to conduct a two-part analysis. State v.
Moore, 131 Idaho 814, 819, 965 P.2d 174, 179 (1998). First, the trial court
must determine that the evidence is relevant under I.R.E. 401; and,
second, the court must determine that the probative value of the evidence
is not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. Id. This
Court reviews the question of relevancy in the admission of evidence de
novo. Id. A trial court's decision that evidence is more probative than
prejudicial is reviewed for abuse of discretion. Id.
Id. p. 821-822.

In other words, even though there is an established exception by which flight
evidence may be admissible, it is still other bad acts evidence. Thus, the proper other
bad acts test must be used.3
So in our case, the district court was required to perform a two step analysis.
First, the court had to find that evidence of flight was relevant.

It then needed to

determine that the probative value of the evidence was not substantially outweighed by
the danger of unfair prejudice.
In addition to the law specific to evidence of flight which requires the two step
analysis, such as Rossignol, supra,

as well as

State v. Moore, supra,

since the

evidence that the state desired to introduce was also an uncharged crime, the district
3

Incidentally, while 404(b) evidence is commonly referred to as prior bad acts evidence,
there is no requirement that it be prior (and flight of course would not be), the rule
simply refers to "other crimes, wrongs or acts."
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court should have also known to perform the two step test under 404(b) itself.

Here,

the other bad acts evidence constituted the crime of eluding police, which was not
charged in this case, but in a separate case.
This situation is similar to that in State v. Sheldon, 145 Idaho 225 (2008), where
the Idaho Supreme Court had to determine whether the defendant's admission that he
had earlier dealt methamphetamine fell under 404(b).
The initial question is whether Sheldon's statements were admissions of a
past crime, wrong, or act. Since methamphetamine dealing is prohibited
under I.C. § 37-2732B(a) (also I.C. § 37-2732(a)), his admission would be
categorized as 404(b) evidence. Thus, the trial court was required to make
a two-tiered analysis to determine whether the evidence was inadmissible
propensity evidence under 404(b) or whether the evidence. could be
admitted for some other purpose. First, the court considers whether the
evidence is relevant to a material disputed issue concerning the crime
charged. Second, the court considers whether the probative value of the
evidence is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice to
the defendant. This Court exercises free review over the first inquiry relevance - but reviews the second inquiry - risk of unfair prejudice - under
an abuse of discretion standard. Unfortunately, the district court appears
not to have recognized the statements as 404(b) evidence and, thus,
failed to perform the two-tiered analysis.
Id., p. 229 (emphasis added, internal citations and footnote omitted).

Our case is the same, since eluding police is a crime it would be categorized as
404(b) evidence and the two-tiered analysis required.
So in our case, whether analyzed under the established law regarding flight
evidence or the more general law regarding other bad acts, the district court was clearly
required to perform the two step analysis prior to its admission. As to the first step,
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relevance, although it made some contrary comments, it does appear that the court did
rule that the flight evidence was relevant. 4
However, the court clearly never made any ruling about probative value or
prejudice, presumably because it did not believe that the flight evidence was other bad
acts evidence for which that second step was required.

However characterized, this

failure by the court was error. At the very least, the court abused its discretion since it
admitted evidence without reference to the legal standards regarding such evidence.
In State v. Perry, 245 P.3d 961 (Idaho 2010), the Idaho Supreme Court
explained:
Idaho shall from this point forward employ the Chapman harmless error
test to all objected-to error. A defendant appealing from an objected-to,
non-constitutionally-based error shall have the duty to establish that such
an error occurred, at which point the State shall have the burden of
demonstrating that the error is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
Id., 974.

In this case, the defense objected below and has established on appeal that an
error occurred. Accordingly, unless the State meets its burden, the convictions must be
reversed. 5

The court mentioned at one point that the flight issue has nothing to do with any of the
elements of the charged crime. It also holds that the use of the dog is not relevant,
however, the court never reconciles just why if the dog is not relevant, anything else
about the chase would be.

4

Also, it is interesting to note that the State's notice of intent to use 404(b) evidence said
that the evidence of flight was relevant to show identity, which was never mentioned by
the court as a reason the evidence was relevant.
5

This is true for every issue on appeal, each having been objected to at trial.
14
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11.
THE COURT ERRED BY EXCLUDING A DEFENSE WITNESS
A.

Standard of review.
A lower court's determination under I.R.E. 403 will not be disturbed on appeal

unless it is shown to be an abuse of discretion. State v. Birk/a, 126 Idaho 498 (Ct.App.
1994).
B.

The background and court's rulings.
After the state rested, defense counsel stated that he had spoken with a witness,

Candice Waters, during the break and she said that she overheard Darryl Shaylor (the
victim) discussing his testimony with another witness (Kasey Smith) and that Candice
knew specific questions that counsel had asked Darryl Shaylor. 6 (Tr. 5/19/2010, p. 101104.)
Apparently, both Kasey Smith and Darryl Shaylor had already testified when they
had their discussion. (Tr. 5/19/2010, p. 105.) Candice Waters had been listed as a
witness by the state, but had not been called. (Tr. 5/19/2010, p. 102-103.) Defense
counsel indicated that he might call her. (Tr. 5/19/2010, p. 102.)
As to the relevance of her testimony, defense counsel explained that a primary
issue of the defense was that Darryl Shaylor and other witnesses had all been talking
about their stories and their stories had changed. (Tr. 5/19/2010, p. 110-111.)
Despite the fact that the witnesses were violating the court's order to not discuss
the case, the court stated there was no proof that any testimony was tainted since the
6

Earlier in the trial there had been another instance where Darryl Shaylor had been
discussing the case with another witness. Dawn Cliff overheard them and testified
about it. (Tr. 5/19/2010, p. 5-12, 105-107.)
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two witnesses discussing their testimony had already testified and while Candice may
have overheard, she was not going to be called as a witness. (Tr. 5/19/2010, p. 107.)
Thus, the court ruled that it was not going to allow the defense to call Candice Waters
to testify about overhearing Darryl Shaylor discussing his testimony with another
witness. (Tr. 5/19/2010, p.108, 116-117.)
Further, the court would not allow the defense to call Candice Waters as an
eyewitness to the crime. As defense counsel explained, she was an eyewitness who
filled out a police statement form. (Tr. 5/19/2010, p. 114.)

Defense counsel made an

offer of proof, and related that during the break, she told him that she did not see Mr.
Fortin throw a punch, it may have happened, but she didn't see it. (Tr. 5/19/2010, p.
114-115.)

The court asked whether she was in a position to observe, and defense

counsel said he didn't know, that is what this trial is for. (Tr. 5/19/2010, p. 115.)
Defense counsel also explained that she would also testify that Mr. Fortin came to her
car accidentally, and she had to tell him it was her car, not his. (Tr. 5/19/2010, p. 115.)
The court ruled that there was nothing relevant that was not cumulative of what
the State had already presented and there is nothing exculpatory because counsel was
not saying that she would testify that it did not happen, the most she can say is she
didn't see it happen and that's already been the testimony of a handful of witnesses.
(Tr. 5/19/2010, p. 115.)

Counsel responded that those witnesses had changed their

stories from their written statements to now saying they did see something outside, to
which the court responded that was not accurate. (Tr. 5/19/2010, p. 115-116.)
Counsel clarified that the court was ruling that he could not call Candice Waters
and the court said he could not unless he could show something that was not
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cumulative or was exculpatory. Defense counsel stated that she did not see Mr. Fortin
throw a punch or make a slapping motion outside.

Second, she had testimony

regarding the credibility of the witnesses, having been present on two occasions where
Darryl Shaylor was discussing the case with other witnesses (the other one which Dawn
Cliff testified about). (Tr. 5/19/2010, p. 116.)
The court ruled as follows:
Which I would not permit you to go into [Shaylor talking to other
witnesses], in-in that aspect, because it doesn't impact-if-from that
testimony only, because that's already been inquired into, unless she
was a witness.
And unless you can represent that she was a -that she saw it, --that it
didn't happen, not that she didn't see it happen, because that's not
necessarily exculpative, unless you can prove-unless you can establish
that she was in a position to see, and was looking, and it didn't happen,
didn't-by--by saying she didn't see it happen that it didn't happen.
If she wasn't looking, and what I'm understanding you to say is she didn't
see it happen, but it could have happened, which kind of says to me she
was not in a position to observe, which is not exculpatory.
I would otherwise rule that-on-on the State's case, it's--that--that
anything else she adds is cumulative to what the State's already added.
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: The only thing-the only information I can give the
Court, as an offer of proof of what Candice Waters is going to say, is her
statement and the--what she just told me in the hall. So other than that , I
request that we be allowed to call her as witness.
THE COURT: On the--offer of proof, I would find that the evidence--the
constructive evidence of what she did observe is cumulative to what the
State has already offered and not exculpatory. And Counsel has not
offered anything in the offer of proof that is exculpative. And therefore, the
test-the testimony would be cumulative
to the State's offer and
otherwise irrelevant.
Tr. 5/19/2010, p. 116, In. 25-p. 118, In. 6.
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Not being allowed to call the witness, the defense rested without calling any
witnesses. (Tr. 5/19/2010, p. 119.)

C.

The court erred by excluding the defense witness.
While the district court did not cite any authority for its ruling excluding the

witness, presumably it was pursuant to I.R.E. 403, which provides as follows:
Rule 403. Exclusion of relevant evidence on grounds of prejudice,
confusion, or waste of time.
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of
the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay,
waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.
I.R.E. Rule 403 (emphasis added).
While the court claimed that Candice Water's testimony was inadmissible
because it was cumulative to what the State had already presented, just because other
witnesses had testified to the subject matter does not make it needlessly cumulative
and therefore inadmissible.
As explained in State v. 8/ackstead, 126 Idaho 22 (Ct.App. 1994):
Statements by witnesses which corroborate the facts to which another has
already testified are not necessarily inadmissible because they are
"cumulative." Rule of Evidence 403 prohibits the introduction of needlessly
cumulative evidence. There is no merit in the argument that this evidence
was needless. The entire tenor of Blackstead's defense was that the victim
had recently fabricated the allegations against him for the purpose of
staying at the treatment facility or being placed with her stepmother rather
than returning to her natural mother. Such an implication of recent
fabrication gives importance to evidence corroborating the victim's
testimony that she had mentioned the defendant's misconduct to someone
within days of the occurrence.
Id. p. 22.
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Like in the case above, in our case, the proposed testimony was corrobative, not
cumulative, or if it was, it was not needlessly so.

The evidence regarding Mr. Fortin

cutting Mr. Shaylor's face while outside was extremely inconsistent. Only one witness
(John Bungard) actually testified that he had saw both the knife and the slashing, but he
also admitted he lied in his police statement about Mr. Fortin brandishing the knife
outside and that he didn't mention the slashing in his statement to police.7
Kasey Smith, Mr. Shaylor's very close friend, testified she saw the slashing
motion toward Mr. Shaylor while they were outside, although she did not put that in her
statement to the police, and she never saw a knife but saw something shiny outside.
Dawn Cliff, who had just started dating Mr. Shaylor, saw what she believed to be
a knife, because she saw a silver point, but she didn't see the full knife, and she didn't
see what then happened between them.
While two other witnesses did not see what happened outside, it was because
they were not outside when it happened. Aaron Moore had run away and John Vida had
shut the door and locked it.
Given this testimony, the testimony of Candice Waters, to wit, that she did not
see Mr. Fortin punch or slash Mr. Shaylor while they were outside, is not cumulative.
While her testimony may have been the same as what all the other witnesses (who
were outside at the time) told the police, for two of the three witnesses, their stories
changed by the time of trial and they had now seen the slashing motion. Therefore,
instead of being needlessly cumulative because it was the same as the other witnesses,

7

Significantly, his testimony about the drug use in the house was completely different
from everyone else's, he denied anyone was using marijuana but stated that other
witnesses were using methamphetamine.
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the testimony of Candice Waters actually corroborated the defense theory of recent
fabrication and impeached the two witnesses who did change their story. In short,
where the state's witnesses are changing their story, the defense should be allowed to
put on the witness who didn't.
Also,

by the time of trial, only Dawn Cliff testified that she did not see the

slashing motion so Candice Water's similar testimony should have been considered to
be corroborative of that, not needlessly cumulative.

The district court was simply

wrong when it stated that a handful of witnesses had already testified this way.
Further, this was evidence favorable to the defense and was the only witness the
defense would be calling.

The court was incorrect in requiring defense counsel to

establish prior to testifying that the witness had the opportunity to observe since as he
stated, that is what the trial is for. More to the point, that was the prosecutor's job, if she
didn't have the opportunity to observe then her testimony would be impeached, not
disallowed in its entirety.
Finally, Candice Waters also had evidence that no one else did, to wit, that Mr.
Fortin accidentally went to her car and she had to tell him to go to his. While Kasey
Smith testified that he went to Candice's car, she did not include the part that it was by
accident, and so the jury could have been left with the impression that Mr. Fortin was
trying to attack Candice as well, and her testimony would clarify that he was not.
To summarize, a witness who says she did not see a disputed event happen is
providing exculpatory evidence, and her ability to see is a matter for cross examination.
Further, her evidence was not needlessly cumulative; it corroborated the other witness
who did not see the slash and also impeached the witnesses who only recently said
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they saw it. Finally, Candice Waters had the clarifying testimony about the car that no
one else did.
While the district court's rush to conclude what it obviously considered to be a
slow trial

may well be understandable, it should not have come at the expense of

excluding the one and only defense witness. For all the reasons above,

the district

court erred by excluding the witness.

111.
THE COURT ERRED DENYING THE MOTION FOR MISTRIAL
A.

Standard of review.
The standard of review was explained by the Idaho Supreme Court in State v.

Field, 144 Idaho 559 (2007):

When there is a motion for mistrial based upon prosecutorial error
supported by a contemporaneous objection to the underlying procedural
or evidentiary error we review the denial of a motion for mistrial for
reversible error.
[T]he question on appeal is not whether the trial judge reasonably
exercised his discretion in light of circumstances existing when the
mistrial motion was made. Rather, the question must be whether
the event which precipitated the motion for mistrial represented
reversible error when viewed in the context of the full record. Thus,
where a motion for mistrial has been denied in a criminal case, the
"abuse of discretion" standard is a misnomer. The standard, more
accurately stated, is one of reversible error. Our focus is upon the
continuing impact on the trial of the incident that triggered the
mistrial motion. The trial judge's refusal to declare a mistrial will be
disturbed only if that incident, viewed retrospectively, constituted
reversible error.

Id. p. 571 (internal citations omitted).
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B.

The motion and the court's ruling.
On cross examination, defense counsel was asking Mr. Shaylor whether he ever

got a clear look at the knife because he had just said it was a shiny object. The following
exchange took place:
A.
Not a clear look, but I believe getting cut across the face and
stabbed in the neck and seeing a shine, you know it's a knife.
Q.

So it's just your opinion that this was a knife?

A.

I knew it was a knife. I couldn't determine which kind.

Q.

How do you know it was a knife?

A.

Because it punctured me in the neck and cut me across the face,
and I know most gang members carry those.

Tr. 5/17/2011, p. 30, Ins. 15-24 (emphasis added).
Defense counsel started to object and the court ruled that volunteered answer
about the gang member be redacted and the jury to disregard it. However, the court
stated that was all it would do since it was an open ended question, but that it would
take up counsel's motion at the break. (Tr. 5/17/2010, p. 31.)
At the break, defense counsel moved for a mistrial, arguing that his question in
no way, shape or form invited a response regarding gang members. Defense counsel
argued that given the current prejudice against gangs, it is one of the most prejudicial
things that could have been said, and it is too inflammatory to be cured by a curative
instruction. (Tr. 5/19/2010, p. 41-44.)
The prosecutor stated that he had not intended to bring up the fact that he was a
gang member.
And I've advised them, and I'm pretty sure I advised the victim the same
thing, Mr. Shaylor, that it is not to be mentioned unless you're asked a
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question that calls for it, and that you cannot lie if asked a question. You
must tell the truth, but not to volunteer that information unless it's asked of
you.
Tr. 5/17/2010, p. 45 Ins. 13-18.
The court again ruled that defense counsel invited the error because he asked
"how do you know," which allowed him to say everything that was going on in his mind,
which included that gang members carry knives. If defense counsel wanted to avoid a
particular answer, he should have asked precise

questions or brought a motion in

limine. Thus, while the court struck the answer and instructed the jury to disregard it,
the court ruled that it is not a mistrial issue and denied the motion for mistrial. (Tr.
5/17/2010, p. 47-48.)
C.

The court erred by denying the motion for mistrial.
Appellant disagrees with the court that the question invited the answer.

The

witness was simply taking advantage of the open ended question to inject prejudicial
information to the jury, rather than it being some valid answer based on stream of
consciousness thinking as apparently held by the court.
We know this because of the prosecutor's comments, which the court ignores.
The prosecutor's admonishment was that gang information was not to be mentioned
unless a question calls for it and it was not to be volunteered. In other words, even if in
the victim's mind a reason he knew it was a knife was because gang members carry
knives, he had been admonished to not mention gangs unless a question called for it,
and it cannot seriously be argued that the question called for that answer even if he was
thinking it. Even the court referred to it as a volunteered answer, showing that the
question did not call for that answer.
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Therefore, this is not a matter of a two word blurt out answer which was not
mistrial material as held by the court. Rather, it was a victim in a case intentionally
prejudicing the defendant by providing inflammatory information despite the fact that he
had been told not to.
As further evidence that this was not just some inadvertent mistake, it must be
remembered that this same witness also violated the court's order to not discuss his
testimony with other witnesses on two different occasions. While defense counsel may
have not been able to establish that this affected other testimony, it nevertheless shows
that this witness was intentionally violating admonishments, and in this instance at least,
did so in an obvious attempt to unfairly prejudice the defendant. This is mistrial material,
and the court erred in denying it.

IV.
THE DOCTRINE OF CUMULATIVE ERROR REQUIRES REVERSAL
Appellant asserts that the errors discussed above combine to constitute
cumulative error. In State v. Cook, 144 Idaho 784, 171 P.3d 1282 (Ct.App. 2007), the
Court of Appeals explained:
Having identified multiple errors, we would normally address whether,
pursuant to I.C.R. 52, each of these errors was harmless. However the
cumulative error doctrine requires reversal of a conviction when there is
an accumulation of irregularities, each of which by itself may be harmless,
but when aggregated, show the absence of a fair trial in contravention of
the defendant's constitutional right to due process. In order to find
cumulative error, this Court must conclude there is merit to more than one
of the alleged errors and then conclude that these errors, when
aggregated, denied the defendant a fair trial.
Id., 171 P.3d at 1289 (footnote and internal citations omitted).
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The multiple errors in this trial have all been discussed at length above.
Therefore, they will not be unnecessarily repeated in this section, but Appellant will
simply request that his convictions be reversed and the case remanded for a new trial
because of the cumulative error.

CONCLUSION
Mr. Fortin respectfully requests that this Court vacate his conviction for
aggravated battery with deadly weapon enhancement.
DATED this _ _ day of November, 2011.
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commission of a crime, affirmed.
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General, Boise, for respondent.
MELANSON, Judge
Cody James Fortin appeals from his judgment of conviction for aggravated battery and
use of a deadly weapon in the commission of a crime. For the reasons set forth below, we
affirm.

I.
FACTS AND PROCEDURE

In 2009, the state charged Fortin with aggravated battery, I.C. §§ I8-903(a), I8-907(a),
and I8-907(b); and use of a deadly weapon in the commission of a crime, LC. § 19-2520. The
information alleged that Fortin willfully and unlawfully stabbed the victim in the face and
shoulder with a knife, causing the man great bodily harm or permanent disfigurement. The state
filed a notice of intent to use evidence at trial that Fortin fled when approached by police officers
the day after the alleged battery occurred. The state asserted that, while the evidence was not
believed to fall under I.R.E. 404(b), the notice was provided out of caution in the event the
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district court found otherwise. Fortin objected to the admission of such evidence at trial. A jury
found Fortin guilty of aggravated battery and use of a deadly weapon in the commission of a
crime. Fortin was sentenced to a unified term of twenty-five years, with a minimum period of
confinement of twelve years. Fortin appeals.
II.

ANALYSIS

A.

Evidence of Flight
Fortin argues that the district court abused its discretion by failing to recognize that

evidence of his flight was I.R.E. 404(b) evidence and by failing to conduct an appropriate
balancing analysis of the probative value of such evidence against the danger of unfair prejudice.
Idaho Rule of Evidence 404(b), provides:
Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the
character of a person in order to show that the person acted in conformity
therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of
motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of
mistake or accident, provided that the prosecution in a criminal case shall file and
serve notice reasonably in advance of trial, or during trial if the court excuses
pretrial notice on good cause shown, of the general nature of any such evidence it
intends to introduce at trial.
This rule prohibits introduction of evidence of acts other than the crime for which a defendant is
charged if its probative value is entirely dependent upon its tendency to demonstrate the
defendant's propensity to engage in such behavior. State v. Grist, 147 Idaho 49, 54, 205 P.3d
1185, 1190 (2009).

Of course, evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts may implicate a

person's character while also being relevant and admissible for some permissible purpose, such
as those listed in the rule. When determining the admissibility of evidence to which a Rule
404(b) objection has been made, the trial court must first determine whether there is sufficient
evidence of the other acts that a reasonable jury could believe the conduct actually occurred. If
so, then the court must consider: (1) whether the other acts are relevant to a material and
disputed issue concerning the crime charged, other than propensity; and (2) whether the
probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. Grist, 14 7 Idaho
at 52,205 P.3d at 1188; State v. Parmer, 147 Idaho 210,214,207 P.3d 186, 190 (Ct. App. 2009).
Rule 404(b) allows evidence of other acts if admitted for the purpose of showing
knowledge or consciousness of guilt. State v. Pokorney, 149 Idaho 459, 463, 235 P.3d 409, 413
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(Ct. App. 2010). Consciousness of guilt has been found in a variety of circumstances. Evidence
of flight, escape, or failure to appear on the part of a defendant is often identified as relevant to
demonstrate consciousness of guilt. State v. Moore, 131 Idaho 814, 819-20, 965 P.2d 174, 17980 (1998) (admitted evidence that defendant left Idaho for his home in Oregon to avoid a
scheduled interview from an officer investigating lewd conduct); State v. Rossignol, 147 Idaho
818, 821-22, 215 P.3d 538, 541-42 (Ct. App. 2009) (allowed evidence that defendant failed to
appear at a hearing to increase bond and left the jurisdiction); State v. Friedley, 122 Idaho 321,
322-23, 834 P.2d 323, 324-25 (Ct. App. 1992) (allowed stipulation that defendant failed to
appear at arraignment and at the initially scheduled trial on drug charges).
The inference of guilt may be weakened when a defendant harbors motives for escape
other than guilt of the charged offense. Rossignol, 14 7 Idaho at 821, 215 P .3d at 541. The
existence of alternative reasons for the escape goes to the weight of the evidence and not to its
admissibility. Id. at 822, 215 P.3d at 542. Admission of evidence which is probative on the
issue of flight to avoid prosecution requires the trial court to conduct a two-part analysis. Id.
First, the trial court must determine that the evidence is relevant under I.R.E. 401; and, second,
the court must determine that the probative value of the evidence is not substantially outweighed
by the danger of unfair prejudice. Id.

This Court reviews the question of relevancy in the

admission of evidence de novo. Id. A trial court's decision that evidence is more probative than
prejudicial is reviewed for abuse of discretion. Id.
We first address Fortin's assertion that the district court erred by failing to recognize that
evidence of his flight was I.RE. 404(b) evidence.

Indeed, the district court did not view

evidence of Fortin's flight as implicating I.R.E. 404(b). However, the only adverse consequence
of this identified by Fortin is that the district court did not, on the record, balance the probative
value of this evidence against the risk of unfair prejudice. 1 We, therefore, address that omission.
In determining that evidence of Fortin's flight would be admitted, the district court
stated:
We visited at some length and talked about this in chambers before trial
began, and I indicated that at that time how I was inclined to read this and how I
as was inclined to rule.

Fortin does not challenge the district court's determination that evidence of his flight was
relevant.
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The law for years has been that flight can be argued--a flight to avoid
arrest can be argued by the prosecutor as indicia of guilt.
Accordingly, the district court referred to the probative value of the evidence of Fortin's flight.
However, as Fortin asserts, the district court did not make any comments on the record regarding
the danger of unfair prejudice posed by such evidence. 2
In State v. Fordyce, 151 Idaho 868, 869-70, 264 P.3d 975, 976-77 (Ct. App. 2011), this
Court addressed an argument that the district court in that case abused its discretion by failing to
conduct a balancing analysis of the probative value of challenged evidence against the danger of
unfair prejudice on the record. We held that, because Fordyce failed to identify any unfair
prejudice from admission of the challenged evidence, the district court did not err by failing to
conduct a balancing analysis on the record. Id. at 870-71, 264 P .3d at 977-78.
Here, with respect to identifying unfair prejudice from the flight evidence, Fortin's
counsel stated at trial:
Two weeks ago ... I actually tried to get a pretrial ruling on this and [the
judge] wouldn't allow us to do it because he said he wanted the trial judge to
make the determination.
The reality of it is, if I file a motion, it is my obligation to set it for notice
of hearing. And the reality here is that this evidence coming in now, without any
prior notice from the prosecutor, is extremely prejudicial. Obviously, it is
prejudicial. It is inflammatory.
To the extent Fortin argued that evidence of his flight was unfairly prejudicial and should not
have been admitted because he did not have prior notice from the prosecutor that such evidence
2

The prosecutor made the following statements during trial regarding the danger of unfair
prejudice posed by the evidence:
As far was whether it is prejudicial, the Court pointed out, and I agree, it is
prejudicial but it is not unfair prejudice. It is not that they are going to think he
did it for the wrong--for some bad reason or something unrelated. It is prejudicial
because he was running from officers and shows his consciousness of guilt.

These statements, coupled with the district court's indication that the matter was discussed in
chambers at some length before trial, indicate that the district court probably did consider the
danger of unfair prejudice stemming from evidence ofFortin's flight. However, such discussion
took place off the record, and we cannot assume that the district court conducted the proper
analysis regarding unfair prejudice.
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would be used, this assertion was without merit because it was belied by the record and Fortin's
own statements. Specifically, prior to trial, the state filed a notice of intent to use evidence of
Fortin's flight and, as just described, Fortin asserted that two weeks prior to trial he attempted to
get a pretrial ruling on the state's notice of intent to use such evidence.
While not specifically identified as unfair prejudice, Fortin also argued that the state's
evidence did not implicate flight because there were potential motives for Fortin's escape other
than guilt of the aggravated battery. Specifically, Fortin asserted:
Now, what the prosecutor said is not a full representation of what
happened. These officers approached in plain clothes in unmarked police cars,
and so I don't know how you can possibly say it is even evidence of flight.
Someone approaches [Fortin] with a gun. Obviously, [the victim] is the
one who brought the knife to this fight, he attacks [Fortin] the night before, and
now somebody approaches [Fortin] with a gun.
We reiterate that the inference of guilt drawn from evidence of escape or flight may be weakened
when a defendant harbors motives for escape other than guilt of the charged offense. Rossignol,
147 Idaho at 821, 215 P.3d at 541. However, the existence of alternative reasons for the escape
goes to the weight of the evidence and not to its admissibility. Id. at 822, 215 P.3d at 542.
Further, if Fortin fled from police the day after he committed the aggravated battery, it cannot be
said that apprising the jury of this fact was necessarily unfair.

Evidence is not unfairly

prejudicial simply because it is damaging to a defendant's case. Fordyce, 151 Idaho at 870, 264
P .3d at 977. Evidence is unfairly prejudicial when it suggests decision on an improper basis.

Pokorney, 149 Idaho at 465, 235 P.3d at 415; State v. Floyd, 125 Idaho 651, 654, 873 P.2d 905,
908 (Ct. App. 1994). That Fortin's flight indicates his consciousness of guilt of the aggravated
battery offense is not unfair prejudice that would justify withholding that fact from the jury. As
in Fordyce, Fortin has not shown reversible error because Fortin has not identified any unfair
prejudice to weigh. Accordingly, we hold that the district court did not abuse its discretion by
failing to conduct a balancing of the probative value of the evidence ofFortin's flight against the
danger of unfair prejudice on the record.

B.

Witness Exclusion
Fortin next argues that the district court abused its discretion by excluding the testimony

of a potential defense witness at trial pursuant to I.R.E. 403.

Idaho Rule of Evidence 403

provides that, although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially
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outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury or
by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative
evidence. The trial court has broad discretion in determining the admissibility of testimonial
evidence. State v. Smith, 117 Idaho 225,232,786 P.2d 1127, 1134 (1990). A decision to admit
or deny such evidence will not be disturbed on appeal absent a clear showing of abuse of that
discretion. Id.
At trial, after the state rested, defense counsel informed the district court that Fortin
would not be calling any witnesses. Before the defense formally rested, the district court took a
break to settle the jury instructions. When the parties returned, Fortin's counsel informed the
district court that, during the break, a woman, who was present when the stabbing occurred and
listed as a potential witness for the state but not called, told Fortin that she had previously
overheard two state witnesses discussing their trial testimony after they both had testified.
Fortin' s counsel then asserted that, while the woman had been tainted as a potential witness, he
felt compelled to call her. The state objected.
The district court then asked Fortin's counsel to make an offer of proof regarding what
the potential witness was expected to testify to that was probative to the defense in this case.
Fortin's counsel asserted that the potential witness was expected to testify that she did not see
Fortin throw a punch in the altercation with the victim outside the residence where the fight
occurred, but that it could have happened. Fortin' s counsel also asserted that this woman would
testify that Fortin accidentally came to get into her car when attempting to leave the residence
after the altercation and that she had to inform Fortin that the car was hers, not his. The district
court responded that there was nothing that was not cumulative to what the state had already
presented and nothing exculpatory. The following exchange then took place between the district
court and Fortin's counsel:
[COUNSEL] So, is--is the--it's the ruling of the Court I cannot call [the
woman] as a witness?
[COURT]
Unless you show me that there is something that is not
cumulative to what the State's already shown or exculpative.
[COUNSEL] Well, that was my conversation with [the woman]. Her-what she told me was that she did not see [Fortin] throw a punch or make a
slapping motion outside. I--I think that--she--the two things she does offer, is--in
terms of--1 don't think it's necessarily impeachment, certainly, of her, but it goes
to the credibility of the witnesses, and certainly my defense that she was present
during a conversation with [the victim] on Monday, and she was also one of the
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witnesses present today when [the victim] was--or yesterday when [the victim]
was discussing the case and [an officer] had to break that up.
So, she's actually present for two situations where [the victim] has been
discussing the facts of this case.
Which I would not permit you to go into ... unless she was
[COURT]
a witness.
And unless you can represent that she was a--that she saw it, that it didn't
happen, not that she didn't see it happen, because that's not necessarily
exculpative, unless you can prove--unless you can establish that she was in a
position to see, and was looking, and it didn't happen, didn't--by--by saying she
didn't see it happen that it didn't happen.
If she wasn't looking, and what I'm understanding you to say is she didn't
see it happen, but it could have happened, which kind of says to me she was not in
a position to observe, which is not exculpatory.
I would otherwise rule that--on--on the State's case, it's--that--that
anything else she adds is cumulative to what the State's already added.
[COUNSEL] The only thing--the only information I can give the Court,
as an offer of proof of what [the woman] is going to say, is her statement and the-what she just told me in the hall. So, other than that, I request that we be allowed
to call her as a witness.
On the--on the offer of proof, I would find that the
[COURT]
evidence--the constructive evidence of what she did observe is cumulative to what
the State has already offered and not exculpative. And Counsel has not offered
anything in the offer of proof that is exculpative. And, therefore, the test--the
testimony would be cumulative of the State's offer and otherwise irrelevant.
Fortin argues that the district court erred by excluding the proposed testimony of the
potential defense witness because such testimony was not needlessly cumulative. However, even
if the district court erred by excluding such testimony, convictions will not be set aside for errors
or defects that have little, if any, likelihood of having changed the results of the trial. State v.
Barcella, 135 Idaho 191, 196-97, 16 P.3d 288, 293-94 (Ct. App. 2000). Where an error concerns
evidence omitted at trial, the test for harmless error is whether there is a reasonable possibility
that the lack of excluded evidence contributed to the verdict. Id.
Here, the evidence adduced at trial was overwhelming that Fortin used a knife in the
commission of the aggravated battery and, as a result, the victim suffered significant injuries.
Multiple witnesses described the altercation between Fortin and the victim in this case. None
testified that anyone other than Fortin and the victim were involved in the physical fight. One
witness testified that, during the altercation between Fortin and the victim, the witness saw Fortin
with a knife in his hand and watched Fortin make a slashing motion and connect with the
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victim's face. Another witness testified that she also saw Fortin holding something in his hand
during the altercation that she believed was a knife. An additional witness testified that she saw
Fortin make a slashing motion toward the victim and saw something in Fortin's hand. The
attending trauma surgeon testified that the penetrating wound to the victim's chest was a stab
wound, although he could not say with certainty what caused the wound. However, the surgeon
also testified that the wound to the victim's face was consistent with a knife wound. Given the
weight of the evidence against Fortin in this case, we are convinced beyond a reasonable doubt
that there is no reasonable possibility that the lack of the excluded evidence contributed to the
verdict obtained against Fortin. Therefore, even assuming the district court erred by excluding
the testimony of the potential defense witness, such error was harmless.

C.

Motion for Mistrial
Fortin additionally asserts that the district court erred by denying his motion for a mistrial

after a state's witness, the victim in this case, referenced Fortin's gang affiliation during crossexamination. In criminal cases, motions for mistrial are governed by I.C.R. 29.1. A "mistrial
may be declared upon motion of the defendant, when there occurs during the trial an error or
legal defect in the proceedings, or conduct inside or outside the courtroom, which is prejudicial
to the defendant and deprives the defendant of a fair trial." I.C.R. 29.l(a). Our standard for
reviewing a district court's denial of a motion for mistrial is well established:
[T]he question on appeal is not whether the trial judge reasonably exercised his
discretion in light of circumstances existing when the mistrial motion was made.
Rather, the question must be whether the event which precipitated the motion for
mistrial represented reversible error when viewed in the context of the full record.
Thus, where a motion for mistrial has been denied in a criminal case, the "abuse
of discretion" standard is a misnomer. The standard, more accurately stated, is
one of reversible error. Our focus is upon the continuing impact on the trial of the
incident that triggered the mistrial motion. The trial judge's refusal to declare a
mistrial will be disturbed only if that incident, viewed retrospectively, constituted
reversible error.

State v. Urquhart, 105 Idaho 92, 95, 665 P.3d 1102, 1105 (Ct. App. 1983).
During cross-examination of the victim in this case, the following exchange occurred:
Q.
Now, at some point, I assume--did you ever get a clear look at this
knife? It seems you like--you just say it was a shiny object.
A.
Not a clear look, but I believe getting cut across the face and
stabbed in the neck and seeing a shine, you know it's a knife.
Q.
So it's just your opinion that this was a knife?

8

000072

e
A.
I knew it was a knife. I couldn't determine which kind.
Q.
How do you know it was a knife?
A.
Because it punctured me in the neck and cut me across the face,
and I know most gang members carry those.
The district court immediately instructed the jury to disregard the victim's reference to gang
members; the victim completed his testimony; and, at the next break in the trial proceedings,
Fortin moved for a mistrial. Fortin argued that the victim's reference to gang members led the
jury to believe that Fortin was potentially a member of a gang and was, therefore, extremely
prejudicial and too inflammatory for a curative instruction. Fortin did not allege that the state
planted or otherwise invited the comment from the victim. In denying Fortin's motion for a
mistrial, the district court explained:

In my view and my opinion, if you ask an open-ended question on crossexamination such as how or why, the witness is entitled to tell you how, and if
that's on his mind, why you've got it. If there's something in that explanation
that you want to build a fence around it, then, either, A, ask precise questions, or,
B, you have to alert in advance with a motion in limine.
I will strike it. I've instructed the jury to disregard it, but I do not consider
it to be a mistrial issue. Motion for mistrial is denied.
We presume that the jury followed the district court's instructions. See State v. Kilby, 130 Idaho
747, 751, 947 P.2d 420, 424 (Ct. App. 1997); State v. Hudson, 129 Idaho 478, 481, 927 P.2d
451,454 (Ct. App. 1996).
We conclude that, given the open-ended nature of Fortin's question on crossexamination, the lack of a motion in limine requesting a pretrial order instructing the state to
admonish witnesses from referencing gang membership and the immediate instruction by the
district court to the jury to disregard the victim's reference to gang members, Fortin has failed to
show that the reference constituted reversible error. Therefore, the district court did not err by
denying Fortin's motion for a mistrial.

D.

Cumulative Error
Fortin argues that the doctrine of cumulative error requires reversal of his judgment of

conviction and remand for a new trial. The cumulative error doctrine refers to an accumulation
of irregularities, each of which by itself might be harmless, but when aggregated, show the
absence of a fair trial in contravention of the defendant's right to due process. Moore, 131 Idaho
at 823,965 P.2d at 183. The presence of errors alone, however, does not require the reversal of a
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conviction because, under due process, a defendant is entitled to a fair trial, not an error-free
trial. Id In this case, there was no accumulation of irregularities. Accordingly, the cumulative
error doctrine is inapplicable.

III.
CONCLUSION
Fortin did not identify any unfair prejudice resulting from the admission of evide~ce of
his flight from police officers the day after the aggravated battery occurred. Accordingly, the
district court did not abuse its discretion by failing to conduct a balancing of the probative value
of the evidence of Fortin's flight against the danger of unfair prejudice on the record.
Additionally, even assuming that the district court erred by excluding the testimony of the
potential defense witness, such error was harmless because we are convinced beyond a
reasonable doubt that there is no reasonable possibility that the lack of such evidence contributed
to the jury verdict. Further, the district court did not err by denying Fortin's motion for a mistrial
because Fortin failed to show that the victim's reference to gang members constituted reversible
error. Finally, because there was no accumulation of irregularities in this case, the cumulative
error doctrine is inapplicable. Accordingly, Fortin's judgment of conviction for aggravated
battery and use of a deadly weapon in the commission of a crime is affirmed.
Chief Judge GRATION and Judge LANSING, CONCUR.
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Continued (Sentencing 08/06/2010 09:00 AM)

Patrick H. Owen

DCHH

CCHUNTAM

Hearing result for Hearing Scheduled held on
Patrick H. Owen
06/18/2010 01:30 PM: District Court Hearing Hele
Court Reporter: Kasey Redlich
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing
estimated: Less than 199 pages

6/4/2010
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7/12/2010

MOTN
MOTN

TCRAMISA

Motion for Transcripts and Action of Records

Patrick H. Owen

CCHUNTAM

Motion to Transport Witness

Patrick H. Owen

ORDR

CCHUNTAM

Order to Transport Witness from the Ada County Patrick H. Owen
Jail

DCHH

CCHUNTAM

Hearing result for Sentencing held on 08/06/201 O Patrick H. Owen
09:00 AM: District Court Hearing Held
Court Reporter: Kasey Redlich
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing
estimated: Less than 100 pages

JAIL

CCHUNTAM

Sentenced to Jail or Detention (118-907
Battery-Aggravated) Confinement terms:
Penitentiary determinate: 12 years. Penitentiary
indeterminate: 13 years.

Patrick H. Owen

SNPF

CCHUNTAM

Sentenced To Pay Fine 125.50 charge: 118-907
Battery-Aggravated

Patrick H. Owen

8/10/2010

JCOC

Judgment of Conviction and Commitment

Patrick H. Owen

9/17/2010

Appealed To The Supreme Court

Patrick H. Owen

Motion for Appt of State Appellate PD

Patrick H. Owen

10/4/2010

APSC
MOTN
ORDR

DCLYKEMA
TCRAMISA
TCRAMISA
CCHUNTAM

Order for Appointment of State Appellate Public
Defender

Patrick H. Owen

12/7/2010

HRSC

CCHUNTAM

Hearing Scheduled (Hearing Scheduled
12/10/201 O 03:00 PM) restitution hearing

Patrick H. Owen

12/10/2010

DCHH

CCHUNTAM

Hearing result for Hearing Scheduled held on
Patrick H. Owen
12/10/2010 03:00 PM: District Court Hearing Hele
Court Reporter: Kasey Redlich
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing
estimated: Less than 100 pages

HRSC

CCHUNTAM

Hearing Scheduled (Hearing Scheduled
01/21/2011 03:00 PM) Restitution hearing

1/6/2011

NOTC

CCTHIEBJ

(4) Notice Of Transcript Lodged - Supreme Court Patrick H. Owen
Docket No. 38069

1/21/2011

CONT

CCHUNTAM

Continued (Hearing Scheduled 02/04/2011
03:00 PM) Restitution hearing

2/4/2011

DCHH

CCHUNTAM

Hearing result for Hearing Scheduled held on
Patrick H. Owen
02/04/2011 03:00 PM: District Court Hearing Heh
Court Reporter: Kasey Redlich
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing
estimated: Less than 100 pages

2/8/2011

RESR

CCHUNTAM

Restitution Recommended by the Prosecutor's
office. 518.14 victim # 4

Patrick H. Owen

RESR

CCHUNTAM

Restitution Recommended by the Prosecutor's
office. 1742.70 victim# 5

Patrick H. Owen

RESR

CCHUNTAM

Restitution Recommended by the Prosecutor's
office. 24447.99 victim# 6

Patrick H. Owen

RESR

CCHUNTAM

Restitution Recommended by the Prosecutor's
office. 16398.84 victim# 7

Patrick H. Owen

ORDR

CCHUNTAM

Order for Restitution and Judgment

Patrick H. Owen
000078

8/5/2010

8/6/2010

Judge

Patrick H. Owen

Patrick H. Owen
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6/13/2011

NOTC

CCTHIEBJ

(2) Notice Of Transcript Lodged - Supreme Court Patrick H. Owen
Docket No. 38069

5/2/2012

MISC

CCTHIEBJ

Opinion - Supreme Court Docket No. 38069

6/1/2012

REMT

TCWEGEKE

Remittitur - Affirmed - Supreme Court Docket No. Patrick H. Owen
38069-2010

Judge

Patrick H. Owen
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10/15/2009

NCRF

PRNYEJED

New Case Filed - Felony

Magistrate Court Clerk

PROS

PRNYEJED

Prosecutor assigned Ada County Prosecutor

Magistrate Court Clerk

HRSC

TCMCCOSL

Hearing Scheduled (Video Arraignment
10/15/2009 01 :30 PM)

Theresa Gardunia

ARRN

CCMANLHR

Hearing result for Video Arraignment held on
10/15/2009 01 :30 PM: Arraignment/ First
Appearance

Theresa Gardunia

CHGA

CCMANLHR

Judge Change: Adminsitrative

Theresa Gardunia

HRSC

CCMANLHR

Hearing Scheduled (Preliminary 10/29/2009
08:30 AM)

Theresa Gardunia

BSET

CCMANLHR

BOND SET: at 1000000.00 - (118-915 {F} Assault Theresa Gardunia
or Battery Upon Certain Personnel)

ORPD

MADEFRJM

Order Appointing Public Defender
[file stamped 10/16/2009]

Theresa Gardunia

MFBR

TCBULCEM

Motion For Bond Reduction

Theresa Gardunia

NOHG

TCBULCEM

Notice Of Hearing

Theresa Gardunia

RQDD

TCBULCEM

Defendant's Request for Discovery

Theresa Gardunia

NOPE

TCWEGEKE

Notification of Penalties for Escape

Patrick H. Owen

SUBC

CCEDWARM

Substitution Of Counsel Charles Crafts

Theresa Gardunia

AMCO

CCEDWARM

Amended Complaint Filed

Theresa Gardunia

CONT

CCEDWARM

Hearing result for Preliminary held on 10/29/2009 Theresa Gardunia
08:30 AM: Continued

HRSC

CCEDWARM

Hearing Scheduled (Preliminary 11/23/2009
08:30 AM)

PHWV

CCEDWARM

Hearing result for Preliminary held on 11/23/2009 Richard Grant
08:30 AM: Preliminary Hearing Waived (bound
Over)

HRSC

CCEDWARM

Hearing Scheduled (Arraignment 12/04/2009
01:30 PM)

Richard Grant

AMCO

CCEDWARM

Amended Complaint Filed 2nd

Richard Grant

COMT

CCEDWARM

Commitment

Richard Grant

11/24/2009

INFO

TCBULCEM

Information

Patrick H. Owen

11/25/2009

PROS

PRBRIGCA

Prosecutor assigned Christopher S. Atwood

Patrick H. Owen

12/4/2009

DCHH

CCHUNTAM

Hearing result for Arraignment held on
Patrick H. Owen
12/04/2009 01 :30 PM: District Court Hearing Hele
Court Reporter: Kasey Redlich
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing
estimated: Less than 100 pages

HRSC

CCHUNTAM

Hearing Scheduled (Entry of Plea 12/18/2009
01:30 PM)

10/16/2009

10/29/2009

11/23/2009

Theresa Gardunia

Patrick H. Owen
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.

Foe

,

Date: 5/23/~013

Judicial District Court - Ada County

Time: '01 :35 PM

e

User: PRFISCKD

ROA Report
Case: CR-FE-2009-0019475 Current Judge: Patrick H. Owen

Page 2 of 5

Defendant: Fortin, Cody James

State of Idaho vs. Cody James Fortin
Date

Code

User

12/18/2009

DCHH

CCHUNTAM

12/29/2009

HRSC

CCHUNTAM

Judge
Patrick H. Owen
Hearing result for Entry of Plea held on
12/18/2009 01:30 PM: District Court Hearing Hele
Court Reporter: Kasey Redlich
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing
estimated: Less than 100 pages
Hearing Scheduled (Jury Trial 02/22/2010 08:30 Patrick H. Owen

AM)
HRSC

CCHUNTAM

Hearing Scheduled (Pretrial Conference
02/05/2010 11 :00 AM)

Patrick H. Owen

RQDS

TCPETEJS

State/City Request for Discovery

Patrick H. Owen

RSDS

TCPETEJS

State/City Response to Discovery

Patrick H. Owen

2/5/2010

HRVC

CCHUNTAM

Hearing result for Jury Trial held on 02/22/2010
08:30 AM: Hearing Vacated

Patrick H. Owen

2/10/2010

SCHE

TCWEGEKE

Second Scheduling Order

Patrick H. Owen

4/14/2010

PROS

PRHEBELE

Prosecutor assigned Gabriel Haws

Patrick H. Owen

4/15/2010

RSDS

TCBULCEM

State/City Response to Discovery/Addendum

Patrick H. Owen

4/19/2010

HRSC

CCHUNTAM

1/29/2010

Hearing Scheduled (Jury Trial 05/17/2010 08:30 Patrick H. Owen

AM)
4/20/2010

MOTN

TCRAMISA

Motion for PT Ruling on the Admissibility of
Evidence

Patrick H. Owen

4/22/2010

RSDS

TCRAMISA

State/City Response to Discovery/Second
Addendum

Patrick H. Owen

4/29/2010

MISC

TCPETEJS

State's List of Potential Trial Exhibits

Patrick H. Owen

MISC

TCPETEJS

State's List of Potential Trial Witnesses

Patrick H. Owen

DCHH

CCHUNTAM

Patrick H. Owen
Hearing result for Pretrial Conference held on
05/07/2010 11:00AM: District Court Hearing Hele
Court Reporter: Kasey Redlich
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing
estimated: Less than 100 pages

HRSC

CCHUNTAM

Hearing Scheduled (Pretrial Conference
05/14/2010 11 :00 AM)

5/14/2010

DCHH

CCHUNTAM

Hearing result for Pretrial Conference held on
Patrick H. Owen
05/14/201011:00AM: District Court Hearing Hele
Court Reporter: Kasey Redlich
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing
estimated: Less than 100 pages

5/17/2010

HRVC

CCHUNTAM

Hearing result for Jury Trial held on 05/17/201 O
08:30 AM: Hearing Vacated

Patrick H. Owen

5/18/2010

RSDS

TCRAMISA

State/City Response to Discovery/Third
Addendum

Patrick H. Owen

5/21/2010

HRSC

CCHUNTAM

Hearing Scheduled (Pretrial Conference
05/21/2010 11 :00 AM)

Patrick H. Owen

DCHH

CCHUNTAM

Patrick H. Owen
Hearing result for Pretrial Conference held on
05/21/201011:00AM: District Court Hearing Hele
Court Reporter: Kasey Redlich
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing
000081
estimated: Less than 100 pages

5/7/2010
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5/21/2010

HRSC

CCHUNTAM

Hearing Scheduled (Change of Plea 06/11/2010 Patrick H. Owen
01:30 PM)

6/10/2010

STIP

CCHUNTAM

Stipulation to Continue

Patrick H. Owen

6/11/2010

CONT

CCHUNTAM

Continued (Change of Plea 06/18/2010 01:30
PM)

Patrick H. Owen

6/18/2010

CONT

CCHUNTAM

Continued (Change of Plea 07/09/2010 01:30
PM)

Patrick H. Owen

7/9/2010

CONT

CCHUNTAM

Continued (Change of Plea 07/16/2010 01 :30
PM)

Patrick H. Owen

7/12/2010

CONT

CCHUNTAM

Continued (Change of Plea 07/16/2010 11 :00
AM)

Patrick H. Owen

7/13/2010

PROS

PRHEBELE

Prosecutor assigned Christopher S. Atwood

Patrick H. Owen

7/16/2010

DCHH

DCJOHNSI

Hearing result for Change of Plea held on
Patrick H. Owen
07/16/2010 11:00 AM: District Court Hearing Hele
Court Reporter: k redlich
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing
estimated:50

HRSC

DCJOHNSI

Hearing Scheduled (Jury Trial 08/30/2010 08:30 Patrick H. Owen
AM)

HRSC

DCJOHNSI

Hearing Scheduled (Pretrial Conference
08/20/2010 11 :00 AM)

Patrick H. Owen

7/23/2010

PROS

PRHEBELE

Prosecutor assigned Gabriel Haws

Patrick H. Owen

8/2/2010

ORDR

TCOLSOMC

Third Scheduling Order

Patrick H. Owen

8/19/2010

ORDR

TCWEGEKE

Order to Transport

Patrick H. Owen

8/20/2010

CONT

CCHUNTAM

Continued (Pretrial Conference 08/27/2010
11:00 AM)

Patrick H. Owen

8/23/2010

ORDR

TCWEGEKE

Order to Transport

Patrick H. Owen

8/27/2010

DCHH

CCHUNTAM

Hearing result for Pretrial Conference held on
Patrick H. Owen
08/27/201 O 11 :00 AM: District Court Hearing Hele
Court Reporter: Kasey Redlich
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing
estimated: Less than 100 pages

8/30/2010

PLEA

CCNELSRF

A Plea is entered for charge: - GT (118-915 {F}
Assault or Battery Upon Certain Personnel)

Patrick H. Owen

PLEA

CCNELSRF

A Plea is entered for charge: - GT (149-1404 {F}
Officer-Flee or Attempt to Elude a Police Officer)

Patrick H. Owen

PLEA

CCNELSRF

A Plea is entered for charge: - GT (119-2520
Enhancement-Use of a Deadly Weapon in
Commission of a Felony)

Patrick H. Owen

DCHH

CCNELSRF

Hearing result for Jury Trial held on 08/30/2010
08:30 AM: District Court Hearing Held
Court Reporter: Kasey Redlich
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing
estimated: less than 100

Patrick H. Owen

HRSC

CCNELSRF

oHearing Scheduled (Sentencing 10/08/2010
09:00 AM)

Patrick H. Owen

Judge
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8/30/2010

GPA

TCWEGEKE

Guilty Plea Advisory

Patrick H. Owen

9/24/2010

ORDR

DCJOHNSI

Order to Transport

Patrick H. Owen

10/8/2010

DCHH

CCHUNTAM

Hearing result for Sentencing held on 10/08/2010 Patrick H. Owen
09:00 AM: District Court Hearing Held
Court Reporter: Kasey Redlich
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing
estimated: Less than 100 pages

FIGT

CCHUNTAM

Finding of Guilty (118-915 {F} Assault or Battery
Upon Certain Personnel)

Patrick H. Owen

JAIL

CCHUNTAM

Sentenced to Jail or Detention (118-915 {F}
Assault or Battery Upon Certain Personnel)
Confinement terms: Penitentiary determinate: 5
years. Penitentiary indeterminate: 15 years.

Patrick H. Owen

FIGT

CCHUNTAM

Finding of Guilty (149-1404 {F} Officer-Flee or
Attempt to Elude a Police Officer)

Patrick H. Owen

JAIL

CCHUNTAM

Sentenced to Jail or Detention (149-1404 {F}
Officer-Flee or Attempt to Elude a Police Officer)
Confinement terms: Jail: 360 days. Credited
time: 360 days.

Patrick H. Owen

FIGT

CCHUNTAM

Finding of Guilty (119-2520 Enhancement-Use of
a Deadly Weapon in Commission of a Felony)

Patrick H. Owen

STAT
ORDR

CCHUNTAM
TCWEGEKE

STATUS CHANGED: closed pending clerk action Patrick H. Owen

10/14/2010

STAT

CCTOMPMA

STATUS CHANGED (batch process)

10/15/2010

JCOC
MOTN
NOHG
HRSC

DCTYLENI

Judgment Of Conviction & Commitment

Patrick H. Owen

TCFARANM
TCBROXLV
TCBROXLV

Motion for Restitution

Patrick H. Owen

Notice Of Hearing

Patrick H. Owen

Hearing Scheduled (Hearing Scheduled
02/04/2011 11 :00 AM) Motion for Restitution

Patrick H. Owen

1/21/2011

CONT

CCHUNTAM

Continued (Hearing Scheduled 02/04/2011
03:00 PM) Motion for Restitution

Patrick H. Owen

2/4/2011

DCHH

CCHUNTAM

Hearing result for Hearing Scheduled held on
Patrick H. Owen
District Court Hearing Hele
Court Reporter: Kasey Redlich
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing
estimated: Less than 100 pages

2/8/2011

RESR

CCHUNTAM

Restitution Recommended by the Prosecutor's
office. 500.00 victim # 1

Patrick H. Owen

RESR

CCHUNTAM

Restitution Recommended by the Prosecutor's
office. 3578.25 victim # 2

·Patrick H. Owen

RESR

CCHUNTAM

Restitution Recommended by the Prosecutor's
office. 1014.00 victim# 3

Patrick H. Owen

ORDR
APSC
NOTA

CCHUNTAM
TCOLSOMC
TCOLSOMC

Order for Restitution and Judgment

Patrick H. Owen

Appealed To The Supreme Court

Patrick H. Owen

NOTICE OF APPEAL

000083
Patrick H. Owen

1/14/2011
1/19/2011

12/7/2012

Order for DNA Sample and Thumbprint
Impression

Patrick H. Owen

02/04/2011 03:00 PM:
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12/27/2012

ORDR

CCHUNTAM

Order re: Time for Filing of Appeal

12/31/2012

ORDR

CCHUNTAM

Order Appointing State Appellate Public Defender Patrick H. Owen
on Direct Appeal

1/31/2013

NOTC

CCTHIEBJ

Notice of Transcript Lodged - Supreme Court
Docket No. 40602

Judge
Patrick H. Owen

Patrick H. Owen
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CODY J. FORTIN # 72953
I.C.C. K Pod 211-A
Post Office Box 70010
Boise, Idaho 83707
Petitioner pro se

OCT O6 2011
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk
By SAYTHAAA KHAM-ONE
Ol!PUTV

PAmct< H. OWEN
~ ·'

"·

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

CODY J. FORTIN,
Petitioner,
-vsTHE STATE OF IDAHO,

______________
Respondent.

"V PC l l 193l3,,;;;,

)
)
)
)
)
)

Civil Case Nlf. - - - - - - - District Court No. CR-2009-0019475

PETITION FOR POST
CONVICTION RELIEF

)
)
)

)

STATE OF IDAHO

)
: ss.
The County of ADA )

COMES NOW, CODY J. FORTIN, petitioner prose, in the above entitled cause; and,
who, respectfully presents this application for post conviction relief, based upon the law and
facts of the case, those grounds and causes more fully explained herein and after, as well as
the petitioner's affidavit in support hereof; said affidavit being attached hereto, and by this
reference, incorporated herein as though quoted in its respective entirety:
I.

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
A.

This matter brings before the Court a collateral attack upon the applicant's entry of a

plea(s) of guilty and subsequent sentencing; alleging, inter alia, that they are the wrongful
resti.lt of ineffective assistance of counsel which, along with other issues, would have been
available for argument on direct appeal had the petitioner's notice of appeal been timely filed.

INITIAL APPLICATION FOR POST CONVICTION RELIEF - Page 1 of 7.
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B.

Moreover, Notice is hereby provided to the Court and opposing parties, pursuant to

I.C. '19-4903, that the applicant lacks both the complete record and legal expertise needed
to properly prepare and present all the applicable issues or to attach the relevant portions of
the case record.
For these reasons alone, notice is being given that further amendment and discovery
will no doubt be required.

II.

JURISDICTION
A.

Petitioner is currently incarcerated within the Idaho Department of Corrections

(IDOC), and housed at the Idaho Correctional Center (ICC), South of Boise, pursuant to pleas
of guilty on charges of Assault and Battery on Certain Personnel, enhanced for Use of Deadly
Weapon, where he is serving sentences of five (5) years fixed, with fifteen (15) years
indeterminate, consecutive to a term of twelve (12) years fixed with a thirteen (13) years
indeterminate handed down in a companion case. Those pleas and sentences complained of
herein were imposed by the Honorable Patrick H. Owen, in criminal case CR-2009-0019475,
on October gth 2010, with a Judgment of Conviction and Commitment filed on October 15th
2010, in the Fourth Judicial District Court, County of Ada, State of Idaho.
B.

This petition challenges the constitutionality of those same pleas and sentences,

charging that there exists evidence of material facts and law, not previously presented nor
heard, which have abrogated the rights of the applicant guaranteed under the applicable
portions of the United States and Idaho State Constitutions, and thus require the withdrawal
of the petitioner's pleas of guilty or, at the very least, resentencing.
C.

Accordingly, jurisdiction is proper in this matter pursuant to Idaho Code 19-4901 et

seq., and Rule 57 of the Idaho Criminal Rules.

Furthermore, venue in these proceedings is

appropriately before this Court, since the crime( s) alleged occurred within Ada County.
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III.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND PRIOR PROCEEDINGS
A.

On October 14th 2011 the petitioner entered and stopped his car in the driveway of

his girlfriend's home, where upon his vehicle was blocked in and Fortin was accosted by
Boise police officers and detectives, pursuant to an arrest warrant, for an incident allegedly
occurring the previous day.
Reports of the exact events that transpired before the petitioner was subsequently
taken into custody vary depending upon the teller of the tale. For the moment it is sufficient
to say that an information was eventually handed down charging Fortin with assault with a
dangerous weapon (a knife) on the prior day, and, assault on a police officer, with a
dangerous weapon (the vehicle) on October 14th 2011.
B.

At his video arraignment, bond and a date for the preliminary hearing were set, and,

the office of the Ada County Public Defender was appointed to represent the petitioner.
Within days, appointed counsel approached Fortin with a deal offered by the
prosecutor, the terms of which were as follows: In consideration for pleas of guilty to assault
on the civilian and eluding a police officer, Fortin would be sentenced on those crimes to five
(5) fixed, fifteen (15) indeterminate and zero (0) fixed, five (5) years indeterminate
respectively; and, the state would drop both weapon enhancements and the assault on the
police officer.
C.

Fortin's parents retained a private attorney on his behalf and matters changed: An

amended complaint was filed, further amended and the charges and trials of October 13th and
14th separated at the request of Fortin's new counsel and against his expressed wishes.

While a series of motions and hearing were held on these matters, Fortin proceeded
to trial in the separated charges and was found guilty by jury in what was now being
designated as CR-FE-09-19383.

A timely appeal was filed in that matter and is presently

being pursued by conflict counsel, Greg Silvey, under Idaho Supreme Court Docket No.
38069-2010.
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D.

On October 30th 2010, the petitioner entered pleas, upon the advice of private

counsel, to three (3) separate charges resulting in those convictions and sentences complained
of herein and above, plus an eluding charge.

E.

Immediately following his sentencing Fortin spoke with his counsel, as did a member

of the petitioner's family requesting that a direct appeal be filed, as well as a motion for
reduction of sentence, pursuant to ICR Rule 35. Both the petitioner and the family member
were assured that each of those filings would occur.
Neither a Notice of Appeal, nor a motion for reduction of sentence were filed. Nor
was any explanation for not doing so provided either the petitioner or his family.
Here, ends the initial statement of the case and the course of the prior proceedings.

IV.
INITIAL CAUSES OF ACTION
A.
WHETHER nns AITORNEY'S FAILURE TO FILE A TIMELY AND REQUESTED
APPEAL ABROGATES THE PETITIONER'S RIGHTS UNDER THE FIFTH, SIXTH AND
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION, AS WELL AS
mosE SAME GUARANTEES UNDER THE APPLICABLE PORTIONS OF IDAHO'S STATE

CONSTITUTION, CONSTITUTING INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL PER SE?
1.

Simply said: The fact that the petitioner asked for and was told that a timely direct

appeal as well as a ICR Rule 35 motion for reduction would be filed by counsel, 1 who than
failed to do so, creates a presumptive case of ineffective assistance of counsel under both
state and federal law ..
Unless the respondent can legitimately rebut this allegation, Fortin is entitled to a
resentencing, nunc pro tune, thus retriggering the time frames to file his notice of appeal.

B.
DID THE PETITIONER'S AITORNEY'S FAILURE TO ADVISE ms CLffiNT THAT
THE PLEAS BEING ENTERED ALLOWED FORTIN TO BE SUBJECTED TO CONSECUTIVE
SENTENCES RESULT IN THE ACCEPTANCE OF PLEAS MADE UNKNOWINGLY,
UNWILLINGLY AND/OR UNINTELLIGENTLY; THUS ENTITLING THE PETITIONER,
UNDER THE PROTECTIONS OF THE STH, 6TH, AND 14TH AMENDMENTS TO THE U.S.

INITIAL APPLICATION FOR POST CONVICTION RELIEF - Page 4 of 7.
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.

CONSTITUTION, AND THOSE SAME COMPARABLE RIGHTS GUARANTEED BY THE
IDAHO STATE CONSTITUTION, TO WITHDRAW
TO HAVE

ms PLEA OR,

IN THE ALTERNATIVE,

ms SENTENCES RUN CONCURRENTLY ?

Trial counsel failed to inform his client that the separation of the charges and his
subsequent entries of pleas would subject him to a sentencing where any argument for
concurrent terms under the doctrine of a common course of conduct and scheme would be
strictly discretionary on the part of the court, and were not a part of any plea bargain.
The foregoing conduct is unquestionably substandard performance on its face, as well
as preponderately prejudicial.

Further, the choice not to inform his client of this material

fact was neither a strategic nor a tactical decision on the part of counsel.
The result was that the petitioner pied guilty to a sentencing scheme which almost
doubled the term he believed could be imposed and far exceeded the state's original offer to
plead.

1
See: Fortin's Affidavit in. Support of Post Conviction Relief, 1 7-8, included herewith
and incorporated hereby, in this regard.

VI.

CONCLUSION
A.

The foregoing material facts and circumstances are sufficient to warrant appointment

of counsel, judicial notice of the entire underlying record, and an evidentiary hearing on the
these and any additional issues brought to light following the court's appointed counsel or the
petitioner being granted possession of the record. Specific relief is sought as follows:
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VII

PRAYER FOR RELIEF
WHEREFORE, the petitioner respectfully moves this Court to enter an Order
providing the following:

1.

ACCEPTANCE OF JURISDICTION and VENUE in these proceedings, with normal

advancement upon the Court's calendar:

2.

THAT JUDICIAL NOTICE is to be taken of the entire underlying record, pursuant to

I.R.E. 201, in district court number CR-2009-0019475, and:
3.

APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL, pursuant to I.C. 19-4904 and 19-852;

4.

THAT DIRECTS the Clerk to serve the respondent a conformed copy of this filing,

pursuant to I. C. 19-4902; thus REQUIRING the respondent to provide an Answer, as well as
those relevant portions of the record within thirty (30) days of receipt thereof, pursuant to

I.e. 19-4906(a).
5.

THAT, following the passing of an adequate amount of time for the parties to

prepare, an evidentiary hearing occur; and,

6.

THAT, in the event, that the preponderance of evidence submitted should eventually

demonstrate that the petitioner has suffered from ineffective assistance of counsel under the
law and in view of the facts submitted, that petitioner's plea of guilty be withdrawn and/or
the subsequent sentences be modified and/or set aside: and/or,
7.

THAT the petitioner be granted a resentencing, nunc pro tune, and allowed to file a

notice of appeal on any and all of those issues legally available had his counsel done so as
promised, with the balance of these proceedings stayed pending the outcome of that appeal:
8.

AND, for any additional relief the Court may deem necessary or proper under these

INITIAL APPLICATION FOR POST CONVICTION RELIEF - Page 6 of 7.

000090

circumstances.

DATED this

4th

day of OCTOBER 2011.
Respectfully submitted,

CO ~RT IN
Petitioner pro se

VIII.

VERIFICATION
I, DO HEREBY CERTIFY and AFFIRM that I am the petitioner in
the foregoing
application for post conviction relief, and; that I have read the conten
ts thereof in their
entirety, and, that the facts contained therein are true and correc
t to the best of my
knowledge and belief in all regards.

DATED this

4th

day of OCTOBER 2011.

COD
Ye/l;;TIN
Petitioner-Affiant pro
SUBSCRIBED and SWORN to before me, a Notary Public, this

***

SEAL

4th

se

day of OCTOBER 2011.

***

KATHY K. RADFORD

Commission Expires:

N01)\RY PUBLIC
STATE Of' IDAHO
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ADA COUNTY PUBLIC DEFENDER
Attorney for Petitioner

DEC D'7 20ti

MICHAEL W. LOJEK, ISB #5611
Deputy Public Defender
200 West Front Street, Suite 1107
Boise, Idaho 83702
Telephone: (208) 287-7400
Facsimile: (208) 287-7409

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

CODY J. FORTIN,
Case No. CV-PC-2011-0019323
Petitioner,

AMENDED PETITION FOR
POST-CONVICTION RELIEF

vs.
STATE OF IDAHO,
Respondent.

COMES NOW the petitioner, CODY J. FORTIN, by and through his attorney ofrecord,

MICHAEL W. LOJEK, Ada County Public Defender's Office, and brings before this Court,
pursuant to Idaho Code§ 19-4901, the following Amended Petition for Post-Conviction Relief.
THE PETITIONER ALLEGES

1)

The petitioner is currently housed at the Idaho Correctional Center in Ada

County, Idaho.
2)

A judgment of conviction was entered against the petitioner after a conviction in

Ada County Case No. CR-FE-2009-0019475 on or about October 15, 2010, for:
COUNT I:

ASSAULT AND BATTERY ON CERTAIN PERSONNEL, FELONY,
Idaho Code§ 18-915;

COUNT II:

FLEEING OR ATTEMPTING TO ELUDE A PEACE OFFICER,
FELONY, Idaho Code § 49-1404;
.

COUNT III:

USE OF A DEADLY WEAPON IN THE COMMISSION OF A CRIME,
FELONY, Idaho Code§ 19-2520.

3)

'

The petitioner was represented by attorney Charles C. Crafts.

AMENDED PETITION FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIBF
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4)

The petitioner was sentenced on October 8, 2010, to a twenty-year term in the

custody of the State Board of Correction, with a minimum period of confinement of five (5)
years for COUNTS I and III, and to three hundred sixty (360) days in the Ada County Jail with
credit for three hundred sixty (360) days served for COUNT IL This sentence was ordered to run
consecutively to a twenty-five (25) year sentence, with twelve (12) years fixed, which was
imposed on August 10, 2010, in connection with Ada County Case No. CR-FE-2009-0019383.
PROCEEDINGS

5)

The petitioner timely filed a pro se Petition and Affidavit for Post-Conviction

Relief on October 6, 2011.
6)

The Court appointed the Ada County Public Defender's Office on October 17,

7)

The petitioner, through appointed counsel, hereby supplements his Verified

2011.
Petition for Post-Conviction Relief with this Amended Petition as contained herein.
8)

In support of his Verified Petition and Amended Petition, the petitioner hereby

submits the attached email correspondence between defense counsel and the petitioner's mother,
dated April 24-25, 2011.
CLAIMS FOR RELIEF

9)

That, pursuant to Idaho Code § 19-4901(a)(l), the petitioner was denied effective

assistance of counsel required by the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution and
Article I, section 13, of the Idaho Constitution, alleging the following:
a)

Defense counsel failed to file a Notice of Appeal within forty-two (42)
days of the Court's order imposing sentence, as requested by the
defendant.

b)

Defense counsel failed to file a Motion for Reduction/Reconsideration of
Sentence pursuant to Idaho Criminal Rule 35 within one hundred twenty
(120) days of the Court's order imposing sentence, as requested by the
defendant.
RELIEF REQUESTED

10)

The petitioner requests the Court for an order vacating the judgment of conviction

and re-entering the judgment so as to allow the petitioner time to perfect a timely appeal, or;

AMENDED PETITION FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF
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The petitioner requests the Court for an order nunc pro tune extending the

11)

l"'-/idi

deadlines by which an appeal and Rule 35 Motion may be filed.
r-]~9

DATED, this _f:::_ day ofOecember 2011.

MICHAEL W. LOJEK
Attorney for Petitioner

CERTIFICATE OF VERIFICATION

I, CODY J. FORTIN, the petitioner named in the above-entitled action, first being duly
sworn upon my oath, depose and say that I have read the foregoing amended petition and the
documents, affidavits, and exhibits attached to this amended petition are hereby sworn to be true
and correct to the best of my information, knowledge, and belief.

_k_ day of December 2011.

DATED, this

c
~
Peti .

STATE OF IDAHO)
)ss.
County of A ~ )

I,

~ ~~

, a notary public, do hereby certify that on this

L:,~

day of

b3:£M~ 20_i_l_, personally appeared before me CODY J. FORTIN who, being by
me first duly sworn, declared that he is the petitioner named in the above-entitled action, that he
signed the fore,ggiJv;~: document as the petitioner in the above-entitled action, and that the
~· i

·~,

statemen~s'~~,~C.P.~t~d are true.
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

I HEREBY CERTIFY, that on this..]__ day of December 2011, I mailed (served) a
true and correct copy of the within instrument to:
CHRISTOPHER S. ATWOOD
Ada County Prosecutor's Office
Interdepartmental Mail
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From: ann fortin (fortinanny@gmail.com)
Sent: Fri 11/11/11 2:20 PM
To:
LouAnn Cooper (louanncooper@hotmail.com)

---------- Forwarded message ---------From: Charles Crafts <idaholitigator@gmail.com>
Date: Mon, Apr 25, 2011 at 1:45 PM
Subject Re:
To: ann fortin <fortinanny@gmail.com>

Ann,
There may have been some miscommunication between Cody and I. We did file the appeal on the most
significant case. The one where he received 12 years. On the second case - where he received 5 years,
nothing was filed because he pied guilty and I did not believe there were any genuine issues on that
case. Also, we discussed the fact that on the 12 year case he has a very good chance of having his case
overturned. So, if that happens, I was hoping to re-negotiate both cases again with the prosecutor and
try to have him out in five, which is the amount he has to serve on the second case. I thought I made
this clear to Cody, and I can assure you I do not believe an appeal or a Rule 35 on the second case would
get much traction. So, strategically, I felt like we were making the best decision.
On Apr 24, 20114:42 AM, "ann fortinif <fortinanny@gmail.com> wrote:
> Charles,
>
> I received a letter from Cody today and was informed that the rule 35 and
> appeal paperwork were never filed. I am at a loss for words. So that means
> that the harsh sentence stands? I really thought that was you last part of
> the job that you would have to do. I emailed you quite sometime ago and
> never got a reply, but assumed you were busy with other cases so didn't give
> it a second thoughU really don't understand why this happened ...

>
> Ann

http://snl06w.snt106.mai1.live.com/mail/PrintMessages.aspx?cpids=43a2b... 11/11/2011
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MAY 24 2013

CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk
By STEPHANIE VIDAK
DEPUTY

GREG H. BOWER
Ada County Prosecuting Attorney

Jonathan M. Medema
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney
ISB No.: 5623
200 West Front Street, Room 3191
Boise, ID 83702
Telephone: (208) 287-7700
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
CODY JAMES FORTIN
Petitioner,
vs.
STATE OF IDAHO,
Respondent.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

CASE NO. CV-PC-2013-08285

MOTION FOR SUMMARY
DISPOSITION

COMES NOW, the State of Idaho, by and through Jonathan M. Medema, Deputy
Prosecuting Attorney for Ada County, and does hereby move for summary disposition of Cody
James Fortin's petition for post-conviction relief pursuant to Idaho Code § 19-4906(c) on the
general basis that, in light of the pleadings, answers, admissions, and the record of the underlying
criminal case, the petition fails to raise a genuine issue of material fact.
The specific grounds for dismissal of each of Mr. Fortin's allegations are as set forth in
the Brief in Support of the State's Motion for Summary Disposition. The Brief in Support is
incorporated herein.
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DATED this

~Jtfay of May 2013.
GREG H. BOWER
Ada County Prosecuting Attorney

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this

23

day of May 2013, I caused a true and

correct copy of the foregoing MOTION FOR SUMMARY DISPOSITION to be placed in the
United States mail, postage prepaid, addressed to:
Cody J. Fortin, Inmate #72953
I.C.C. K Pod 216-B
PO Box 70010
Boise, ID 83707
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A.M_____

MAY 2 4 2013
CHRISTOPHeA 0. RICH Cl
By STEPHANIE VIDAK
DEPUTY

'

GREG H. BOWER
Ada County Prosecuting Attorney
Jonathan M. Medema
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney
ISB No.: 5623
200 West Front Street, Room 3191
Boise, ID 83702
Telephone: (208) 287-7700

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
CODY JAMES FORTIN
Petitioner,
vs.
STATE OF IDAHO,
Respondent.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

CASE NO. CV-PC-2013-08285

BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR
SUMMARY DISPOSITION

COMES NOW, the State of Idaho, by and through Jonathan M. Medema, Deputy

Prosecuting Attorney, and does hereby provide this brief in support of the state's motion for
summary disposition of Cody James Fortin's petition for post-conviction relief pursuant to Idaho
Code§ 19-4906(c).
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On October 13, 2009 Mr. Fortin was at a home in Ada County. While at the home, Mr.
Fortin stabbed James Shayler in the neck and shoulder area with a knife. Mr. Fortin also slashed
Mr. Shayler's face with the knife. The wounds to Mr. Shayler's torso were life threatening. (Trns.
8-6-10 SH, p. 50, lns 7-8). The next morning, October 14, 2009, the State of Idaho charged Mr.
Fortin by complaint with committing the crimes of Aggravated Battery and alleged the sentence
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enhancement that Mr. Fortin had used a deadly weapon in the commission of that aggravated
battery. The court assigned that case the moniker CR-FE-2009-0019383 and issued a warrant for
Mr. Fortin' s arrest.
Later in the day of October 14, 2009, police located Mr. Fortin. Mr. Fortin fled from
police in a vehicle and on foot. Mr. Fortin was eventually apprehended.
On October 15, 2009, the State filed a separate complaint charging Mr. Fortin with the
crimes of Aggravated Battery on a Law Enforcement Officer, Eluding a Peace Officer, and
Leaving the Scene of an Accident Involving Property Damage. The State also alleged that Mr.
Fortin had used a deadly weapon in his commission of the Aggravated Battery on the Law
Enforcement Officer. The court assigned this case the number CR-FE-2009-0019475.
Mr. Fortin appeared before a magistrate in both cases on October 15, 2009 for his initial
appearance pursuant to I.C.R. 5. The magistrate scheduled the preliminary hearing in both cases
for October 29, 2009 1 and appointed counsel to represent Mr. Fortin in both cases.
On October 29, 2009, private counsel substituted as counsel of record in both cases and
requested that the preliminary hearing in both cases be continued. The court reset the preliminary
hearing in both cases for November 23, 2009. The State filed an amended complaint in the 19383
case changing the language, but not the nature, of the aggravated battery charge involving Mr.
Shayler.
On November 23, 2009 Mr. Fortin waived his preliminary hearing in each case. In
exchange for the waiver, the State made the following plea offers to Mr. Fortin. In the 19383
case, the State would require Mr. Fortin to plead guilty to both the Aggravated Battery and the
sentence enhancement. The State would limit its recommendation to a unified sentence of fifteen
years consisting of five determinate and ten indeterminate. The State extended a separate plea
bargain in the 19475 case. That offer required Mr. Fortin to plead guilty to the Eluding a Police
Officer charge. The State would dismiss the remaining charges. The State agreed to recommend a

I This appears to have been done for convenience or simply because I 0-29 was the next day available for
preliminary hearings. There was no motion to consolidate the charging documents for trial pursuant to I.C.R 13.

BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY DISPOSITION - 2
000100

•

•

sentence on the Eluding charge of five years consisting of two years determinate and three years
indeterminate. The State would recommend the sentence in the 19475 case run consecutively to

the 19383 case.
Both cases were assigned to the same District Court and the State filed Informations
charging Mr. Fortin with crimes and enhancements identical to those in the complaints.
Mr. Fortin appeared before the District Court in both cases for arraignment on December
4, 2009 and again for entry of plea on December 18, 2009. At the entry of plea hearing, Mr.
Fortin stood silent in each case and the District Court entered pleas of not guilty in each case.
The District Court set each case for trial to begin February 24, 2010. It appears the Court
intended to start the trial in one case immediately upon the conclusion of the other. The cases
were never consolidated for a simultaneous trial pursuant to I.C.R. 13.
After a continuance, Mr. Fortin proceeded to trial in the 19383 case in May of 2010. The
jury found Mr. Fortin guilty of the Aggravated Battery as well as the sentence enhancement. The

19475 case was reset for trial on August 30, 2010.
On August 6, 2010, the Court sentenced Mr. Fortin in the 19383 case. The Court imposed
a unified enhanced sentence on the Aggravated Battery of twenty-five years with twelve years
fixed.
On August 30, 2010, the date of trial in the 19475 case, Mr. Fortin pleaded guilty to
Aggravated Battery on a Law Enforcement Officer, Eluding a Police Officer and the sentence
enhancement of Using a Deadly Weapon in the Commission of the Aggravated Battery. The
State dismissed the charge regarding leaving the scene of a vehicle collision. There was no
further plea agreement.
On October 8, 2010, the Court sentenced Mr. Fortin in the 19475 case. The Court
imposed an enhanced sentence of fifteen years with five years determinate on the Aggravated
Battery on a Law Enforcement Officer charge. The Court ordered that this sentence run
consecutively to the sentence in the 19383 case that was earlier imposed. The Court imposed and
commuted a sentence on the Eluding crime.
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Mr. Fortin timely appealed from the conviction in the CR-FE-2009-0019383 case. The
Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction in an unpublished opinion - Docket No. 38069 (Ct.
App. April 30, 2012). Mr. Fortin's petition for review was denied and the remittitur issued May
22, 2012.
Mr. Fortin did not appeal from the CR-FE-2009-0019475 conviction and sentence.
However, in October of 2011, Mr. Fortin filed an application seeking post conviction relief from
the judgment and sentence in the 19475 case. The Court assigned that case the number CV-PC2011-19323. Mr. Fortin's pro se petition alleged that his trial counsel was ineffective in three
ways: failing to file a motion for sentence reduction pursuant to I.C.R. 35, failing to file a timely
notice of appeal, and that trial counsel failed to inform his client that the separation of the
charges and his subsequent entry of pleas would subject him to a sentencing where any argument
for concurrent terms under the doctrine of a common course of conduct and scheme would be
strictly discretionary on the part of the court. The Court appointed counsel to assist Mr. Fortin
and with counsel's assistance, Mr. Fortin filed an amended application for post conviction relief.
In his amended petition, Mr. Fortin abandoned the claim regarding advice about separation of the
charges and alleged only the failure to file a motion for sentence reduction and failure to file a
timely notice of appeal.
The parties eventually stipulated that the Court grant Mr. Fortin limited post conviction
relief by essentially "restarting" the time period under which Mr. Fortin could appeal his
conviction in the 19475 case. The Court dismissed Mr. Fortin's other claim. Mr. Fortin has
subsequently filed a notice of appeal in the 19475 case which appeal is currently pending.
On May 7, 2013, Mr. Fortin filed a prose application seeking post conviction relief from
the conviction and sentence imposed in CR-FE-2009-0019383. Mr. Fortin has not filed a motion
requesting appointment of counsel. Mr. Fortin's claims all involve ineffective assistance of his
trial counsel. The State will address each claim individually below. Mr. Fortin has failed to
support any of his claims with sufficient admissible evidence to warrant a trial.
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Mr. Fortin's first claim is that his trial counsel was constitutionally ineffective because
"at the time of trial counsel's paid retention a plea bargain was on the table which would have
resulted in a maximum term of imprisonment of fifteen (15) years on two felony convictions with
concurrently imposed sentences in consideration for pleas of guilty. Counsel's advice to separate
the charges and proceed to trial on each, instead, was clearly a matter of substandard
performance." The State reads Mr. Fortin's claim to allege his trial counsel was deficient in two
respects - advising Mr. Fortin to reject the plea bargain Mr. Fortin alleges was 'on the table' and
somehow causing separate trials in the 193 83 and 194 75 cases.
The State will first address Mr. Fortin's claim that his counsel was constitutionally
ineffective for advising Mr. Fortin to have his fair trial.
An application for post-conviction relief under the Uniform Post Conviction Procedure
Act (UPCPA) is civil in nature. Stuart v. State, 118 Idaho 865,869,801, P.2d 1216, 1220 (1990).
Like a plaintiff in a civil action, the applicant for post-conviction relief must prove by a
preponderance of evidence the allegations upon which the application for post-conviction relief
is based. Grube v. State, 135 Idaho 24, 995 P.2d 794 (2000). Unlike the complaint in an ordinary
civil action, however, an application for post-conviction relief must contain more than "a short
and plain statement of the claim" that would suffice for a complaint under I.R.C.P. 8(a)(l).
Rather, an application for post-conviction relief must be verified with respect to facts within the
personal knowledge of the applicant. LC. §19-4903. The application must include affidavits,
records, or other evidence supporting its allegations, or must state why such supporting evidence
is not included. Id.
The post-conviction petitioner must make factual allegations establishing each essential
element of the claim, and a showing of admissible evidence must support those factual
allegations. Roman v. State, 125 Idaho 644, 647, 873 P.2d 898, 901 (Ct. App. 1994); Drapeau v.
State, 103 Idaho 612, 617, 651 P.2d 546, 651 (Ct. App. 1982); Stone v. State, 108 Idaho 822,
824, 702 P .2d 860, 862 (Ct. App. 1985). The district court may take judicial notice of the record
of the underlying criminal case. Hays v. State, 113 Idaho 736, 739, 745 P.2d 758, 761 (Ct. App.
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1987), aff'd 115 Idaho 315, 766 P.2d 785 (1988), overruled on other grounds State v. Guzman,
122 Idaho 981, 842 P.2d 660 (1992).
A court is required to accept the petitioner's unrebutted allegations as true, but need not
accept the petitioner's conclusions. Ferrier v. State, 135 Idaho 797, 799, 25 P.3d 110, 112 (2001).
When the alleged facts, even if true, would not entitle the applicant to relief, the trial court may
dismiss the application without holding an evidentiary hearing. Stuart v. State, 118 Idaho 865,
869, 801, P.2d 1216, 1220 (1990), citing Cooper v. State, 96 Idaho 542, 545, 531 P.2d 1187,
1190 (1975). Allegations contained in the application are insufficient for the granting of relief
when (1) they are clearly disproved by the record of the original proceedings, or (2) do not justify
relief as a matter of law. Id.
To prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, the defendant must demonstrate
both that (a) his counsel's performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and
(b) there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, the result of the proceedings
would have been different. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88 (1984); LaBelle v.
State, 130 Idaho 115, 118, 937 P.2d 427, 430 (Ct. App. 1997). "Because of the distorting effects
of hindsight in reconstructing the circumstances of counsel's challenged conduct, there is a strong
presumption that counsel's performance was within the wide range of reasonable professional
assistance -- that is, 'sound trial strategy."' Davis v. State, 116 Idaho 401, 406, 775 P.2d 1243,
1248 (Ct. App. 1989) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689-90); Aragon v. State, 114 Idaho 758,
760, 760 P.2d 1174, 1176 (1988). A petitioner must overcome a strong presumption that counsel
"rendered adequate assistance and made all significant decisions in the exercise of reasonable
professional judgment" to establish that counsel's performance was "outside the wide range of
professionally competent assistance." Claibourne v. Lewis, 64 F.3d 1373, 1377 (9th Cir.1995)
(quoting, Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690).
Until about one year ago, a petitioner who had a fair trial and was sentenced in
accordance with the law would not be heard to complain about his regret for having rejected a
plea bargain, even if he alleged that decision was based on counsel's advice. Then, the United
States Supreme Court decided Missouri v. Frye,_ U.S._, 132 S.Ct. 1399, 182 L.Ed.2d. 379
BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY DISPOSITION - 6

000104

(2012) and Lafler v. Cooper,_ U.S._, 132 S.Ct. 1376, 182 L.Ed.2d 398 (2012). In Frye, the
Supreme Court decided that the constitutional right to a fair trial includes a right to effective
assistance of counsel during plea bargains. In Lafler, the Supreme Court dictated that in order to
establish prejudice when a petitioner alleges counsel was ineffective for advising a petitioner to
assert his right to trial, "a defendant must show that but for the ineffective advice of counsel there
is a reasonable probability that the plea offer would have been presented to the court (i.e., that the
defendant would have accepted the plea and the prosecution would not have withdrawn it in light
of intervening circumstances), that the court would have accepted its terms, and that the
conviction or sentence, or both, under the offer's terms would have been less severe than under
the judgment and sentence that in fact were imposed." Lafler, 132 S.Ct. at 1385.
Neither Em nor Lafler contain much guidance about exactly what constitutes ineffective
assistance of counsel during the plea bargaining process. In f:m, counsel failed to communicate
a plea bargain to Frye and Frye later pleaded guilty without a plea agreement2 • f:m, 132 S.Ct. at
1404. In Lafler, Missouri conceded ineffective assistance of counsel. The opinion contains no
details about what Lafler' s attorney did or did not do.
A petitioner seeking post conviction relief has the burden of alleging facts in his petition
that would establish the elements of his claim and to support those allegations with admissible
evidence. LC. § 19-4903. In his petition, Mr. Fortin says only that his counsel advised him to
proceed to trial. Mr. Fortin fails to say what his counsel told him about why counsel felt Mr.
Fortin should refuse to waive his constitutional right to a trial. Mr. Fortin seems to take the
position that the mere fact that counsel advised him to go to trial and he lost at trial is per se
ineffective assistance. The United States Supreme Court has yet to go that far. If this Court
accepts Mr. Fortin's position, every criminal defendant would simply go to trial and see if they
win confident in the knowledge that they could always come back and take advantage of any plea
bargain through the post conviction process if they lose at trial. Mr. Fortin has failed to allege any

2 Although the prosecutor at sentencing recommended a sentence identical to one alternative set forth in the
plea agreement.
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facts to support his conclusion that his lawyer's advice to demand that which the constitution
guarantees - a full and fair trial-was in any way objectively unreasonable.
Similarly, Mr. Fortin's petition has failed to allege sufficient facts to establish prejudice
from his decision to go to trial under the test articulated in Lafler. Mr. Fortin has to show that,
absent his counsel's advice, the plea agreement 1) would have been presented to the court, 2) the
court would have accepted its terms,3 and 3) that the conviction or sentence under the plea
agreement would have been less severe than under the judgment and sentence. in fact imposed.
Mr. Fortin alleges that he rejected a plea agreement by the prosecutor where "Mr. Fortin
would be sentenced on those crimes to five (5) fixed, fifteen (15) indeterminate and zero (0)
fixed, five (5) years indeterminate" (Pet. p. 3) on the charge of Aggravated Battery in the 19383
case and Eluding a Police Officer in the 19475 case·. Mr. Fortin later alleges that the plea bargain
"would have resulted in maximum term of imprisonment of fifteen (15) years on two felony
convictions with concurrently imposed sentences." (Pet. p. 4). While Mr. Fortin claims that this
was the plea agreement, Mr. Fortin has offered no evidence that the Court would have followed
such agreement and imposed the recommended sentences. Mr. Fortin has not alleged that the
plea agreement was contemplated to be binding on the Court pursuant to I.C.R. 1 l(t)(l)(C). Even
if it were, Mr. Fortin has presented no evidence that the court would have accepted such
agreement. Similarly, Mr. Fortin has presented no evidence that the Court would have followed
the recommendation of the State had Mr. Fortin accepted the plea agreement as he alleges it
existed. Mr. Fortin has also failed to present any evidence that, had he chosen to plead guilty, the
Court would have accepted his guilty plea. Mr. Fortin took the position in the trial court that he
did not use a knife against Mr. Shayler. Mr. Fortin has failed to submit admissible evidence with
his petition that would establish either ineffective assistance of counsel or resulting prejudice.
This Court should dismiss this claim.

3 In states like Idaho, where the majority of plea agreements are not binding on the court, it is hard to know
what the Supreme Court means when it says that the trial court would have accepted the terms of the agreement. It
clearly means something other than that the court would have imposed the sentence recommended in the plea bargain
because that is the third prong of the Lafler test for prejudice.
·
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Mr. Fortin alleges that his counsel was ineffective for "separating the cases for trial". Mr.
Fortin's claim is disproved by the record below. The trials in cases CR-FE:-2009-0019383 and
CR-FE-2009-0019475, while set for trial to begin the same day, where never consolidated for
trial pursuant to I.C.R. 13. The trials were separate because they were separate crimes resulting
out of separate incidents. Mr. Fortin's attorney did not cause the cases to be tried separately as he
alleges. Therefore, the Court must dismiss this claim. Further, Mr. Fortin's only allegation of
prejudice is that he lost the opportunity to argue for concurrent sentences. This claim is disproven
by the law and the record below. A sentencing court has broad discretion to make a sentence for
one crime consecutive to crimes the defendant is already serving. State v. Lawrence, 98 Idaho
399 (1977). Additionally, Mr. Fortin can assert no prejudice in this case from this alleged error.
Mr. Fortin seeks post conviction relief only from the conviction and sentence in the CR-FE2009-0019383 case. The Court imposed sentence in this case before Mr. Fortin was ever
convicted of the crimes in the CR-FE-2009-0019475 case. The Court's decision to run the
sentences in the 19475 case consecutively to the sentences it imposed months earlier in the 19383
case are what Mr. Fortin appears to complain about. However, he is not seeking relief from the
19475 convictions in this petition4 • The Court must dismiss this claim.
Mr. Fortin next alleges that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to file a motion in
limine regarding Mr. Fortin's alleged gang affiliation, or in the alternative to move for an

immediate mistrial, "resulted in the jury hearing the petitioner was a gang member." (Pet. p. 5).
Mr. Fortin refers to a comment by Mr. Shayler during cross-examination. The relevant testimony
is as follows:
Q. Now, at some point, I assume - did you ever get a clear look at
this knife? It seems you like - you just say it was a shiny object.
A. Not a clear look, but I believe getting cut across the face and
stabbed in the neck and seeing a shine, you know it's a knife.
Q. So it's just your opinion that this was a knife?
A. I knew it was a knife. I couldn't determine which kind.

4 Any attempt to do so would be barred by the statute of limitations and by operation of J.C. §19-4908 as
Mr. Fortin has already sought post conviction relief from the 19475 case.
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•
Q. How do you know it was a knife?
A. Because it punctured me in the neck and cut me across the face,
and I know most gang members carry those. (Trial Tms. 5-17-09
at 30).
'
Counsel for Mr. Fortin objected and the Court instructed the jury to disregard the
statement regarding the gang member. (Trial tms. 5-17-09 at 31). Mr. Fortin claims counsel was
ineffective for failing to file a motion in limine, presumably to prevent the State from introducing
evidence of Mr. Fortin's alleged gang membership. However, Mr. Fortin has failed to show how
the filing of a motion in limine would have prevented what occurred. The witness' answer came
on cross-examination5 • It was not introduced by the State. It was volunteered by the witness, even
though the State apparently advised its witnesses, including Mr. Shaylor, not to mention any
allegations of Mr. Fortin's gang membership. (Trial Tms. 5-17-09 at 45). Mr. Fortin fails to
establish how the filing of a motion in limine would have prevented the witness from making this
two-word blurb. Mr. Fortin has failed to show why his counsel should have anticipated this twoword blurb by the witness and, therefore, filed a motion to prevent it. Mr. Fortin has failed to
establish ineffective assistance or any resulting prejudice. The Court must dismiss this claim.
Mr. Fortin also alleges that his counsel was ineffective for failing to move for an
immediate mistrial after the witness' statement about gang membership. This claim is disproved
by the record. Counsel for Mr. Fortin immediately objected. Counsel also told the Court he
wanted to make a motion outside the presence of the jury. (Trial Tms. 5-17-09 at 31 ). The Court
told counsel it would take up his motion later on. At the end of Mr. Shayler's testimony, Mr.
Fortin's counsel did in fact move for a mistrial which was denied by the trial court. (Trial Tms.
5-17-09 at 41-48). Mr. Fortin's claim is disproved by the record below and must be dismissed.
Mr. Fortin alleges his attorney failed to conduct a pre-trial interview and to subpoena
defense witness Casey Smith which resulted in the trial judge's refusal to allow counsel to recall

5 Mr. Fortin has not alleged any error by his attorney for asking the question that elicited the witness'
answer.
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that witness. However, Casey Smith testified at trial and was subject to questioning by counsel
for Mr. Fortin. There is nothing in the record to establish that counsel for Mr. Fortin attempted to
recall Ms. Smith and the Court refused because Ms. Smith was not under subpoena. Mr. Fortin
fails to allege exactly what his counsel should have discovered in a pre-trial interview and asked
Ms. Smith at trial. Mr. Fortin claims counsel could have impeached her with her statements to
police, but counsel did so. (See Trial Trns. 5-17-09 at 71-74). Mr. Fortin's claims are conclusory
and disproven by the record below. Mr. Fortin has failed to allege any facts to establish either
deficient performance or resulting prejudice. The Court must dismiss this claim.
Mr. Fortin alleges that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the
admission of evidence of Mr. Fortin's flight from police during trial on the basis of relevance.
Evidence of flight can be relevant to show consciousness of guilt. See State v. Moore, 131 Idaho
814, 819-20, 965 P.2d 174, 179-80 (1998); State v. Rossignol, 147 Idaho 818, 821-11
(Ct.App.2009); State v. Friedley, 122 Idhao 321 (Ct.App.1992). The inference of consciousness
of guilt may be weakened when the defendant harbors an ulterior motive to flee. Rossignol, 14 7
Idaho at 821. However, existence of alternative reasons for the escape goes to the weight of the
evidence and not to its admissibility. Rossignol, at 822. The trial court explicitly determined that
evidence of Mr. Fortin's flight from police was relevant, but limited the details the State could
introduce. (See Trial Trns. at 220-229). Mr. Fortin has not shown any evidence of an alternative
motive other than that argued by his counsel at trial. (Trial Trns. at 214-215). Mr. Fortin has not
shown any reason to believe the Court's ruling would have been different had counsel
specifically objected on the basis of relevance. Counsel did lodge a general objection. (Trial
Trns. at 229). The Idaho Court of Appeals concluded that the District Court did not abuse its
discretion by failing to balance the unfair prejudice of the flight evidence against its probative
value. State v. Mr. Fortin, Docket No. 38069 (Ct. App. 4-30-12). Mr. Fortin has failed to
establish deficient performance or resulting prejudice. The Court must dismiss this claim.
Mr. Fortin alleges that his trial counsel should have objected to the wording of the verdict
form. Mr. Fortin alleges the verdict form "destroyed his presumption of innocence by listing
seven possibilities of guilt before the entitled first consideration of not guilty." (Pet. p. 6). Mr.
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Fortin's complaint is without merit. The jury verdict form was in a format approved by the Idaho
Supreme Court. It required the jury to decide whether Mr. Fortin was guilty or not guilty of
Aggravated Battery. It then required the jury to consider the weapon enhancement if it convicted
Mr. Fortin of Aggravated Battery and to consider lesser offenses if the jury acquitted Mr. Fortin
of Aggravated Battery. Mr. Fortin cites to no authority that this was improper. Mr. Fortin fails to
state any legal basis upon which his attorney should have objected. Mr. Fortin has failed to
establish his counsel's performance was objectively unreasonable. Mr. Fortin has also failed to
establish any prejudice as a result of the error he alleges. The jury convicted Mr. Fortin of the
first offense that it was required to consider under the verdict form. Mr. Fortin fails to say how
the inclusion of the other crimes and offenses on the verdict form prejudiced Mr. Fortin in any
way. The Court must dismiss this claim.
Mr. Fortin next alleges that his attorney failed to file a motion to reduce sentence
pursuant to I.C.R. 35. Mr. Fortin fails to set forth any facts to show how Mr. Fortin was
prejudiced by this failure. Mr. Fortin has presented no evidence about any change in
circumstances between his sentencing and the expiration of the timeframe for the filing of the
Rule 35 motion. Mr. Fortin has shown no evidence of why the Court would have chosen to grant
him mercy had his attorney filed the motion as requested. Mr. Fortin has failed to establish any
prejudice and the Court must dismiss this claim.
Lastly, Mr. Fortin alleges that his appellate attorney was ineffective for two reasons. First,
Mr. Fortin claims his appellate counsel was ineffective for failing "to federalize any issues raised
on direct appeal." (Pet. p. 6). The State has no idea what Mr. Fortin intends to allege. Mr. Fortin
has failed to cite to any specific action he alleges his appellate counsel failed to take, any specific
legal authority regarding why such action is necessary, or any prejudice as a result of such alleged
inaction on the part of his appellate counsel. Mr. Fortin's claim, whatever it is, is conclusory. The
Court must dismiss this claim. Second, Mr. Fortin alleges his appellate counsel failed to object to
a record that contains an erroneous transcript of the hearing to determine a restitution amount. It
is clear that the transcript of the February 4, 2010 hearing transposes the name of the prosecutor
with the name of Mr. Fortin's counsel in the labeling of the speaker. Mr. Fortin has made no
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claim of prejudice as a result of this error by the transcriptionist. The transcript remains clear
who is speaking when and Mr. Fortin raised no issues regarding restitution on appeal. Mr. Fortin
has failed to show any prejudice from his appellate counsel's alleged failure to object to the
transcript. The Court must dismiss Mr. Fortin's claims regarding his appellate counsel.
CONCLUSION
Mr. Fortin's ineffective assistance of counsel claims fail to raise a genuine issue of

material fact regarding both deficient performance and resulting prejudice. The State is therefore
entitled to summary disposition pursuant to Idaho Code § 19-4906(c).
The State requests that this Court grant the State's Motion for Summary Disposition.
DATED this ~ y of May 2013.

GREG H. BOWER

ey
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this

23

day of May 2013, I caused a true and

correct copy of the foregoing BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY
DISPOSITION to be placed in the United States mail, postage prepaid, addressed to:
Mr. Cody J. Fortin, Inmate #72953
I.C.C. K Pod 216-B
P0Box70010
Boise, ID 83707
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MAY 2 4 2013
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk
By STEPHANIE VIDAK
DEPUTY

GREG H. BOWER
Ada County Prosecuting Attorney
Jonathan M. Medema
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney
ISB No.: 5623
200 West Front Street, Room 3191
Boise, Idaho 83702
Telephone: (208) 287-7700

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
CODY JAMES FORTIN
Petitioner,
vs.
STATE OF IDAHO,
Respondent.
___________

TO:

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CV-PC-2013-08285
NOTICE OF HEARING

Cody James Fortin, Pro Se Petitioner: Please take notice that on the 18th day of

June 2013 at the hour of 3:30 p.m. of said day, or as soon thereafter as counsel can be heard,
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney, Jonathan M. Medema, will move this Honorable Court regarding
the State's Motion for Summary Disposition in the above-entitled action.

DATED this .£day of May 2013.

GREG H. BOWER
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this

2..3

day of May 2013, I caused a true and

correct copy of the foregoing NOTICE OF HEARING to be placed in the United States mail,
postage prepaid, addressed to:
Cody J. Fortin, Inmate #72953
I.C.C. K Pod 216-B
PO Box 70010
Boise, ID 83707
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CODY J. FORTIN # 72953
I.C.C. K Pod 216-B
Post Office Box 70010
Boise, Idaho 83707
Petitioner pro se

AJJ

::2 /

F1i.:,iM.----

JUN O6 2013
CHflUSTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk
ly l'IIC N!!LSON
r,!!l"t.rrY

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
CODY J. FORTIN,
Petitioner,
-vsTHE STATE OF IDAHO,

__________
Respondent.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Civil Case No. CV-PC-2013-08285
District Court No. CR-2009-0019383

MOTION FOR AN EXTENSION OF
TIME TO RESPOND TO SUMMARY
JUDGMENT AND TO VACATE THE
JUNE 1sm 2013 HEARING ON THE
SAME STATE'S MOTION

COMES NOW, CODY J. FORTIN, petitioner prose, in the above encaptioned cause of
action; and, who, respectfully moves this Honorable Court, pursuant to Rule 6(b) and Rule
56(c) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, for a forty-five (45) day enlargement of time in

which to file a response and objection to the respondent's May 23rd 2013 motion for
summary disposition and to vacate the forthcoming June 18, 2013 hearing; thereby causing
said response to be filed on or before July 25th 2013.
Petitioner's motion is predicated upon the Rules, the record to date, the included
affidavit and memorandum of points and authorities in support hereof; and, by this reference
incorporated herein as though quoted in their respective entireties

DATED this 4th day of JUNE 2013.
Respectfully submitted by:

Y J. FORTIN
etitioner-Movant prose

C
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CODY J. FORTIN# 72953
I.C.C. K Pod 216-B
Post Office Box 70010
Boise, Idaho 83707

A.M

JUNO 6 2013

Petitioner pro se

CHfUS10PHEFI D. RICH, Cterk
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
CODY J. FORTIN,
Petitioner,
-vsTHE STATE OF IDAHO,

_______________
Respondent.

)
)
)
)

)
)
)
)
)
)

Civil Case No. CV-PC-1308285
District Court No. CR-2009-0019383

AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF A
MOTION FOR EXTENSION OF
TIME TO RESPOND TO MOTION
FOR SUMMARY DISPOSITION &
TO VACATE THE HEARING

STATE OF IDAHO

)
: ss.
The County of ADA )

CODY J. FORTIN, after first being duly sworn upon his oath, deposes and says:
1.

AFFIANT is the petitioner pro se in the above encaptioned matter, and brings this

motion for enlargement of time and to vacate the June 18, 2013 hearing in good faith, absent
any purpose to delay or annoy:
2.

AFFIANT has only a limited education and has no knowledge of case law and legal

procedure; as a point of fact, all of these filings have been prepared by a former inmate law
clerk, who may or may not be able to continue to aide YOUR AFFIANT since the rules that
govern such assistance are growing increasingly more restrictive:

3.

AFFIANT has never seen nor possessed the entire case file or fully examined a

complete copy of the underlying record and discovery in these matters:

4.

THAT the Idaho Correctional Center's legal resource office, where the petitioner is

housed, has no state or federal reporter series, and contains only the most basic of pre-
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printed forms, some of which including those for post conviction relief are legally inadequate:

5.

YOUR AFFIANT has not been advised by either the court, or the Ada County Public

Defender's Office that counsel has been appointed or denied in these matters.

6.

AFFIANT is of the reasonable belief that absent this enlargement of time he will be

unable to protect his substantial rights.

7.

YOUR AFFIANT has not sought any previous extensions of time in these regards,

nor has he discussed this request with opposing counsel; however, contemperaneously with
this filing a true and correct copy of each of the included documents has been provided the
respondent by mail.

FURTHER sayeth YOUR AFFIANT naught.
DATED this 4th day of JUNE 2013.

Petitioner-Affiant pro se

SUBSCRIBED and SWORN to before me, a Notary Pubic{~ 4:

:1LP_::_

~--rAwPuBLIC - IDAHO

***

SEAL

***

JAMES G. OU:NN
NOTAflY PUBUC
STATE OF JDAHO

Commission Expires:

1;1.12.l13
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JUN O6 2013

CODY J. FORTIN # 72953
I.C.C. K Pod 216-B
Post Office Box 70010
Boise, Idaho 83707

CHRISTOPHEFt D. AICH, C1erk
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Petitioner pro se

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT

OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
CODY J. FORTIN,

)
)
)
)
)

Petitioner,
-vs-

Civil Case No. CV-PC-2013-08285
District Court No. CR-2009-0019383

MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND
AUTHORITIBS IN SUPPORT OF A
MOTION FOR ENLARGEMENT OF
TIME TO RESPOND AND OBJECT
TO SUMMARY DISPOSITION

)

THE STATE OF IDAHO,

)

_______________

)
)

Respondent.

)

COMES NOW, CODY J. FORTIN, petitioner prose, in the above cause of action; and
presents the following points of fact and legal authority in support of an extension of time to
respond and object to the respondent's May 23rd 2013 motion for summary judgment.
I.

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
This matter brings before the Court a request for enlargement of time and the
vacation of the forthcoming June 18th 2013 hearing, pursuant to the Rules and based upon
the fact that the state's filings are both premature and outside the parameter of the governing
rules of civil procedure.
II.

STANDARD OF LAW
Motions filed under I.C. 19-4906{c) are the functional equivalent of those sought
under Rule 56{c) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. Newman v. State, 140 Idaho 491, 95
P.3d 642 (2004). Moreover, it is - with few exceptions - the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO ENLARGE AND VACATE - 1 of 2.

000118

that govern the proceedural rules for post conviction relief. See: I.C.R. 57(b); and, Ferrier v
State of Idaho, 135 Idaho 797, 25 P.3d 110 (2001, respectively, in this regard.

m.
MATERIAL FACTS AND LEGAL ARGUENDO
Simply said the respondent's motion for summary disposition and notice of hearing do
not comport with the procedural rules governing these types of filings.
I.R.C.P. 56(c) requires that motions for summary judgment and their supporting

documentation "shall be served at least twenty eight (28) days before the time fixed for the
hearing." Rule 56(c). Further, where as in the instant matter, service is being accomplished
by mail, these same documents must be mailed no less than thirty-one (31) days in advance
of the hearing. Ponderosa Paint Mfg. Inc. v. Yack, 125 Idaho 310, 870 P.2d 663 (C.O.A.
1994). The mailing certificate on the respondent's filings are dated May 23rd 2013 and the

hearing set for June 18th 2013: Clearly outside the rules.
Finally, it warrants judicial notice that the petition provides notice that the pro se
petitioner lacks the complete record and discovery is likely to be required to protect his
substantial rights See: P.C.R. p.2 12; as well as the fact that the petitioner has yet to receive
any notice on his motion for appointment of counsel, nor any contact by the office of the
public defender in this same regard.
Accordingly, and with all due respect to opposing counsel, the state's motion for
summary disposition is premature and violates the rules; thus, at the very least, the
petitioner is entitled to a requested enlargement of time to respond to the state's filings and
vacation of the present hearing date.

DATED this 4th day of JUNE 2013.
Respectfully submitted by:
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CERTIFICATE OF FILING AND SERVICE BY MAILING
I, DO HEREBY CERTIFY and AFFIRM that the original and a true and correct copy
of the foregoing MOTION FOR EXTENSION OF TIME TO RESPOND TO SUMMARY
JUDGMENT, with accompanying documentation were served upon Christopher D. Rich, Clerk
of Fourth Judicial District Court for filing, and the respondent by placing the same in the
U.S. Mail, this 4th day of JUNE 2013, addressed as follows:

MR. CHRISTOPHER D. RICH
Clerk of District Court
Fourth Judicial District
ADA COUNTY COURTHOUSE
200 Front Street
Boise, Idaho 83702
MR. JONATHAN M. MEDEMA
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney
Office of Ada County Prosecutor
200 West Front Street, Rm. 3191
Boise, Idaho 83702

J. FORTIN
itioner-Affiant pro se
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A.M.

»JI), J ti

FILED

P.M._ _ __

JUN 1 O2013
, Clerk

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRIC
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF A ~
CODY J FORTIN,

Case No.: CV PC 13 8285

Plaintiff,
ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR
APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL

vs.
STATE OF IDAHO,
Defendant.

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Plaintiffs Motion for Appointment of Counsel is
granted and Ada County Public Defender's office, or an attorney appointed by Ada County
Public Defender's office, a duly licensed attorney in the State of Idaho, is hereby appointed to
represent said Plaintiff in all proceedings involving this Petition for Post Conviction Relief.
DATED this

_1L_ day o~013.

PAT
District Judge

c c=PA- PD Fov-hl'\

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO APPOINT COUNSEL
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;

·-'""!'----

JUN 25 2013 ~ ~D.RICH
S y ~. . . . . Clerk
~

GREG H. BOWER
Ada County Prosecuting Attorney
Jonathan M. Medema
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney
ISB No.: 5623
200 West Front Street, Room 3191
Boise, Idaho 83702
Telephone: (208) 287-7700

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
)
)
Case No. CV-PC-2013-08285
)
Petitioner,
)
vs.
NOTICE OF HEARING
)
)
STA TE OF IDAHO,
)
)
Respondent.
)
TO: CODY J. FORTIN and the Ada County Public Defender, his Attorney of
CODY J. FORTIN

_________ _______

Record, please take notice that on the 30th day of July 2013, at the hour of 3:00 p.m. of said day,
or as soon thereafter as counsel can be heard, Deputy Prosecuting Attorney, Jonathan M.
Medema, will move this Honorable Court regarding the State's Motion for Summary Dismissal
in the above-entitled action.

DATED this _;dj.ay of June 2013.

GREG H. BOWER

an . Medema
By:
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney

NOTICE OF HEARING (FORTIN}, Page 1

e

000122

•
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

.2f_

day of June 2013, I caused to be served, a true
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this
and correct copy of the foregoing Notice of Hearing upon the individual(s) named below in the
manner noted:
Ada County Public Defender
200 W. Front Street, Rm. 1107
Boise, ID 83702

o By depositing copies of the same in the United States mail, postage prepaid, first class.
~ y hand delivering said document to defense counsel.
By depositing copies of the same in the Interdepartmental Mail.
o By informing the office of said individual(s) that said copies were available for pickup at
the Office of the Ada County Prosecutor.
o By faxing copies of the same to said attorney(s) at the fa · ile number: _ _ __

Co

NOTICE OF HEARING (FORTIN), Page 2

e

000123

~• .,......-l

FILED

A"lQ~-P.M.----

·JUL O2 2013

1

.L

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF

2

THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

3

4

CODY J. FORTIN,
5

Petitioner,

6
7

vs.

8

STATE OF IDAHO,

9

10
11

l2

Case No. CV-PC-2013-08285
MEMORANDUM DECISION
AND ORDER RE: APPOINTMENT
OF COUNSEL, WAIYER OF FILING
FEES, RELEASE OF THE PRESENTENCE REPORT, AND JUDICIAL
NOTICE OF UNDERLYING FILES

Res ondent.
Before the Court are Cody J. Fortin's ("Fortin") motions for appointment of counsel, waiver

13

I of filing fees, release of the pre-sentence report, and judicial notice in connection with his petition

14

I' for post-conviction relief.

'"

II underlying files, not waive fees, and will issue an order releasing the pre-sentence report to counsel.

..1 .•,

As stated below, the Court will appoint counsel, take judicial notice of

16

Background
~,

1

.,

~

On May 19, 2010, in Ada County Case No. CR-FE-2009-19383, Fortin was convicted by a
~

.L

Cl

l

~j

jury of Aggravated Battery, Felony,§§ 18-903(a), 907(a) and Use of a Deadly Weapon in the

20

Commission ofa Crime. Felony,§ 19-2520. On August 10, 2010, Fortin was sentenced to the

21

custody of the State Board of Correction of the State of Idaho for an aggregate term of twenty-five

2 L.,
23

(25) years, with the first twelve(] 2) years fixed and the remaining thirteen (13) years indeterminate.
Fortin appealed his conviction and the Idaho Court of Appeals affirmed in an unpublished case. See

:14

State v. Fortin, Docket No. 38069 (Ct. App. April 30, 2012).
,, C

,:.;:)

26

J
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•
On August 30, 2010, in Ada County Case No. CR-FE-2009-19475, Fortin pleaded guilty to
1

Aggravated Battery on Law Enforcement, Felony, Idaho Code§§ 18-903(b), 907(b), 915(1);
3

Eluding a Peace Officer, Felony, Idaho Code§ 4-1404(2)(c); and Use of a Deadly Weapon in the

4

Commission of a Crime. Felony, § 19-2520. As to Eluding a Peace Officer, the Court commuted

5

the sentence to time served. As to the Aggravated Battery and the enhancement, Fortin was

6

sentenced to the custody of the State Board of Correction of the State of Idaho for an aggregate term

7

of twenty (20) years, with the first five (5) years fixed and the remaining fifteen (15) years
8

indeterminate. This sentence was imposed consecutively to the sentence in the case cited above. It
appears that Fortin has filed an appeal as to this matter in addition to the previously adjudicated
10

]1
., ')
.1~

l3
l_,.,"

appeal.
Fortin is currently serving his sentence in the custody of the Idaho Department of Correction .
On May 7, 2013, Fortin filed a prose Petition for Post-Conviction Relief. On the same day, Fortin
filed, prose: a motion requesting that the Court to take judicial notice of the files and records in
both underlying criminal cases, a motion to release the PSI, a motion to waive filing fees, and a

16

motion for the appointment of counsel. The petition alleges numerous claims of ineffective
l7

I assistance of counsel.
l 'l

Discussion

19
20

Fortin requests that counsel be appointed to assist him in this matter. "The Court of Appeals

21

has ruled that when a district court is 'presented with a request for appointed counsel, the court must

22

address this request before ruling on the substantive issues in the case."' Charboneau v. State, 140

23

I Idaho 789, 792, 102 P.3d 1108, 1111 (2004) (quoting Fox v. State, 129 Idaho 881,934 P.2d

24

947(Ct.App.1997)).
2S
26
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•
The Uniform Post-Conviction Procedure Act provides in part that "a court-appointed
1
2

attorney may be made available to the applicant ... " in a post-conviction action. Idaho Code § 19-

3

4904. Thus, the decision of whether to grant or deny a request for court-appointed counsel is in the

4

discretion of the trial court. Plant v. State, 143 Idaho 758, 760-61, 152 P.3d 629, 631-32 (Ct. App.

5

2006). In determining whether to appoint counsel, "the trial court should keep in mind that petitions

6

and affidavits filed by a pro se petitioner will often be conclusory and incomplete." Id (quoting

7

Charboneau, 140 Idaho at 792). The trial court must, therefore, "afford some leniency to prose
8

petitioners whose petitions may be inartful or incomplete." Id. If an applicant alleges facts that
9

10

raise the possibility of a valid claim, the district court should appoint counsel in order to give the

11

applicant an opportunity to work with counsel and properly allege the necessary supporting facts.

12

Charboneau, 140 Idaho at 793. On the other hand, if claims are so patently frivolous that they could

13

not be developed into viable claims even with the assistance of counsel, the court may decline to

14

appoint counsel. Newman v. State, 140 Idaho 491,493, 95 P.3d 642,644 (Ct. App. 2004).

1.5

The Court finds that Fortin is indigent based upon the submitted prison account records and

16

the Court's previous appointment of the State Appellate Public Defender. The Court also finds that
'7
.L'

at least one claim is not so patently frivolous as to preclude its development into a viable claim.
18
19
20

21

Therefore, in an exercise of its discretion, the Court will appoint Fortin counsel to assist him in this
matter.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Ada County Public Defender, or his designee is hereby
appointed as Counsel for the petitioner.

23

Additionally, the Court will deny the motion to take judicial notice of the entire files of both

24

underlying cases, Case Nos. CR-FE-2009-193883 and CR-FE-2009-19475. In the Court's view, the
25
26

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER- PAGE 3

000126

proper procedure is for the Court to take note of specific matters that are part of the files. These
1

2
3

items must be made a part of the record in this case. The Court will take judicial matters of those
items in the underlying files that are made a part of this file.
As to the PSI, the Court may issue an appropriate order releasing the PSI to Fortin's counsel

4
5

once designated.

6

There are no filing fees associated with the filing of a post-conviction action. See Appendix

7

A to the I.R.C.P. at H(IO). Accordingly, the Court rejects the motion to waive fees because there
8

are no fees to waive.
9

Conclusion
1()

As discussed above, the Court will grant Fortin's motion for appointment of counsel. The

11

l?

Court will deny the blanket request for judicial notice. The Court will deny the fee waiver. Finally,

1.3

the Court may issue an order releasing the PSI to Fortin's counsel, if counsel demonstrates good

14

cause.
IT IS SO ORDERED.

16

Dated this _ _/ _ day of July 2013.
17

18
19

Patrick H. Owen
District Judge

20

21

22
23

24
25

26
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•

•
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

1

2
3
4
5
6

I hereby certify that on the-#=-" day of July 2013, I mailed (served) a true and correct copy
of the within instrument to:
CODY J. FORTIN
ICC K POD 216-B
PO BOX 70010
BOISE ID 83707

7

8
9

10
11

12
13

14
15

CHRISTOPHER D. RICH
Clerk of the District Court

16
17

By~
Deputy Clerk

18

19
20
21
22
23

24
25
26
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:~.~ Utfl ~~~-·-Jul 1g 2013
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Cl2rl<

ADA COUNTY PUBLIC DEFENDER
Attorney for Petitioner

By ELYSHIA HOLMES
::>EPUT'I

D. David Lorello, Jr.
Deputy Public Defender
200 West Front Street, Suite 1107
Boise, Idaho 83702
Telephone: (208) 287-7400
Facsimile: (208) 287-7409
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
CODY J. FORTIN,
Case No. CV-PC-2013-08285

Petitioner,
MOTION FOR STAY OF
PROCEEDIN GS AND FOR LEAVE TO
AMEND PETITION

vs.
STATE OF IDAHO,
Res ondent.

COMES NOW the petitioner, CODY J. FORTIN, by and through his attorney, D. David
Lorello, Jr., Ada County Public Defender's Office, and moves this Court for an order staying
proceedings and allowing the petitioner to amend his petition after a discussion of issues with
appointed counsel. The petitioner requests a stay of sixty (60) days in order to review the file,
receive and review a copy of the presentence investigation report, receive and review transcripts,
and prepare an amended petition.
Dated this

18th

day of July 2013.

U:<~ ·~

D. DAv~LORELLb, JR.
Attorney for Defendant

MOTION FOR STAY OF PROCEEDINGS AND FOR LEAVE TO AMEND PETITION
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I HEREBY CERTIFY, that on this 18th day of July 2013, I mailed (served) a true and
correct copy of the within instrument to:
Jonathan Medema
Ada County Prosecutor's Office
Interdepartmental Mail

MOTION FOR STA Y OF PROCEEDINGS AND FOR LEAVE TO AMEND PETITION
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.,,o

NO.

•

t[8'·F1~
,_..P.M---

JUL 1 9 2013
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk

ALANE. TRIMMING
ADA COUNTY PUBLIC DEFENDER

By KATRINA CHRISTENSEN
DEPUTY

D. David Lorello, Jr.
Deputy Public Defender
200 West Front Street, Suite 1107
Boise, Idaho 83702
Telephone: (208) 287-7400
Facsimile: (208) 287-7409
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff,
vs.

Case No. CR-FE-2009-0019383
(Civil Case Ref: CV-PC-2013-08285)
MOTION TO RELEASE PSI

CODY J. FORTIN,
Defendant.
COMES NOW, D. David Lorello, Jr. of the Ada County Public Defender's Office, courtappointed counsel for Cody J. Fortin, and moves this Court, pursuant to Idaho Criminal Rule 32,
for an order releasing the presentence investigation report prepared in the above-entitled case
number to undersigned counsel.
The defendant recently filed a Petition for Post-Conviction Relief in Case No. CV-PC2013-08285. Subsequent to his filing, the Ada County Public Defender's Office was appointed
to represent the above-named defendant in post-conviction proceedings. To aid undersigned
counsel in the post-conviction proceedings and familiar counsel with the defendant's case,
counsel respectfully requests this Court release a copy of the presentence investigation report
generated in the above-entitled case number.
Dated this 18th day of July 2013.

Attorney for Defendant

~

MOTION TO RELEASE PSI
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...

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I HEREBY CERTIFY, that on this 18th day of July 2013, I mailed (served) a true and
correct copy of the within instrument to:
Jonathan Medema
Ada County Prosecutor's Office
Interdepartmental Mail

MOTION TO RELEASE PSI
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e

:~.:;o: 12 ~·~---JUL 2 9 2013

CHRISTOPHER 0. RICH, Clork
By STEPHANIE VIOAK
DEPUTY

GREG H. BOWER
Ada County Prosecuting Attorney
Jonathan M. Medema
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney
ISB No.: 5623
200 West Front Street, Room 3191
Boise, Idaho 83702
Telephone: (208) 287-7700

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

CODY J. FORTIN
Petitioner,
vs.
STATE OF IDAHO,
Respondent.
________________

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CV-PC-2013-08285
NOTICE OF HEARING

TO: CODY J. FORTIN and David Lorello, his/her Attorney of Record, please take
notice that on the 1J1h day of September 2013, at the hour of 3:00 p.m. of said day, or as soon
thereafter as counsel can be heard, Deputy Prosecuting Attorney, Jonathan M. Medema, will
move this Honorable Court regarding the State's Motion of Summary Dismissal and Motion to
Take Judicial Notice in the above-entitled action.
DATED this '1.lf_day of July 2013.

GREG H. BOWER

NOTICE OF HEARING (FORTIN), Page 1
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 2/-f' day of July 2013, I caused to be served, a true
and correct copy of the foregoing Notice of Hearing upon the individual(s) named below in the
manner noted:
David Lorello
Ada County Public Defender
200 W. Front Street, Rm. 1107
Boise, ID 83702

o By depositing copies of the same in the United States mail, postage prepaid, first class.
~ y hand delivering said document to defense counsel.
o By depositing copies of the same in the Interdepartmental Mail.
o By informing the office of said individual(s) that said copies were available for pickup at
the Office of the Ada County Prosecutor.
o By faxing copies of the same to said attomey(s) at the csimile number: _ _ __

NOTICE OF HEARING (FORTIN), Page 2
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NO·---~rr- -:::::---2,

FILED
AM
. ·----P.M.,

ALANE. TRIMMING
ADA COUNTY PUBLIC DEFENDER

AUG 2 3 2013

D. David Lorello, Jr.
Deputy Public Defender
200 West Front Street, Suite 1107
Boise, Idaho 83702
Telephone: (208) 287-7400
Facsimile: (208) 287-7409
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DIST

THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
STATE OF IDAHO,
Case No. CR-FE-2009-0019383
(Civil Case Ref: CV-PC-2013-08285)

Plaintiff,

ORDER RELEASING PSI

vs.
CODY J. FORTIN,
Defendant.

This matter having come before the court upon court-appointed counsel's motion, and for
good cause appearing, this Court hereby grants counsel's Motion to Release PSI.
A copy of the presentence investigation report prepared on behalf of the defendant in the
above-entitled case number shall be released to D. David Lorello, Jr., court-appointed counsel
for the defendant in Case No. CV-PC-2013-08285, to aid counsel in preparation of the pending
post-conviction proceedings.
Counsel is to make no copies of the report, shall not disclose the report to any other
person outside the office of the Ada County Public Defender, and shall surrender said copy to
this Court upon completion of the defendant's post-conviction proceedings in Case No. CV-PC2013-08285. Failure to comply with any portion of Idaho Criminal Rule 32 may be deemed a
contempt of court and may be subject to appropriate san1~~s.
SO ORDERED AND DATED this

4-

r

day of~~13.
I'

p

{
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't'.C

•

•
NO.-----:::~----: --FILED
;2.. .'lt.
A.M. _ _ _ _
,P.M.---:~----.__

C

AUG 2 3 2013
ADA COUNTY PUBLIC DEFENDER
Attorney for Petitioner
D. David Lorello, Jr.
Deputy Public Defender
200 West Front Street, Suite 1107
Boise, Idaho 83 702
Telephone: (208) 287-7400
Facsimile: (208) 287-7409
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
CODY J. FORTIN,

Case No. CV-PC-2013-08285
Petitioner,
ORDER GRANTING STAY OF
PROCEEDINGS AND FOR LEAVE TO
AMEND PETITION

vs.
STATE OF IDAHO,
Res ondent.

For good cause appearing, this Court hereby grants the Petitioner's Motion for Stay of
Proceedings and for Leave to Amend Petition. The petitioner shall be given sixty (60) days from
the entry of this order to file an amended petition in t h i s ~
SO ORDERED AND DATED this

1::1_ day ol~e>13.

~«~

ATRICK H. OWEN
,istrict Judge

ORDER GRANTING STA Y OF PROCEEDINGS AND FOR LEAVE TO AMEND PETITION
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NO.

A.M.ll!.[oQrii"~FiF1Lu:iEo~-----P.M. _ _ __

DEC 1 7 2013
(

.

B y ~ · RICH: Clerk
·

,UTY

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
CODY J FORTIN,
Petitioner,

Case No. CV PC 13 8285

vs.

NOTICE OF SCHEDULING
CONFERENCE UNDER I.R.C.P. 16(a)
and 16(b)

STATE OF IDAHO,
Respondent.

The Court has determined that this matter is appropriate for a scheduling order under
I.R.C.P. 16(b).
YOU ARE HEREBY NOTIFIED a telephonic scheduling conference is hereby set for
January 13, 2014, at 3:30 p.m. before the Honorable Patrick H. Owen. A scheduling order

under I.R.C.P. 16(b) may issue following this conference. The Court will initiate the call.
All parties must appear at this time in person or by counsel. Counsel must be the
handling attorney, or be fully familiar with the case, and have authority to bind his/her client and
law firm on all matters set forth in I.R.C.P. 16(a) and 16(b).
Dated this Il_day of December, 2013.
Christopher D Rich
Clerk of the Distri Court

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on this
day of December, 2013, I mailed (served) a true and

17

correct copy of the within instrument to:
Ada County Prosecuting Attorney
INTERDEPARTMENTAL MAIL

Ada County Public Defender
INTERDEPARTMENTAL MAIL

Christopher D Rich

:~:rk~rr:1~Ql1,1,1U:t....-----Depu~
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2014 at Cf/(!/)
C ~ . · , lerk
By: _ _ __ _ , ~ - - - - - lnga J
son, Deputy

2

/

3

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL ~TRICT OF

4

THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNT,~F ADA

5
6

CODY FORTIN,
Petitioner,

7

vs.

8

STATE OF IDAHO,

Case No. CVPC 13-08285

NOTICE OF STATUS CONFERENCE
Respondent.

9
10

YOU ARE HEREBY NOTIFIED That a Status Conference has been set on June 25,

11

2014 at 3:00 PM in the Ada County Courthouse regarding the above entitled matter.

12

,,,,''s1RI CT.

,,,,
Christopher D. Rich

13
14

Dated:

:..,,
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I HEREBY CERTIFY That on this .L...L_
~, 2014, I caused a true and
correct copy of the above and foregoing instrument to be mailed, postage prepaid, to:

18
19

Ada County Prosecuting Attorney, lnterdept Mail
Ada Co. Public Defender, lnterdept Mail

20

Christopher D. Rich

21

22
23
24
25

26

r
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•

Owen !Johnson 070914 Redlich
Time

Speaker

3:44:29 PM /.
3:44:32 PM
/
3:44:33 PM lcounsel
3:44:46 PM !Lorello
/
3:45:45 PM ict
3:48:49 PM 1ct
3:49:05 PM !ct
3:49:18 PM !

!

7/9/2014

Courtroom504
Note

I
!cody Fortin v. State CVPC13-08285

Status Conf. (Not
/Trnsp)
lLorello/Medema
!Adv. of status. working with def. on affidavit to factually support
/allegations in petition.
io. on specifics
fAllows 30d to supply affidavit.
!wm put on for scheduling conf. once received
!End

1 of 1
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NO·------;;iis,'",t...,~-

FILED...JlP.;3/'0 ::

ADA COUNTY PUBLIC DEFENDER
Attorneys for Defendant

A.M _ _ _

-~--l~n,,
NOVO 3 201~

D. DAVID LORELLO, JR., ISB #6232
Deputy Public Defender
200 West Front Street, Suite 1107
Boise, Idaho 83702
Telephone: (208) 287-7400
Facsimile: (208) 287-7409

eHAIS'teftHlfll 91 FtHilH

t'll-....

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

pc

STATE OF IDAHO,

Case No. CV~2013-8285

Plaintiff,
vs.

NOTICE OF HEARING
(Status Conference)

CODY J. FORTIN,
Defendant.
TO:

THE STATE OF IDAHO, Plaintiff, and to Jonathan Medema, Ada County
Prosecutor's Office:
YOU, AND EACH OF YOU, ARE HEREBY NOTIFIED that the above-named

Defendant will call on for hearing Status Conference, now on file with the Court. Said hearing
shall take place on November 19t\ 2014, at 3 :00 p.m., in the courtroom of the above-entitled
court, or as soon thereafter as counsel may be heard.
DATED, Friday, October 31, 2014.

fl

D. David Lorello, Jr.
Attorney for Defendant
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I HEREBY CERTIFY, that on Friday, October 31, 2014, I mailed (served) a true and
correct copy of the within instrument to:
Jonathan Medema
Ada County Prosecutor's Office
Interdepartmental Mail

--

NOTICE OF HEARING (Status Conference)
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Owen !Johnson 111914 Rlich
TirrlQ

Speaker

04:35:16 PM!.
04:35:18-PMl° .

-

Note

!Cody Fortin v. State CVPC13-08285

•

Courtroom504

Status Conf

J.

.04:35: 19.. PM.l.Counse1 ........... Lorello/. Medema·································-···························-············································-···························································
04:35:31 PM!+.,Ct
Calls case and reviews .
...............................................
........................................j.!...............................................................................................................................................................................................................................
..
04:35:35 PM! Lorello
!Responds- Clarifies status. Still intends on filing amended petition
.
!
!or affidavit or respond to motion to dismiss.
................................................, .........................................t ........................................................................................................................................................................................................--.....................
04:36:46 PM I: Ct
!: Further Status Review- 1/21 at 3

11/19/2014

1 of 1
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Owen !Johnson 012115 R!ich

•

Courtroom504

Time
Speaker
Note
04:11:05 PM!.
04:11 :12 PMJ
JCody Fortin v. State CVPC13-08285
Review{not tmsp)
i
i
................................................i .........................................i .................................................................................................................................................................................................................................
04: 11 : 14 PM! Counsel
! Lorello/ Medema
04: 11 :25 PM i Ct
! Calls case and reviews
met with def twice, ·relying on· original petition, asks 'f week to .......................
04: 11 :36 PM Lorello
respond to Motion for Dismissal
04:
12:02
PM
Medema
Asks
set for hearing .
................................................+...........................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................
04: 12:23 PM f Ct
j Clerk will contact and set for hearing, order for time to respond to
I
! state.
:

I
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Jl'C:1CL
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.?\ 16/1-s uH

NO.·-----.;~---l'°f
FILED - - ,

A

A.M·----..JP.M~

FEB O9 2015
CHR!STOPHcR D. RICH, Clerk
By TENILLE RAD
DCP:JTV

JAN M. BENNETTS
Ada County Prosecuting Attorney
Jonathan M. Medema
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney
ISB No.: 5623
200 West Front Street, Room 3191
Boise, Idaho 83702
Telephone: (208) 287-7700

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
CODY JAMES FORTIN
Petitioner,
vs.
STATE OF IDAHO,
Respondent.

_______________
TO:

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CV PC 2013 08285
NOTICE OF HEARING

D. David Lorello: PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that the above case has been set in

the Courtroom at the Ada County Courthouse, 200 West Front Street, Boise, Idaho, in front of
Judge Patrick Owen, on the 17th day of March, 2015, at 3 :00 p.m. for the Motion for Summary
Dismissal.

DATED this

kpday of February 2015.
JAN M. BENNETTS
Attorney

Deputy Prosecuting Attorney

NOTICE OF HEARING (FORTIN), Page 1
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this

Dt

day of February 2015, I caused a true and

correct copy of the foregoing NOTICE OF HEARING to be placed in the United States mail,
postage prepaid, addressed to:
HAND DELIVERED
MAILED POSTAGE PREP AID
___L"INTERDEP ARTMENT AL MAIL
VIA FACSIMILE

D. DAVID LORELLO
PUBLIC DEFENDER

\.H~Q~
~l
Assistant

L

NOTICE OF HEARING (FORTIN), Page 2
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e

LJDen
_JrACL

~ 1'f\ ,~- 0,1

NO·------=:-:-=~~ur-Jr.?f:--A.M. _ _ _ _F_1L~·~·

1Lrt;-

FEB 1 0 2015
CHR!STOPhEF: 0. HlCrl, C:e"K
B'./ TSN:U.£ F,A'J

ADA COUNTY PUBLIC DEFENDER
Attorney for Petitioner

!J'.:P:JT'/

D. David Lorello, Jr.
Deputy Public Defender
200 West Front Street, Suite 1107
Boise, Idaho 83 702
Telephone: (208) 287-7400
Facsimile: (208) 287-7409
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
CODY JAMES FORTIN,
Case No. CV-PC-2013-08285

Petitioner,
MEMORANDUM IN RESPONSE TO
STATE'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY
DISPOSITION

vs.
STATE OF IDAHO,
Respondent.

COMES NOW the petitioner, CODY JAMES FORTIN, by and through his attorney,
D. David Lorello, Jr., Ada County Public Defender's Office, and hereby submits to the
Court this Memorandum in Response to State's Motion for Summary Disposition. This
Memorandum is based upon the Petition for Post-Conviction Relief and the court records,
transcripts, and reports associated with the underlying criminal matter on file with the
Court.

FACTS

•

On October 14, 2009, Petitioner was charged with Aggravated Battery and the use of
a deadly weapon in commission of a crime (Case No. CR-FE-2009-0019383) and
issued a warrant for Petitioner's arrest.

MEMORANDUM IN RESPONSE TO STATE'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY DISPOSITION
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•

On October 15, 2009, Petitioner was charged with Aggravated Battery on a Law
Enforcement Officer, Eluding a Police Officer, and Leaving the Scene of an Accident
(Case No. CR-FE-2009-0019475).

•

On November 23, 2009, Petitioner waived his Preliminary Hearing in exchange for
the following offer:
•

CR-FE-2009-0019383: Plead guilty to Aggravated Battery plus the Use
of a Deadly Weapon Enhancement and the state would cap its
recommendation at a 5 + 10 = 15; and

•

CR-FE-2009-0019475: Plead guilty to Eluding a Police Officer and the
state would cap its recommendation at a 2 + 3 = 5 with said sentence
to be consecutive to CR-FE-2009-0019383.

•

As of November 23, 2009, Petitioner's total exposure, pursuant to plea negotiations
was 7 + 13 = 20.

•

On May 19, 2010, Petitioner was convicted after a jury trial of Aggravated Battery as
well as the enhancement in CR-FE-2009-0019383.

•

On August 6, 2010, the Court sentenced the Petitioner to 12 + 13 = 25 in Case No.
CR-FE-2009-0019383.

•

On August 30, 2010, Petitioner entered a guilty plea to Aggravated Battery on a Law
Enforcement Officer, Eluding a Police Officer, and deadly weapons enhancement in
Case No. CR-FE-2009-0019475.

•

Petitioner did not have any plea agreement at the time he entered his plea in Case
No. CR-FE-2009-0019475.

•

On October 8, 2010, the Court sentenced Petitioner to 5 + 10 = 15 in Case No. CRFE-2009-0019475 with said sentence to be served consecutive to the 12 + 13 = 25 in
Case No. CR-FE-2009-0019383.

•

Thus, upon the conclusion of both cases, Petitioner received a sentence of 17 + 23 =
40.

MEMORANDUM IN RESPONSE TO STATE'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY DISPOSITION
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SUMMARY DISMISSAL STANDARDS
A petition for post-conviction relief initiates a new and independent civil proceeding and
the petitioner bears the burden of establishing, by a preponderance of the evidence, that he is
entitled to relief. State v. Bearshield, 104 Idaho 676, 678 (1983). The petitioner must submit
verified facts within his personal knowledge and produce admissible evidence to support his
allegations. Id. (citing Idaho Code§ 19-4903).
Idaho Code § 19-4906 authorizes summary dismissal of an application for postconviction relief in response to a party's motion or on the court's own initiative. "To
withstand summary dismissal, a post-conviction applicant must present evidence
establishing a prima facie case as to each element of the claims upon which the applicant
bears the burden of proof." State v. Lovelace, 140 Idaho 53, 72, (2003) (citing Pratt v. State,
134 Idaho 581, 583, (2000)). Thus, a claim for post-conviction relief is subject to summary
dismissal pursuant to Idaho Code § 19-4906 only "if the applicant's evidence raises no
genuine issue of material fact" as to each element of petitioner's claims. Workman v. State,
144 Idaho 518, 522, (citing Idaho Code§ 19-4906(b), (c)). The facts set forth in the Petition
must be construed in the light most favorable to the Petitioner. Id.

ARGUMENT
I. Petitioner Has Raised A Genuine Issue of Material Fact About Whether His Trial
Counsel Was Deficient In Conveying Whether Or Not A Trial Was In The
Petitioner's Best Interest
The test for determining whether a defendant has received effective assistance of counsel
1s the two-part test established by the United States Supreme Court in Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, (1984); State v., Mathews, 133 Idaho 300, 306, (1999). The

first prong of the Strickland test requires the defendant to show that counsel's performance
was deficient. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. The second prong requires the defendant to "show
that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense." Id. In determining whether a
defendant was deprived of reasonably competent assistance of counsel as guaranteed by the
Idaho Constitution, Article 1, Section 13, Idaho courts employ the same two-part test.
Mathews, 133 Idaho at 306. Although Strickland concerned an allegation of ineffective
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assistance in a sentencing proceeding, the same standard applies equally to claims arising
from the plea process. Mathews, 133 Idaho at 306.
Deficient performance by an attorney is performance that falls outside the wide range of
II

professional norms. 11 Mathews, 133 Idaho at 306, Petitioner argues his attorney's
performance was deficient because his attorney failed to inform him that proceeding to trial
might allow the court to run each case consecutively to each other and increase his exposure
to a lengthy jail sentence. Petition at p. 5.
The second prong of the Strickland test requires the petitioner to show he was prejudiced
as a result of counsel's deficient conduct. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, Mathews, 133 Idaho at
306. In this case, Petitioner was prejudiced by counsel's advice to take Case No. CR-FE2009-0019383 to trial and forego the plea agreement. Petitioner's resulting sentence was, for
all practical purposes, more than twice the sentence he would have been recommended to
receive had he accepted the plea agreement instead of proceeding to trial. Accordingly, the
State's Motion for Summary Disposition should be denied.
II. Petitioner Has Raised A Genuine Issue of Material Fact About Whether His Plea
Was Knowing, Voluntary and Intelligent
Trial counsel is under an obligation to advise a client and ensure any guilty plea is
knowing and voluntary. "Where a defendant is represented by counsel during the plea
process and enters a plea upon the advice of counsel, the voluntariness of the plea depends
on whether counsel's advice was within the range of competence demanded of attorneys in
criminal cases." Dunlap v. State, 141 Idaho 50, 60. Further, "a guilty plea is only valid where
the plea represents a voluntary and intelligent choice among the alternative courses of action
open to the defendant." Id.
For a guilty plea to be valid, the entire record must demonstrate that the plea was
entered into in a voluntary, knowing, and intelligent manner. State v. Heredia, 144 Idaho 95,
96, (2007) (emphasis added). Whether a plea is voluntary and understood entails inquiry
into three areas: (1) whether the defendant's plea was voluntary in the sense that he
understood the nature of the charges and was not coerced; (2) whether the defendant
knowingly and intelligently waived his rights to a jury trial; and (3) whether the defendant
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understood the consequences of pleading guilty. State v. Colyer, 98 Idaho 32, 34, (1976). It is
the third prong that is at issue in this matter.
Petitioner maintains that his guilty plea was not intelligent because he misunderstood
and was not familiar with the terms of the agreement. Specifically, Petitioner states that trial
counsel was ineffective in advising to proceed to trial and which increased Petitioner's
exposure above and beyond the exposure in the initial plea agreement. Petition at pp. 4-5.
Petitioner's Petition creates a genuine issue of material fact as to what the plea
agreement actually was, what Petitioner's understanding of the plea agreement was, and
whether or not Petitioner understood the plea agreement and the concordant risks of
proceeding to trial. Petitioner's statement creates an issue as to whether his guilty plea and
decisions were knowing and voluntary. Since trial counsel is under an obligation to ensure
the Petitioner's plea is knowing and voluntary, Petitioner's statements create a genuine issue
of material fact as to whether trial counsel properly advised Petitioner prior to entry of his
guilty plea and about whether or not to proceed to trial. Accordingly, when interpreting the
facts in the light most favorable to the Petitioner, the Court must deny the State's Motion
and allow this case to proceed to hearing.

CONCLUSION

Therefore, for the reasons set forth above, the Petitioner respectfully requests that this

M

Court deny the State's Motion for Summary Disposition.
ft, A,..

DATED this _w_ day ofFebruary 2015.

!u1,

4,-,

-D-.D-A-V-ID_L_O_RE_L_uA--,J-R-.- - - - - Attorney for Petitioner
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this

JQ__ day of February 2015, I mailed a true and

correct copy of the foregoing to Jonathan Medema, Ada County Prosecutor's Office, by
placing the same in the Interdepartmental Mail.

Katie Van Vorhis
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FEB 2 6 2015
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk
By KATRINA HOLDEN
DEPUTY

JAN M. BENNETTS
Ada County Prosecuting Attorney
Jonathan M. Medema
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney
ISB No. 5623
200 West Front Street, Room 3191
Boise, Idaho 83 702
Telephone: (208) 287-7700

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
CODY JAMES FORTIN,
Petitioner,
vs.
THE STATE OF IDAHO,
Respondent.
________________

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CV PC 2013 08285
REPLY MEMORANDUM
REGARDING MOTION FOR
SUMMARY DISPOSITION

COMES NOW, the State of Idaho, by and through Jonathan M. Medema, Deputy
Prosecuting Attorney for Ada County, and submits the following:
The State has moved this Court for summary dismissal of Mr. Fortin's claims for postconviction relief. On February 10, petitioner filed a memorandum in response to that motion. The
State hereby submits this reply.
Prior to a decision in the year 2012 by five (5) Justices of the Supreme Court of the
United States, the American criminal justice system had spent well over 200 years concerned
primarily with ensuring that persons accused by the government of committing crimes receive a
fair trial by a jury of their peers before the government may punish them for such allegations. The

REPLY MEMORANDUM REGARDING MOTION FOR SUMMARY DISPOSITION
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cause, the placing of the burden of proof upon the government, the standard of proof required,
the right to a public trial, the right to a trial by jury, limitations on how jurors are selected or
excluded by the government, limitations on what types of evidence the government may show
such jurors; the right to counsel to assist the accused; the protection against compulsory selfincrimination; the ability to introduce evidence; the power to compel the production of evidence;
the right to, in advance, discover what the government's evidence at trial will be; and the right to
cross-examine witnesses presented by the government - to name but a few. We have developed a
body of law designed to protect the accused not only from malfeasance or abuse of power by the
accusatory body of the government, but also from errors by the Court and from incompetence on
the part of the accused's attorney.
In 2012, the five (5) Justices of the Supreme Court of the United States created a new
system of resolving accusations by the government that an individual has committed a crime the plea bargain system. What protections the Court will decide that the Constitution demands
defendants be afforded in the plea bargain system is still largely unknown. One can certainly not
divine those protections from the language of the Constitution itself or frankly, from the two (2)
opinions authored by those five (5) justices. So far, those Justices have only demanded that
defendants involved in the plea bargain process be provided with effective assistance of counsel
when deciding to reject a plea bargain.
Mr. Fortin's brief opposing the State's motion is understandably long on law and short on
facts. That is assuredly a direct consequence of Mr. Fortin's petition and affidavit being short on
facts. Mr. Fortin alleges simply that counsel advised him to reject the plea bargain, so he did. Mr.
Fortin offers no specifics about what counsel told him; no basis from which this Court might
conclude that counsel's performance fell below an objective standard of competence. He does
not allege that his counsel failed to communicate the terms of the agreement, as in Missouri v.
Frye; nor does he allege counsel advised him about some defense premised on misunderstanding

of the law, as in Lafler v. Cooper. He appears simply to say that counsel advised him to avail
himself of his constitution right to a fair trial and now he wishes he'd made a different choice. If
that is a sufficient showing to justify post-conviction relief of some sort under this new
constitutional right to plea bargain, then those five (5) justices of the Supreme Court of the
United States will have ironically destroyed what they themselves say is the reality of the
REPLY MEMORANDUM REGARDING MOTION FOR SUMMARY DISPOSITION
(FORTIN), Page 2
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•

criminal justice system - a system of pleas. If a defendant may reject a plea bargain and take his
chances at trial safe and secure in the knowledge that if he is convicted and sentenced to some
term greater than the plea bargain, he may always get back the benefit of the plea in postconviction relief simply by alleging that his lawyer was obviously incompetent in advising him to
have a trial (after all he lost and got a greater sentence); then there will be no incentive for the
State to offer plea bargains at all. And, in the irony of all ironies, it may be per se ineffective
assistance for defense counsel to ever recommend his client plead guilty. Who wouldn't risk the
trial if you can get the same sentence recommendation from the State in post-conviction relief?
The State submits that not even the majority in Frye and Lafler are willing to go that far. Surely
this Court should not be.
DATED this ~ a y of February 2015.
JAN M. BENNETTS

Deputy Prosecuting Attorney
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this

~\o

day of February 2015, I caused a true and

correct copy of the foregoing Reply Memorandum Regarding Motion for Summary Disposition
upon the individual(s) named below in the manner noted:
D. David Lorello, Ada County Public Defender
Q

By depositing copies of the same in the United States mail, postage prepaid, first class.

~By depositing copies of the same in the Interdepartmental Mail.
Q

By informing the office of said individual(s) that said copies were available for pickup at the
Office of the Ada County Prosecutor.

Q

By faxing copies of the same to said attomey(s) at the facsimile number: _ _ _ __
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By INGA
1

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRIC

2

THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF AD

3

4

CODY JAMES FORTIN,
Petitioner,

5

6

vs.

7

STATE OF IDAHO,

8

Case No. CV-PC-2013-08285
MEMORANDUM DECISION
AND ORDER RE: STATE'S MOTION
FOR SUMMARY DISPOSITION

Respondent.

9

10
11

12
13

Before the Court is the State's Motion for Summary Disposition Re: Cody James Fortin's
("Fortin") Petition for Post-Conviction Relief. As discussed below, the Court will grant the
motion.
Background and Prior Proceedings

14

On May 19, 2010, in Ada County Case No. CR-FE-2009-19383 ("19383 case"), Fortin
15

was convicted by a jury of Aggravated Battery, a felony, I.C. §§ 18-903(a), -907(a) and Use of a
16
l'7

Deadly Weapon in the Commission of a Crime, an enhancement, I.C. § 19-2520. The Honorable

18

Senior Judge McKee presided. The undersigned conducted a sentencing hearing on August 6,

19

2010. Fortin was present with his trial counsel, Charles Crafts ("Crafts"). Christopher S.

20

Atwood, Deputy County Prosecuting Attorney, appeared and argued for the State. The Court

21

imposed an enhanced sentence consisting of an aggregate term of twenty-five (25) years, with the

22

first twelve (12) years fixed, and the remaining thirteen (13) years to be indeterminate. The State

23

recommended a sentence of thirty (30) years with twenty (20) years fixed.

24
25
26

J
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Fortin did not file a motion for a reduction of sentence pursuant to LC.R. 35. Fortin
1

2
3

4

timely appealed his conviction and the Idaho Court of Appeals affirmed in an unpublished
opinion. See State v. Fortin, Docket No. 38069 (Ct. App. April 30, 2012).
On August 30, 2010, in Ada County Case No. CR-FE-2009-19475 ("19475 case"), Fortin

5

pleaded guilty to Aggravated Battery on Law Enforcement, a felony, LC.§§ 18-903(b), -907(b), -

6

915(1); Eluding a Peace Officer, a felony, LC.§ 49-1404(2)(c); and Use of a Deadly Weapon

7

During the Commission of a Crime, an enhancement, LC. § 19-2520. On October 8, 2010, the

8

Court held a sentencing hearing. The Court imposed a consecutive enhanced sentence on the

9

Aggravated Battery charge for an aggregate term of twenty (20) years, with the first five (5)
10

years fixed, and the remaining fifteen (15) years to be indeterminate. The State recommended a
11

consecutive enhanced sentence of twenty (20) years with eight (8) years fixed. As to the Eluding
12

13

14
15

a Peace Officer, the Court commuted the sentence to time served. Fortin did not file a Rule 35
motion for reduction in sentence or a notice of appeal.
On October 6, 2011, Fortin filed a petition for post-conviction relief in the 19475 case.

16

Ada County Case No. CV-PC-2011-19323. On November 2, 2012, the Court entered its

17

Judgment Granting Post Conviction Relief Per Stipulation in which the Court restarted the time

18

period to appeal the sentence. Fortin appealed his consecutive sentence of twenty (20) years and

19

the Court of Appeals affirmed in an unpublished opinion. See State v. Fortin, Docket No. 40602
20

(Ct. App. November 8, 2013).
21

Fortin is currently serving his sentences in the custody of the Idaho Department of
22

23
24

Correction. On May 7, 2013, Fortin filed a prose Petition for Post-Conviction Relief of the
19383 case, among other prose motions. As such, while the 19475 case is relevant to understand

25

26

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER RE: STATE'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY
DISPOSITION - PAGE 2

000157

the context of Fortin's petition, the Court will only consider the allegations in regards to the
1
2
3

4

19383 case in which Fortin was convicted by a jury. Fortin's initial petition for post-conviction
relief alleges that trial counsel and appeal counsel were ineffective as follows:
a) Trial counsel's advice to not accept the state's plea bargain and inform Fortin of
the consequences of his charges constitutes ineffective assistance;

5

6
7

8
9

b) Trial counsel's advice to separate the two proceedings, i.e., the 19383 case and the
19475 case, was against the express wishes of Fortin was ineffective assistance;
c) Trial counsel failed to file a motion in limine regarding Fortin's alleged gang
affiliation;
d) Trial counsel failed to move for an immediate mistrial following a witnesses
statement that Fortin was involved in gang activity;

10
11

12
13

e) Trial counsel failed to recall as a defense witness, Casey Smith, who Fortin claims
could have been impeached by the defense;

f) Trial counsel failed to object to the admission of flight evidence during trial;

14

g) Trial counsel failed to object to the wording of the verdict form, which destroyed
Fortin's presumption of innocence; and

15

h) Trial counsel failed to file a Rule 35 against the express wishes of Fortin

16

i) Appellate counsel failed to "federalize" some of Fortin's issues on direct appeal
and did not object to mistakes in the restitution hearing transcript

17

18
19

20

The State filed its Answer on May 25, 2013. On the same day, the State filed its motion for
summary disposition with a brief in support.
On July 2, 2013, the Court entered its Memorandum Decision and Order Re:

21

Appointment of Counsel, Waiver of Filing Fees, Release of the Pre-Sentence Report, and Judicial

22

Notice of Underlying Files. In its Order, the Court appointed counsel, took judicial notice of the

23

underlying files that were made a part of the record in this case, and released the pre-sentence

24
25

26
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report to appointed counsel. On August 23, 2013, the Court entered its Order Granting Stay of
1

2
3

Proceedings and For Leave to Amend Petition. However, Fortin did not file an amended petition.
On February 10, 2015, Fortin filed his opposition in response to the State's motion for summary

4

disposition. On February 26, 2015, the State replied. This matter came for hearing on March 17,

5

2015. D. David Lorello, Jr., Deputy Ada County Public Defender, appeared on behalf of Fortin

6

and presented argument. Fortin was not transported for the hearing. Deputy Ada County

7

Prosecuting Attorney, Shelley W. Akamatsu, appeared and argued for the State. The Court took

8

the matter under advisement and will address each claim in tum.

9

Discussion
10

The Uniform Post-Conviction Procedure Act, Idaho Code§ 19-4901 et seq. provides a
11

12
13

mechanism by which a person convicted of a crime may challenge the validity of a sentence by
showing, among other things, that the conviction is subject to collateral attack. See Idaho Code §

14

19-4901(a). 1 The remedy is not intended to be a substitute for a direct appeal from the sentence

15

or conviction. Idaho Code§ 19-490l(b). However, a criminal defendant may raise a claim of

16
17
18

"(a) Any person who has been convicted of, or sentenced for, a crime and who claims:
(1) That the conviction or the sentence was in violation of the constitution of the United States or the constitution or
laws of this state;
(2) That the court was without jurisdiction to impose sentence;
(3) That the sentence exceeds the maximum authorized by law;
(4) That there exists evidence of material facts, not previously presented and heard, that requires vacation of the
conviction or sentence in the interest of justice;
(5) That his sentence has expired, his probation, or conditional release was unlawfully revoked by the court in which
he was convicted, or that he is otherwise unlawfuJly held in custody or other restraint;
(6) Subject to the provisions of section 19-4902(b) through (g), Idaho Code, that the petitioner is innocent of the
offense; or
(7) That the conviction or sentence is otherwise subject to collateral attack upon any ground of alleged error
heretofore available under any common law, statutory or other writ, motion, petition, proceeding, or remedy: may
institute, without paying a filing fee, a proceeding under this act to secure relief." Idaho Code§ 19-4901(a)."
1

19
20

21
22
23

24
25

26
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ineffective assistance of counsel either on direct appeal or reserve the issue for post-conviction
1

2
3

proceedings. Nellsch v. State, 122 Idaho 426,430, 835 P.2d 661,665 (Ct. App. 1992).
A petition for post-conviction relief is a special proceeding that is civil in nature and

4

therefore is entirely new and independent from the underlying criminal action which led to the

5

conviction. Ferrier v. State, 135 Idaho 797, 798-99, 25 P.3d 110, 111-12 (2001) (citing Peltier v.

6

State, 119 Idaho 454,456,808 P.2d 373,375 (1991)). The petitioner seeking post-conviction

7

relief has the burden of proving the allegations upon which the petition is based by a

8

preponderance of the evidence. I.C.R. 57(c); Grube v. State, 134 Idaho 24, 27, 995 P.2d 794,

9

797 (2000).
10

The Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure generally apply to post-conviction proceedings, but a
11

12
13

petition in a post-conviction proceeding differs from that of an ordinary civil action because it
must contain more than a "short and plain statement of the claim" that would suffice for a

14

complaint under I.R.C.P. 8(a)(l). State v. Yakovic, 145 Idaho 437,444, 180 P.2d 476,482

15

(2008). Instead, an application for post-conviction relief must be verified with respect to facts

16

within the personal knowledge of the applicant, and affidavits, records or other evidence

17

supporting its application must be attached, or the application must state why such supporting

18

evidence is not included within the application. I.C. § 19-4903; LaBelle v. State, 130 Idaho 115,

19

117-18, 937 P.2d 427, 429-30 (Ct. App. 1997). In other words, the application must present or
20

be accompanied by admissible evidence supporting its allegations or the application will be
21
22

23

24

subject to dismissal. Id.
This evidence must be evidence that would be admissible at a hearing on the claims.

Bergv. State, 131 Idaho 517, 518-19, 960 P.2d 738, 739-40 (1998);!.C. 19-4903. Bare or

25

26
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conclusory allegations, unsubstantiated by any fact, are inadequate to entitle an applicant to an
1
2

evidentiary hearing. Id. at 121; Nguyen v. State, 126 Idaho 494,497, 887 P.2d 39, 42 (Ct. App.

3

1994). The petitioner must present evidence establishing a prima facie case as to each of the

4

elements that his claim rests upon. Pratt v. State, 134 Idaho 581, 583, 6 P.3d 831, 833 (2000)

5

(citingBergv. State. 131 Idaho 517, 518-19, 960 P.2d 738, 739-40 (1998)).

6
7

8

Each of Fortin's claims allege ineffective assistance of either trial counsel or appeal
counsel. To prevail on a post-conviction relief claim based on ineffective assistance of counsel
the applicant must establish the two prongs set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668,

9

104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984), to wit: (1) counsel's performance was deficient, and (2)
10

that deficiency prejudiced appellant's case. State v. Dunlap, 32773, 2013 WL 4539806 (Idaho
11

12
13

Aug. 27, 2013). In order to survive a motion for summary dismissal, the applicant must show
that there were genuine issues of material fact as to whether counsel's performance was deficient,

14

and whether that deficiency prejudiced appellant's case. Id (citing Kelly v. State, 149 Idaho 517,

15

522,236 P.3d 1277, 1282 (2010). To be deficient, trial counsel's performance must have fallen

16

below "an objective standard ofreasonableness." Id (quoting Dunlap v. State, 141 Idaho 50, 59,

17

106 P.3d 376,385 (2004). As for prejudice, the petitioner "must show a reasonable probability

18

that, but for the attorney's deficient performance, the outcome of the trial would have been

19

different." Id
20

Idaho Code § 19-4906 authorizes summary disposition of a petition for post-conviction
21

relief, either pursuant to motion of a party or upon the court's own initiative. Summary dismissal
22

23
24

of a petition is the procedural equivalent of summary judgment. The Court of Appeals has
explained:

25

26
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1

2
3

4
5
6

7

8
9

Idaho Code § 19-4906 authorizes summary dismissal of a petition for postconviction relief, either pursuant to motion of a party or upon the court's own
initiative. Summary dismissal of a petition is the procedural equivalent of
summary judgment under Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 56. A claim for postconviction relief will be subject to summary dismissal if the petitioner has not
presented evidence making a prima facie case as to each essential element of the
claims upon which the petitioner bears the burden of proof. Thus, summary
dismissal is permissible when the petitioner's evidence has raised no genuine
issue of material fact that, if resolved in the petitioner's favor, would entitle the
petitioner to the requested relief. If such a factual issue is presented, an
evidentiary hearing must be conducted.
Hoffman v. State, 153 Idaho 898,902,277 P.3d 1050, 1054 (Ct. App. 2012) (citations omitted).

Allegations contained in the petition are insufficient to prevent summary dismissal if they
are clearly disproved by the record of the original proceedings, or do not justify relief as a matter

10

oflaw. McKay v. State, 148 Idaho 567,569,225 P.3d 700, 702 (2010). Summary dismissal of
11

an application for post-conviction relief may be appropriate even where the state does not
12
13

controvert the petitioner's evidence because, as indicated above, the court is not required to

14

accept a petitioner's mere conclusory allegations, unsupported by admissible evidence. State v.

15

Lovelace, 140 Idaho 53, 61, 90 P.3d 278,286 (2003). Bare assertions and speculation,

16

unsupported by specific facts, do not suffice to show ineffectiveness of counsel. State v. Rendon,

17

107 Idaho 425,427,690 P.2d 360,362 (Ct.App.1984).

18
19

When considering a dismissal of a post-conviction relief application without an
evidentiary hearing, the court must determine whether a genuine issue of fact exists based on the

20

pleadings, depositions and admissions together with any affidavits on file which, if true, would
21

entitle the petitioner to relief. Rhoades v. State, 148 Idaho 247,250,220 P.3d 1066, 1069 (2008).
22

23

A. Plea Agreement

24
25
26
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Fortin claims that trial counsel was ineffective because he failed to inform Fortin that
1

2
3

proceeding to trial might allow the court to run the sentences in the 193 83 and 1947 5 case
consecutively. Fortin maintains that he would have accepted the plea agreement offered by the

4

state had counsel properly advised him of the possible punishment and consequences of

5

proceeding to trial, i.e., the Court could run the sentences consecutively. In other words, Fortin

6

argues that counsel failed to advise him of the best course of action.

7

8

As evidence that his attorney did not adequately inform him of the consequences of not
accepting the plea agreement, Fortin presents in his own affidavit that, but for Crafts

9

misrepresentation that he could prevail at a trial by jury, Fortin would have accepted the state's
10

plea agreement. Even if the Court is to accept Fortin's conclusory allegations about Crafts'
11

12
13

erroneous advice as true, Fortin cannot demonstrate any prejudice. because Fortin cannot
demonstrate that the Court would have accepted his plea as a binding plea agreement under

14

I.C.R. 11. As a general practice, this Court does not accept binding plea agreements. As part of

15

any plea colloquy, the Court routinely advise a defendant that the plea bargain is not binding on

16

the Court. If there was a plea agreement in the 19475 case, there is no evidence that the Court

17

would not have agreed to a binding plea agreement with a concurrent sentence recommendation.

18

As a consequence, Fortin cannot demonstrate any prejudice, since the Court would not have been

19

bound to follow the plea agreement.
20

B. Consolidation
21

Fortin argues that trial counsel Crafts' decision to not consolidate.the 19383 case and the
22

23
24

194 7 5 case against the wishes of Fortin constitutes ineffective assistance of counsel because
bifurcating the proceedings led to longer consecutive sentences. However, there is no evidence,

25

26
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and Fortin cannot demonstrate, that he received a more lengthy sentence because the cases were
1

2
3

4

not consolidated.

C. Motion in Limine
Fortin argues that Crafts' failure to file a motion in limine regarding Fortin's alleged gang

5

affiliation, or in the alternative to move for an immediate mistrial after a state's witness

6

referenced Fortin's gang affiliation constitutes deficient performance with a prejudicial result.

7

On direct appeal in the 19383 case, Fortin challenged the trial court's denial ofFortin's motion

8

for mistrial. The Court of Appeals held:

9

During cross-examination of the victim in this case, the following exchange occurred:
10
11

12
13

Q. Now, at some point, I assume-<lid you ever get a clear look at this
knife? It seems you like-you just say it was a shiny object.
A. Not a clear look, but I believe getting cut across the face and stabbed in
the neck and seeing a shine, you know it's a knife.

14

Q. So it's just your opinion that this was a knife?

15

A. I knew it was a knife. I couldn't determine which kind.

16

Q. How do you know it was a knife?

17

A. Because it punctured me in the neck and cut me across the face, and I
know most gang members carry those.

18
19

20
21
22

The district court immediately instructed the jury to disregard the victim's
reference to gang members; the victim completed his testimony; and, at the next
break in the trial proceedings, Fortin moved for a mistrial. Fortin argued that the
victim's reference to gang members led the jury to believe that Fortin was
potentially a member of a gang and was, therefore, extremely prejudicial. and too
inflammatory for a curative instruction. Fortin did not allege that the state planted
or otherwise invited the comment from the victim.
·
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e
1
2

3
4
5

We conclude that, given the open-ended nature of Fortin's question on crossexamination, the lack of a motion in limine requesting a pretrial order instructing
the state to admonish witnesses from referencing gang membership and the
immediate instruction by the district court to the jury to disregard the victim's
reference to gang members, Fortin has failed to show that the reference
constituted reversible error. Therefore, the district comi did not err by denying
F01iin's motion for a mistrial.

State v. Fortin, Docket No. 38069 (Ct. App. April 30, 2012). Fortin, relying on this passage,

6

argues that Crafts' failure to file a motion in limine resulted in the jury hearing a reference to

7

Fortin's alleged gang affiliation which was prejudicial. However, Fortin does not present

8

evidence of how the above quoted gang reference prejudiced him. The trial court immediately

9

instructed the jury to disregard the comment and the Court is to presume that the jury followed
10

these instructions. See State v. Kilby, 130 Idaho 747, 751, 947 P.2d 420, 424 (Ct.App.1997);
11

12
13

14
15

State v. Hudson, 129 Idaho 478,481, 927 P.2d 451,454 (Ct.App.1996). As such, Fortin has
failed to make a showing how he was prejudiced.

D. Mistrial
As to the failure of Crafts to immediately file for a mistrial following the witness's

16

reference to Fortin's gang affiliation, the record is clear that Crafts immediately objected and, at

17

the next break in the trial proceedings, moved for a mistrial. As such, there is no material

18

question of fact that Crafts' performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.

19

E. Witness Exclusion
20

On direct appeal in the 19383 case, Fortin argued that the trial court erred by excluding
21

the testimony of Casey Smith as a potential defense witness. Here, Fortin argues that Crafts'
22

23
24

failure to conduct a pretrial interview and subpoena Smith constitutes ineffective assistance of
counsel. On direct appeal, the Court of Appeals held:

25
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------

1

2
3

4
5

6
7

8
9

10

----------------------------------

Here, the evidence adduced at trial was overwhelming that Fortin used a knife in
the commission of the aggravated battery and, as a result, the victim suffered
significant injuries. Multiple witnesses described the altercation between Fortin
and the victim in this case. None testified that anyone other than Fortin and the
victim were involved in the physical fight. One witness testified that, during the
altercation between Fortin and the victim, the witness saw Fortin with a knife in
his hand and watched Fortin make a slashing motion and connect with the
victim's face. Another witness testified that she also saw Fortin holding something
in his hand during the altercation that she believed was a knife. An additional
witness testified that she saw Fortin make a slashing motion toward the victim and
saw something in Fortin's hand. The attending trauma surgeon testified that the
penetrating wound to the victim's chest was a stab wound, although he could not
say with certainty what caused the wound. However, the surgeon also testified that
the wound to the victim's face was consistent with a knife wound. Given the
weight of the evidence against Fortin in this case, we are convinced beyond a
reasonable doubt that there is no reasonable possibility that the lack of the
excluded evidence contributed to the verdict obtained against Fortin. Therefore,
even assuming the district court erred by excluding the testimony of the potential
defense witness, such error was harmless.

11

12
13

Id. (emphasis added).

Fortin has provided no evidence other than the bare assertion in his petition that

14

introducing this witness testimony would have resulted in a different outcome at trial. This

15

allegation is conclusory and not supported by the record. As such, Fortin has failed to

16

demonstrate prejudice.

17
18

F. Evidence of Flight
On direct appeal in the 19383 case, Fortin argued that the trial court erred when it

19

admitted evidence of his flight without conducting an appropriate balancing analysis under I.R.E.
20

404(b). See State v. Fortin, Docket No. 38069 (Ct. App. April 30, 2012). In this petition, Fortin
21

argues that Crafts' failure to object to Fortin's evidence of flight during trial constitutes
22
23

24

ineffective assistance of counsel. Fortin's allegation is not supported by the record. In affirming
the trial court's ruling to allow evidence of Fortin's flight, the Court of Appeals stated:

25

26

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER RE: STATE'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY
DISPOSITION - PAGE 11
.

000166

1

Here, with respect to identifying unfair prejudice. from the flight evidence,
Fortin's counsel stated at trial:

2

Two weeks ago ... I actually tried to get a pretrial ruling on this and
[the judge] wouldn't allow us to do it because he said he wanted the
trial judge to make the determination.

3

4

The reality of it is, if I file a motion, it is my obligation to set it for
notice of hearing. And the reality here is that this evidence coming in
now, without any prior notice from the prosecutor, is extremely
prejudicial. Obviously, it is prejudicial. It is inflammatory.

5
6
7

8

Id. The record clearly indicates that Crafts was vehemently against any evidence of Fortin's
flight being introduced at trial. Crafts attempted to receive a pretrial ruling and objected to its

9

introduction during trial. As such, Fortin has failed to raise a genuine issue of fact as to whether
10

Crafts' performance fell below an objective standard ofreasonableness for a criminal defense
11

12
13

attorney.

G. Verdict Form

14

Fortin argues that Crafts should have objected to the wording of the verdict form which

15

directed the jury to consider lesser included offenses if it found Fortin not guilty of Aggravated

16

Battery. Fortin asserts that including lesser offenses in the jury instructions destroyed his

17

presumption of innocence. Fortin's conclusory allegations are not supported by the record. Jury

18

Instruction No. C instructed the jury that Fortin is presumed innocent and the state has the burden

19

of proving his guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. The jury found Fortin guilty of Aggravated
20

Battery and the we~pons enhancement. Fortin has provided no evidence that Crafts' failure to
21

object to the inclusion of the lesser offenses fell below an objective standard ofreasonableness.
22
23

Fortin has also failed to make a showing that inclusion oflesser offenses created a reasonable

24
25
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probability that the outcome of the trial would have been different. As such, this allegation must
1

2
3

4

be dismissed.

H. Rule 35
Fortin alleges that trial counsel failed to file a Rule 35 motion2 on his behalf. It is

5

undisputed that Crafts did not file a Rule 35 motion. Fortin argues that he requested counsel to

6

file a Rule 35 motion and that counsel failed to do so.

7

8

"[I]n a post-conviction proceeding challenging an attorney's failure to pursue a motion in
the underlying criminal action, the court properly may consider the probability of success of the

9

motion in question in determining whether the attorney's inactivity constituted incompetent
10

performance." Hassett v. State, 127 Idaho 313,316,900 P.2d 221,225 (Ct. App. 1995) (citing
11

12
13

14
15
16
17

Huckv. State, 124 Idaho 155,158,857 P.2d 634,637 (Ct. App. 1993)).
As noted above, in order to prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel
an applicant must meet a two-pronged test. The applicant must show both that
counsel's performance was deficient and that the deficiency prejudiced the
applicant. Where the alleged deficiency is counsel's failure to file a ... motion, a
conclusion that the motion, if pursued, would not have been granted, is generally
detem1inative of both prongs of the test. If the motion lacked merit and would
have been denied, counsel ordinarily would not be deficient for failing to pursue
it, and, concomitantly, the petitioner could not have been prejudiced by the want
of its pursuit.

18

19

20
21

22
23

2 "The court may correct a sentence that has been imposed in an illegal manner within the time provided herein for
the reduction of sentence. The court may reduce a sentence within 120 days after the ti ling of a judgment of
conviction or within 120 days after the court releases retained jurisdiction. The court may also reduce a sentence
upon revocation of probation or upon motion made within fourteen (14) days after the filing of the order revoking
probation. Motions to correct or modify sentences under this rule must be filed within 120 days of the entry of the
judgment imposing sentence or order releasing retained jurisdiction and shall be considered and determined by the
court without the admission of additional testimony·and without oral argument, unless otherwise ordered by the
court in its discretion; .provided, however that no defendant may file more than one motion seeking a reduction of
sentence under this Rule." I.C.R. 35(b).
·
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I
Huck, 124 Idaho at 158-59, 857 P.2d at 637-38.
1

2
3

In this case, while Fortin may have presented evidence in support of the allegation of
deficient performance by not filing a Rule 35 motion, there is no evidence to show actual

4

prejudice resulting from the alleged deficiency. A Rule 35 motion is essentially a plea for

5

leniency and reconsideration. Fortin presents no additional facts which might have resulted in a

6

reduction to his original sentence. The maximum penalty for Aggravated Battery, a felony, is

7

fifteen (15) years in prison. Idaho Code§ 18-908. The penalty for Use of a Deadly Weapon

8

During the Commission of a Crime, an enhancement, increases the maximum sentence

9

authorized for the Aggravated Battery conviction by fifteen (15) years. LC. § 19-2520.
10

Accordingly, the maximum penalty for Aggravated Battery with the enhancement is thirty (30)
11

12
13

years. The sentence imposed is within the statutory bounds.
At the time the Court imposed Fortin's sentence, it considered all relevant and required

14

sentencing factors, see Toohill, 103 Idaho at 565; Reinke, .103 Idaho at 771, and imposed a

15

reasonable and appropriate sentence for Fortin's crimes. The Court does not find that Fortin's

16

sentence is excessive. After a careful and thorough review of the record in the 19383 case, the

17

pre-sentence report, victim impacts and the criminal history of Fortin, the Court remains

18

convinced that the sentence was appropriate when imposed and remains reasonable. Fortin was

19

convicted of a very serious and violent crime. The Court has concerns regarding Fortin' s
20

apparent lack of remorse for his crimes and has serious concerns over trusting Fortin in the
21

community. As such, the Court would not have granted a reduction in the prisoner's sentence
22
23
24

even if a timely Rule 35 motion had been filed. For that reason, Fortin cannot demonstrate
prejudice.
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I. Appeal
1

2
3
4

Lastly, Fortin alleges that appeal counsel, Greg Silvey, failed to "federalize" any issued
on direct appeal and did not object to errors in the transcript of the February 4, 2011 restitution
hearing. Both of these allegations are conclusory and must be dismissed.

Conclusion

5
6
7

8

As explained above, the Court will grant summary dismissal of all claims that trial
counsel was ineffective. Counsel for the State is directed to submit an appropriate form of
judgment.

9

IT IS SO ORDERED.
10

Dated this_/_/_ day May, 2015.
11

12

13

PatrikH. Owen
District Judge

14

15
16
17

18
19

20
21
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23
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
1
2

3

I, Christopher D. Rich, the undersigned authority, do hereby certify that I have mailed, by
United States Mail, a true and correct copy of the within instrument as notice pursuant to Rule
77(d) I.R.C.P .. to each of the attorneys ofrecord in this cause in envelopes addressed as follows:

4
5

6
7

Ada County Prosecutor
Interdepartmental Mail
Ada County Public Defender
Interdepartmental Mail

8
9
10
11

12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24

Date:

~1,l ~ }0

By

I
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JAN M. BENNETTS
Ada County Prosecuting Attorney

JUN 1 2 2015
Jonathan M. Medema
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney
ISB No.: 5623
200 West Front Street, Rm. 3191
Boise, Idaho 83702
Telephone: 287-7700

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

CODY JAMES FORTIN

)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Petitioner,
Vs.
State of Idaho,

R~.

j"'l,{J.~i\

~ f...-t> tl Ol))S;

Case No. CV PC 13 08285

JUDGMENT

)

It is the JudgrMnt of this Court that all of petitioner's claims for postconviction relief contained within his application for post-conviction relief, Be and
Hereby are finally DISMISSED.

JUDGMENT - Page I
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NO _________-i:iii:n"-;--:-------At.1. _ _ _ _ _ _
l0

F11.~~--L..

ADA COUNTY PUBLIC DEFENDER
Attorney for Petitioner-Appellant

JUN 15 2015
CHRISl~~Pn.:~ 0. RICH, CliJrk
By "'"NT!AuO BARRIOS
IY.=PUTV

D. David Lorello, Jr.
Deputy Public Defender
200 West Front Street, Suite 1107
Boise, Idaho 83 702
Telephone: (208) 287-7400
Facsimile: (208) 287-7409

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
CODY J. FORTIN,
Case No. CV-PC-2013-08285

Petitioner-Appellant,
NOTICE OF APPEAL

vs.

STATE OF IDAHO,
Respondent-Respondent.

TO: THE ABOVE-NAMED RESPONDENT, STATE OF IDAHO, AND THE CLERK
OF THE ABOVE-ENTITLED COURT
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT:
1) The above-named Appellant appeals against the above-named Respondent to the
Idaho Supreme Court from the final decision and order entered against him in
the above-entitled action on May 12, 2015, the Honorable Patrick H. Owen,
District Judge, presiding.
2) That the party has a right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court, and the
judgments or orders described in paragraph 1 above are appealable orders under
and pursuant to I.A.R. 1l(c)(l-10).
3) A preliminary statement of the issues on appeal, which the Appellant then
intends to assert in the appeal, provided any such list of issues on appeal shall not
prevent the Appellant from asserting other issues on appeal is:
a) Did the district court err by dismissing Petitioner's Petition for PostConviction Relief?
NOTICE OF APPEAL

1
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4) Reporter's Transcript. The Appellant requests the preparation of the entire
reporter's standard transcript as defined by I.A.R. 25(c). The Appellant also
requests the preparation of the additional portions of the reporter's transcript:
a) Evidentiary Hearing held March 17, 2015 (Court Reporter: Kasey
Redlich, Estimated pages: 50).
5) Clerk's Record. The Appellant requests the standard clerk's record pursuant to
I.A.R. 28(b)(l). In addition to those documents automatically included under
I.A.R. 28(b)(l}, the Appellant also requests that any briefs, statements or
affidavits considered by the court, and memorandum opinions or decisions of the
court be included in the Clerk's Record.
6) I certify:
a) That a copy of this Notice of Appeal has been served on the Court
Reporter(s) mentioned in paragraph 4 above;
b) That the Appellant is exempt from paying the estimated fee for the
preparation of the record because the Appellant is indigent (I.C. §§ 313220, 31-3220A, I.A.R. 24(e));
c) That there is no appellate filing fee since this is an appeal in a criminal
case (I.C. §§ 31-3220, 31-3220A, I.A.R. 23(a)(10));
d) That Ada County will be responsible for paying for the reporter's
transcript(s}, as the client is indigent (1.C. §§ 31-3220, 31-3220A, I.A.R.
24(e)); and
e) That service has been made upon all parties required to be served pursuant
to I.A.R. 20.
I 11-,.
DATED this_~_ day of June 2015.

D. DAVID LORELLO, JR.
Attorney for Petitioner-Appellant

NOTICE OF APPEAL
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this liday of June 2015, I mailed (served) a true and
correct copy of the within instrument to:
Idaho Attorney General
Criminal Division
Joe R. Williams Bldg., 4th Fir.
Statehouse Mail
Idaho State Appellate Public Defender
PO Box 2816
Boise, ID 83701
Kasey Redlich
Court Reporter
Interdepartmental Mail
Jonathan Medema
Ada County Prosecutor's Office
Interdepartmental Mail

Katie Van Vorhis

NOTICE OF APPEAL
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FILED

P.M. _ _ __

JUN 1 8 2015

~¥
ADA COUNTY PUBLIC DEFENDER
Attorney for Petitioner-Appellant
D. David Lorello, Jr.
Deputy Public Defender
200 West Front Street, Suite 1107
Boise, Idaho 83702
Telephone: (208) 287-7400
Facsimile: (208) 287-7409
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
CODY J. FORTIN,
Case No. CV-PC-2013-08285

Petitioner-Appellant,
ORDER APPOINTING STATE
APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER
ON DIRECT APPEAL

vs.

STATE OF IDAHO,
Respondent-Respondent.
The Petitioner has elected to pursue a direct appeal in the above-entitled matter. The
Petitioner being indigent and having heretofore been represented by the Ada County Public
Defender's Office in the District Court, the Court finds that, under these circumstances,
appointment of appellate counsel is justified. The Idaho State Appellate Public Defender
shall be appointed to represent the above-named Petitioner in all matters pertaining to the
direct appeal.
IT rs so ORDERED.
DATED this~ day of June 2015.

PATRl:CKH. OWEN
District Judge

ORDER APPOINTING STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER ON DIRECT APPEAL
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CERTIFIC ATE OF MAILING
I, CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, the undersigned authority, do hereby certify that I have
mailed one copy of the Order Appointing State Appellate Public Defender on Direct Appeal
as notice pursuant to the Idaho Rules to each of the parties of record in this case in
envelopes addressed as follows:
Idaho Attorney General
Criminal Division
Joe R. Williams Bldg., 4th Fir.
Statehouse Mail
Idaho State Appellate Public Defender
POBox28 16
Boise, ID 83701
Jonathan Medema
Ada County Prosecutor's Office
Interdepartmental Mail
Ada County Public Defender's Office
Attn: Katie Van Vorhis
Interdepartmental Mail

Date:~{g /_,__/
<i:.............,.p5
__

ORDER APPOINTING STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER ON DIRECT APPEAL
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No._
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A.M,------_:~

P.M.&: l.<,_,..___

AUG 11 2015
CHRISTOPHfr:-.

TO:

CLERK OF THE COURT

IDAHO SUPREME COURT .

451 WEST STATE STREET, BOISE, IDAHO

CODY J. FORTIN,
Petitioner-Appellant,
vs.
STATE OF IDAHO,
Respondent-Appellee.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

By KE

n D. RICH
LLEWEGEN
,
DEPUry

ER

83702

Supreme Court
Docket No. 4334

Case No. CV-PC-2013-08285
NOTICE OF TRANSCRIPT
LODGING

NOTICE OF TRANSCRIPT LODGED
Notice is her·eby given that on August 11th, 2015, I
lodged transcript(s) of the following hearing(s):
Evidentiary Hearing on March 17, 2015, of 12 pages;
a total of 12 pages; for the above-referenced appeal with

the District Court Clerk of the County of Ada in the Fourth
Judicial District.

Date
Certified Court Reporter
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH WDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
CODY JAMES FORTIN,
Supreme Court Case No. 43334
Petitioner-Appellant,
CERTIFICATE OF EXHIBITS

vs.

STATE OF IDAHO,
Respondent.
I, CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk of the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District of
the State of Idaho in and for the County of Ada, do hereby certify:
There were no exhibits offered for identification or admitted into evidence during the
course of this action.
IN WI1NESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the said
Court this 12th day of August, 2015.
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
CODY JAMES FORTIN,
Supreme Court Case No. 43334
Petitioner-Appellant,
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
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STATE OF IDAHO,
Respondent.
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CLERK'S RECORD AND REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT
to each of the Attorneys of Record in this cause as follows:
STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
CODY JAMES FORTIN,
Supreme Court Case No. 43334
Petitioner-Appellant,
CERTIFICATE TO RECORD

vs.
STATE OF IDAHO,
Respondent.

I, CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk of the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District of the
State of Idaho; in and for the County of Ada, do hereby certify that the above and foregoing record in
the above-entitled cause was compiled under my direction and is a true and correct record of the
pleadings and documents that are automatically required under Rule 28 of the Idaho Appellate Rules,
as well as those requested by Counsel.
I FURTHER CERTIFY, that the Notice of Appeal was filed in the District Court on the
15th day of June, 2015.
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